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Abstract 
 
Through eight experiments this thesis investigated the divergence in children’s 
abilities in the domain of tool making. Despite being excellent tool manufacturers 
following full instruction, children displayed great difficulty in innovating novel tools to 
solve problems.  Experiments 1 to 3 found four-to-seven-year-olds’ tool-innovation 
difficulty to be a robust phenomenon that extended to new tasks requiring different tools 
made by a variety of methods and materials. Experiments 3 and 4 aimed to discover 
whether some tool-innovation tasks are harder for children than others. Together these 
experiments suggested that the difficulty of tool innovation is due to the type of 
transformation required. Experiments 5 to 8 investigated why children find tool innovation 
so difficult. Experiments 5 and 6 ruled out singular executive functions as limiting factors 
on children’s performance. Experiments 7 and 8 found that young children have great 
difficulty in generating and coordinating the components of a problem even if aspects of 
the task are highlighted for them. Overall this thesis led to the conclusion that tool-
innovation difficulty is due the ill-structured nature of the task. Additionally this thesis 
provides new definitions and frameworks with which to study tool-related behaviour that 
will benefit both the developmental and comparative literatures.  
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1.0 Overview 
Human life is dominated by the use of tools. From ‘simple’ tools such as hammers 
and pencils to more complex ones such as computers and mobile phones, life as we know 
it would not exist if we had not evolved such a tool-rich culture. Children build a vast 
knowledge and experience of the tools that surround them from a very young age. 
However, to get to the tool-rich culture we currently experience someone must have 
invented and made those tools in the first place. Surprisingly there has been very little 
investigation into the tool-making abilities of modern humans. This thesis presents the first 
series of studies to investigate tool making in young children. The findings of this thesis 
challenge the assumption that humans are experts in all aspects of tool-related behaviour. 
Drawing on definitions and evidence from the comparative literature this thesis introduces 
a new way of thinking about tool making and provides new definitions and ways of 
categorising tool behaviour that benefit both the developmental and comparative 
literatures. 
In this introductory chapter I will first review human children’s tool-using 
behaviours. I will then review evidence for tool making in the comparative literature 
before discussing the limited evidence for human children’s tool-making difficulties. I will 
go on to review areas of the literature that may give some indication for the roots of 
children’s difficulties. Finally I will outline the studies included in this thesis. 
1.1 Tool Use 
1.1.1 Children’s Tool Use 
 Children have a vast aptitude for learning about tools. Tool use is observed in 
infants as young as 9 months old who have been shown to pull a cloth towards themselves 
to retrieve a toy placed on top (Willatts, 1984). The most commonly used tool in early life 
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is the spoon (Barrett, Davis & Needham, 2007), and as such spoon use has been widely 
studied. Connolly and Dalgleish (1989) conducted a longitudinal study investigating the 
development of infant spoon use. They found that spoon use improved due to the 
emergence of handedness, convergence on a singular grip type and increased visual 
monitoring which helped the infant improve their control over the spoon. 
It is proposed that our cognitive system facilitates tool learning due to the ability to 
represent tools in terms of functions (Hernik & Csibra, 2009). From a young age children 
think about tools in terms of the outcomes they can achieve. Children strive to learn as 
much as possible about the functions of tools and artefacts. Any information that they are 
unable to learn directly for themselves, children gain from observing others. In this section 
on children’s tool use I will first review the literature on children’s function learning 
before assessing what we know about children’s ability to learn about tools from others. 
 
1.1.2 Children’s Learning about Functions 
 The majority of research reviewed in this section refers to artefacts in general 
rather than tools specifically. An artefact is any man-made object, whereas the definition 
of a tool is an ‘unattached environmental object…(used)…to alter more efficiently the 
form, position or condition of another object’ (B. Beck, 1980, pg. 10). Tools are therefore 
artefacts that have specific functions. 
Children understand that artefacts are for something from a very young age. This 
functional understanding is not simply linked to actions, but exists independently (Hernik 
& Csibra, 2009). Children understand that an artefact has a function even if it is not 
currently being used. They do not need to see someone using an artefact to know that it 
must have some use. All artefacts are expected to have functions and children are not 
satisfied until they have learnt what they are. This has been demonstrated in children as 
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young as 2 years old, who after asking ‘what is it?’ were more satisfied with an answer 
about function than they were with merely a label (Kemler Nelson, Egan & Holt, 2004). In 
conditions where an artefact was labelled only with its name, children asked more follow-
up questions to try and discover the artefact’s function. This drive to learn about artefacts 
and their functions is adaptive as it allows us to behave in efficient ways. 
 Adults are known to take a ‘design stance’ (Dennett, 1987) when considering the 
functions of artefacts, meaning they relate functions to the historical origins of artefacts, 
namely the intentions of the inventor/designer (Chaigneau, Castillo, & Martinez, 2008).  
Bloom (1996) suggested this was due to artefacts being the manifestation of intention. 
Artefacts are created to have specific functions intended by the designer. Other factors 
such as current use, context and appearance have been shown to be important, but adults’ 
categorisation of artefacts is predominantly determined by the original intended design 
(Kelemen, 1999; German & Johnson, 2002).  Having a ‘design stance’ is adaptive and 
efficient as it ensures that adults know which object they will need to use to perform a 
specific task without having to think through their actions each time to see if something 
will work.  However, this relationship with objects causes adults to have functional 
fixedness (Duncker, 1945), in that they assign a function to an object and then find it 
difficult to use the object for any other means.  
There is some debate as to when children adopt the design stance approach towards 
objects, but it is argued to be around 6 years of age (Defeyter & German, 2003; German & 
Defeyter, 2000). Defeyter and German (2003) demonstrated functional fixedness in 
children from the  age of 6. These children were less likely to choose the only object able 
to push a toy out of a tube, a pencil, when its function as a writing implement was 
demonstrated than when no demonstrations occurred. Below this age there was no 
difference between the two conditions. Defeyter and German concluded that below age 6 
children’s views on object function are based on the current goals of the user rather than 
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the designed for function. More recent work with 4- to 6-year olds (Defeyter, Hearing & 
German, 2009), i.e. before functional fixedness becomes established, has shown that 
judgements about function are based on current goals, but judgements about category are 
more likely to be based on the designers intentions, indicating the beginnings of ‘design 
stance’. 
 Casler and Kelemen (2005) have also investigated children’s approach towards 
object functions before functional fixedness occurs, and found that children need only have 
one experience to deem that an object is ‘for’ a particular function. They went on to test 
younger children and found that although 2-year-olds quickly learn that a tool has a 
particular function, children did not readily make exclusive object categories at this age 
(Casler & Kelemen, 2007). Although 2-year-olds will use a tool for a particular function, 
they will happily use that tool for a second function. Casler, Terziyan and Greene’s (2009) 
recent research  has shown that children as young as 2 years of age show evidence that 
they strongly believe there to be right and wrong ways to act with objects. For both 
familiar and novel objects children protested when a puppet used the object in a non-
demonstrated way. Jaswal (2006) provides further evidence that young children (3- to 4- 
years) have the beginnings of design stance as they are more likely to name an object with 
an obviously ‘wrong’ name if they are told the person made it rather than found it. This 
shows evidence of naming taking the inventor’s intentions into consideration. 
In sum, humans have adapted to learn about the functions of artefacts from an 
extremely young age. This adaption allows children to navigate the world and its artefacts 
quickly and efficiently. This may however come at a cost if children have set ideas about 
what artefacts are for and become unable to use them in ways other than their intended use. 
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1.1.3 Children’s Social Learning of Tools 
When children are unable to learn how artefacts function for themselves they look 
to others for this information. Gardiner, Bjorklund, Greif and Gray (2012) have recently 
demonstrated that learning about tools from others is much more efficient than exploring 
objects and discovering functions for oneself. There has been a vast amount of research 
investigating how children learn to use tools from others. Children learn to use tools from 
an extremely young age (Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989; Meltzoff, 1995; McGuigan & 
Whiten, 2009) and in this section I will review the literature detailing the methods used by 
children to learn about tools. 
Early research classified any type of behaviour replication as imitation, but more 
recently different types of copying behaviour have been more precisely defined. Want and 
Harris (2002) proposed five types of social learning: local enhancement, stimulus 
enhancement, emulation, mimicry and imitation. Local enhancement was first defined by 
Thorpe (1956) and refers to an increased interest in the location where an action has taken 
place. Stimulus enhancement (Spence, 1937) more specifically refers to an increased 
interest in the object on which an action was carried out. Local and stimulus enhancement 
only give the observer information that there is something of interest about the location or 
object. The observer must engage with the object to work out for themselves what the goal 
is and how they can achieve it.  Emulation (Tomasello, 1990) refers to when an observer 
learns the properties of objects and the causal relationships between them. Using this 
information the observer is able to adopt his or her own strategy to achieve the goal. 
Whiten and Ham (1992) defined goal emulation, and used it to refer to instances when an 
observer learns about a goal but then uses their own means to achieve it. Mimicry 
(Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993) refers to instances when an observer replicates a 
model’s actions without any insight in to why they might be effective or even what goal 
those actions might serve. Lastly, imitation (Tomasello, 1990) refers to the recognition and 
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reproduction of a goal and the specific actions required to bring about that goal. Two types 
of imitation have been suggested; blind imitation refers to the replication of actions and 
goals without any understanding of the affordances or causal mechanisms involved, 
whereas insightful imitation refers to when one learns about the affordances and causal 
mechanisms via the imitative process. Most developmental tool research has focused on 
the imitation-emulation distinction, there is very little research regarding mimicry, 
stimulus and local enhancement.  
There are differing views on children’s motivations to copy others’ behaviours, and 
children’s motivations are thought to change through development. Young children are 
thought to be motivated to imitate for cognitive reasons, namely to learn about causal 
events (Uzgiris, 1981). As infants are interested in learning how the world works, under 
the age of 2 they often emulate end results when a model’s actions appear to contain 
causally irrelevant behaviours (Nielsen, 2006). However, infants returned to imitating full 
actions if they could see that extra actions are justified (Gergely, Bekkering & Király, 
2002). 
 As children get older their motivations for imitating others change. By the age of 2 
as well as imitating for cognitive advancement children begin to imitate for social reasons. 
By 18 months infants are more likely to imitate a model if they were behaving socially 
rather than aloof (Nielsen, 2006) and if the actions to be copied are socially cued (Brugger, 
Lariviere, Mumme & Bushnell, 2007). Infants become more faithful at imitation with age 
and their desire to be sociable leads them to imitate all aspects of a model’s behaviour. 
Killen and Uzgiris (1981) found that infants were willing to imitate nonsense actions in 
order to keep the game going and continue their interaction with the model. Children 
become such faithful imitators that their behaviours often become maladaptive regarding 
the endstate they are trying to achieve. Children have been shown to imitate all aspects of a 
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model’s behaviour even when they are obviously causally irrelevant; this phenomenon has 
been termed over-imitation (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, Young & Keil, 2007). 
Horner and Whiten (2005) tested whether 3-to-4-year-olds would selectively use 
emulation or imitation depending on the causal information available to them. Children 
watched as an experimenter carried out relevant and irrelevant actions with a tool on 
opaque and transparent puzzle boxes to retrieve a reward. Horner and Whiten suggested 
that the children possessed the required causal knowledge to understand which actions 
were relevant. Based on this they suggested that children should imitate all actions in the 
opaque condition when the relevance of the actions could not be observed, but should 
emulate in the transparent condition when it should be obvious that the actions were not 
needed. This was the pattern of behaviour observed in a group of chimpanzees tested on 
the same task. However, the children in this study were shown to imitate in both 
conditions, a finding consistent with previous research (Nagell, Olguin & Tomasello, 
1993; Whiten et al., 1996). Horner and Whiten suggested that children’s tendency to 
imitate obviously irrelevant actions could be due to them focusing on actions rather than 
goals, and/or could be due to children interpreting the actions as intentional. The actions 
were presented three times and so would look purposeful to an observer. Horner and 
Whiten’s (2005) findings were replicated by McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn and Horner (2007) 
who confirmed the presence of over-imitation in a larger sample of 3-year-olds and 
extended the findings to include 5-year-olds. Surprisingly the older children were found to 
be higher fidelity over-imitators than the 3-year-olds suggesting that imitation might be an 
adaptive strategy which is more frequently adopted with age. 
There is some debate about the reasons underlying over-imitation in children. 
Lyons, Young and Keil (2007) proposed three potential explanations for over-imitation. 
First, children may over-imitate to satisfy social motivations, meaning they are more 
interested in the imitative interaction than the actual action being copied. Second, children 
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may over-imitate because they view the actions of the model as being intentional. Third, 
imitation may occur due to it becoming habitual. Through a series of manipulations Lyons 
et al. investigated these opposing suggestions. Children continued to over-imitate despite 
attention being brought to ‘silly’ actions and despite the experimenter leaving the room. 
This suggests that children were not over-imitating to satisfy social motivations. Over-
imitation persisted despite children being asked to quickly check the apparatus worked, a 
manipulation designed to rule out children’s assumption that they are supposed to copy the 
experimenter and to overcome any reluctance to contradict the model’s actions. Lyons et 
al. concluded that children over-imitate in order to learn causal relations; imitation 
becomes automatic in children leading to them mis-encoding actions as being causally 
relevant even if there is evidence to suggest otherwise. Lyons et al. concluded this on the 
basis of their final manipulation where children stopped imitating if the actions to be 
imitated occurred on one half of an object that was not connected to the other half 
containing the reward. When the model’s actions clearly violated the contact principle 
children did not encode them as causally relevant and so did not copy them. 
Simpson and Riggs (2011) argued that children’s over-imitation cannot easily be 
explained as a desire to learn about causal mechanisms. They manipulated the order of 
presentation for relevant and irrelevant actions and tested whether children would imitate 
or emulate in a puzzle box task after either a short or long delay. They found that 3-and-4-
year-olds continued to imitate irrelevant actions even if they occurred after the reward had 
been retrieved, suggesting that children may imitate for social reasons rather than to learn 
about causality. They provide further evidence against the causal argument for imitation as 
children stopped imitating irrelevant actions after a delay, suggesting that irrelevant 
actions were not encoded as well as relevant actions. 
 Whatever the mechanism underlying it, imitation has proven to be adaptive for 
humans. It is a useful method that can be used to learn new skills. Over evolution humans 
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have learnt to be faithful imitators as this ensures that the fruitful products of other’s 
knowledge are transmitted between individuals and generations. Imitation ensures that as 
well as the goals and end-products being transmitted the methods of how to achieve these 
are also shared. If only the end result was known it would take a lot more effort and be 
much more cognitively demanding to realise the means to achieve the end result for 
oneself. Social learning is clearly important for the spread of culture amongst a group; 
however, for a culture to evolve there must be innovations. In turn, these innovations must 
spread via transmission for progression to occur.  
 Research in to children’s tool behaviour has predominantly investigated the ability 
to use tools. To my knowledge there have been only two studies investigating children’s 
ability to make tools. This is a surprising gap in the literature as tool making is a vital 
component of human evolution, for humans to possess the tool-rich culture that we 
currently experience someone must have made the tools to begin with. The current interest 
in human cultural evolution is focused on the social learning of tool use, but to fully 
understand how human tool culture evolved we need to know about tool making. The 
evolution of tools requires the initial innovation of a tool and then social learning within a 
group to spread information about how to make the newly innovated tool. To understand 
about tool making we need to discover how innovations are achieved. What skills are 
required to invent new tools? Under what conditions do innovations occur? Second, once 
someone has discovered how to make a tool how does this knowledge spread amongst a 
group. It seems likely that the skills involved in making tools would spread through social 
learning in a similar way to knowledge about tool use, but we are currently lacking the 
evidence to support this suggestion. 
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1.2 Tool Making 
As mentioned above there is very little research into the tool making abilities of 
modern humans. In the developmental literature there have been only two published 
studies investigating children’s tool making, and so first I will look to research into tool 
making in the comparative literature, before discussing the limited research on human 
children’s tool making. 
 
1.2.1 Non-human Animal Tool Making 
As with the tool-related research investigating human children’s abilities research 
into animal tool behaviour has predominantly focused on abilities to use tools. Tool use 
has been reported in a wide range of animals from invertebrates to the great apes 
(Schumaker, Walker & Beck, 2011). Tool use is most commonly associated with obtaining 
food, as evidenced by the nut-cracking behaviours of capuchin monkeys (Ottoni & Manu, 
2001), gorillas (Owen, 2005) and chimpanzees (Sugiyama, 1989), who used stones to 
pound open nuts. Other food related tool use includes the use of twigs, feathers or shells to 
probe into cracks by woodpecker finches (Merlen & Davis-Merlen, 2000) and 
observations of octopus dropping coral into open oysters to prevent them from closing 
(Lane, 1957). Animals have also been reported to use tools for other means such as 
protection or comfort. Hermit crabs have been reported to carry anemones to protect 
themselves against predators (Ross, 1971). When the crabs retreat into their shells the 
anemones block the shell entrance and prevent predators from gaining access. Elephants 
have been widely reported to brandish branches to rid themselves of flies, a practice 
commonly known as fly switching (Hart & Hart, 1994; Hart, Hart, McCoy & Sarath, 
2001). As these observations clearly demonstrate, non-human animal tool use is a 
widespread phenomenon with reports of tool-using behaviours steadily increasing. 
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Recently there has been growing interest in non-human animals’ abilities to make 
tools. In his book cataloguing animal tool behaviour Benjamin Beck (1980) defined four 
different modes of tool making. The most commonly observed mode of tool making is 
termed detach, and refers to the making of a tool by the severation of a fixed attachment, 
such that the severed material is used as a tool. A common example of detachment is when 
an animal may break a branch off a tree and use that branch as a tool. Chimpanzees 
(Sugiyama, 1989) and orang-utans (Kaplan & Rogers, 1994) have been observed to detach 
branches and use them to repel insects or to keep cool.  
Subtract refers to the removal of parts of an object so that the remaining core can 
be used as a tool. The most common example of subtraction is the removal of twigs and 
leaves from a branch so that a long smooth core is left. Orang-utans have been observed to 
subtract leaves and twigs from a branch to leave a sharp tool used for peeling fruits (van 
Schaik & Fox, 1994). Bonobos subtract leaves and bark from branches to leave a core that 
can be used to fish for termites in termite mounds (Parish, 1994). 
 Add/combine refers to when two or more objects are connected together to form a 
tool. It is very rare to see this form of tool making in the wild, but it has been observed in 
the laboratory (see Price, Lambeth, Schapiro & Whiten, 2009; Bania, Harris, Kinsley & 
Boysen, 2009 for adding/combining in chimpanzees).  
The final mode of tool making is reshaping; this refers to when a material is 
fundamentally restructured in to a new shape that can be used to serve as a tool. An 
example of reshaping is the crumpling of leaves so that they more usefully serve as a 
sponge tool. Sponge making has been observed in orang-utans (van Schaik et al., 2003) 
and bonobos (Walraven, van Elsacker & Verheyen, 1993) amongst many other species. 
Another form of reshaping occurs when chimpanzees (Sugiyama, 1985) chew the ends of 
sticks to make brush like tools which are used for termite fishing. 
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Much of the literature on non-human animal tool making is very descriptive and 
simply catalogues tool-making behaviour seen in the wild (see Schumaker et al., 2011 for 
a recent catalogue of animal tool making). More recent research has started to investigate 
causal understanding in animals and has set out to find the limits of non-human animal 
tool capacity. It is not surprising that the majority of evidence for non-human tool making 
comes from our nearest relatives – non-human primates. As such I will begin by discussing 
recent advances in the understanding of non-human primate tool making, before going on 
to discuss the remarkable tool-making abilities of animals less closely related to ourselves. 
Bania et al. (2009) investigated the ability of chimpanzees to make tools by either 
assembling or disassembling materials. Chimpanzees were presented with a piece of dowel 
into the ends of which two shorter pieces of dowel could be inserted to make an H-shape. 
In a hook retrieval task chimpanzees were presented with the separated materials and were 
required to construct a hook tool to pull a reward towards them. In a probing task 
chimpanzees were presented with the H-shaped tool and were required to remove one of 
the cross-pieces to create a long stick capable of probing into a narrow tube to retrieve 
their reward. B. Beck (1980) would label these tool-making techniques adding and 
subtracting respectively. As noted above the adding method of tool making is rarely seen 
in the wild and as such this is one of very few studies to demonstrate non-human primate 
abilities for this tool-making mode. Bania et al.’s study was a replication of research 
carried out with chimpanzees by Povinelli et al. (2000). Povinelli et al. found low success 
rates for chimpanzees for both adding and subtracting tasks, these findings were 
inconsistent with the reported tool-making abilities observed in the wild. In contrast Bania 
et al.’s chimpanzees performed extremely well on both types of task, although the 
subtraction task was found to be easier for the chimpanzees to achieve than the adding 
task. This was not surprising as subtraction is the more common form of tool making seen 
in chimpanzees. Bania and colleagues suggest the difference between their results and 
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those of Povinelli et al. to be due to the environment in which the chimpanzees had been 
reared. Povinelli et al.’s chimpanzees had not had opportunity to explore raw materials in 
their early development, and were also only given a short amount of time to interact with 
the materials prior to the start of the study. The chimpanzees were therefore not given the 
best chances possible to help them with the tasks. Together these studies indicate the effect 
that enculturation could have on non-human primate performance on tool-related tasks. 
Visalberghi, Fragaszy and Savage-Rumbaugh (1995) tested the abilities of 
capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees, bonobos and orang-utans on tasks requiring the retrieval 
of a reward from a horizontal tube. After familiarisation with a simple condition where a 
single straight stick was needed to retrieve the reward participants were then given two 
complex conditions requiring the making of a tool. In one condition participants were 
presented with a bundle of sticks tied together with tape or an elastic band. The bundle as a 
whole was too wide to fit into the tube and so participants were required to detach a single 
stick from the bundle. In the second condition participants were presented with an H-
shaped stick, a long stick with two shorter sticks at each end. These shorter sticks 
prevented the tool from entering the tube and as such participants needed to subtract them 
to make a functional tool. The great apes passed all of the tasks with ease. They never tried 
to insert the bundle as a whole and although they made more errors on the H-shaped stick 
task they quickly refined their behaviour and became quicker and more accurate over 
trials. The capuchins also managed to solve both of the tasks within the given timeframes, 
however they made many more errors than the great apes, and these errors did not reduce 
over trial blocks. Visalberghi and colleagues concluded that success alone does not mean 
causal comprehension. The fact that the errors the capuchins made did not decrease over 
time shows that they did not gain any understanding about the task. They did get quicker 
over time suggesting that they were making associations, i.e. if I put this stick in here I will 
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get the reward, but they did not have any causal understanding about how this was 
achieved. 
In the last decade corvid research has been at the forefront of investigations into 
non-human tool making. The remarkable abilities of New Caledonian crows, a member of 
the corvid family, have been studied in the wild and in the laboratory. In the wild New 
Caledonian crows have been reported to make hook tools to retrieve grubs from holes. The 
birds have demonstrated two methods for making hooks, both using a subtraction method 
of tool manufacture. The first method New Caledonian crows use is to use their beak to 
shape pandanus leaves into hooks (Hunt & Gray, 2003). The second method involves 
twigs and is achieved by breaking off parts of a twig in specific areas to leave behind a 
strong hooked tool (Hunt, 1996; Hunt & Gray, 2004). 
Building on these natural behaviours New Caledonian crow hook use and 
manufacture was tested in the laboratory. Weir, Chappell & Kacelnik (2002) originally set 
out to test whether New Caledonian crows could choose between a hooked wire tool and a 
straight wire tool to retrieve a bucket containing a food reward from a tall vertical tube. 
Shortly into the experiment the male crow removed the hook tool and so the female subject 
was left with the straight wire. The female crow, Betty, spontaneously bent the wire in to a 
hook and used it to retrieve the bucket and her reward. The participants had had prior 
experience with the apparatus but the only opportunity they had to bend pliable materials 
was with pipecleaners a year before the current experiment, and this experience had only 
been for one hour. Based on this remarkable observation of spontaneous tool making, the 
experimenters continued to give Betty only the straight wire with which to solve the task. 
Betty continued to make hook tools using a variety of different techniques. For example on 
one trial she held the wire with her feet whilst pulling the other end upwards with her beak, 
whilst on another trial she pushed the wire into the sticky tape around the bottom of the 
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apparatus and then pulled the other end away with her beak. Betty provided the first 
evidence in corvids of innovative tool-making methods with novel materials. 
Bird and Emery (2009) replicated this study with four rooks and found that they 
were all successful at bending hooks to retrieve the reward. Three of the rooks successfully 
manufactured a hook from straight wire on their first attempt. Unlike Betty the rooks had 
not seen a functional wire hook in the context of the hook-making task. However, the 
rooks had used other hooks made of different material to retrieve buckets from the same 
apparatus. The rooks therefore had some indication of the type of tool that the task 
required. 
Following on from evidence of successful hook making Weir and Kacelnik (2006) 
set about discovering the extent of Betty’s abilities, and investigated how much Betty 
understood about the physical causality underlying her tool making. First, Weir and 
Kacelnik presented Betty with the same hook-making apparatus but a different material for 
making hooks. Betty was given an aluminium strip that could only be bent in one plane. 
After initially trying to use similar techniques that had previously been successful with the 
thin wire (Weir et al., 2002) Betty quickly adapted her technique and found new methods 
with which to solve the task. In experiment 3 Betty was required to perform a different 
action with the aluminium strip. This time the strip was bent into a U-shape and required 
unbending to allow it to fit into a horizontal tube and be long enough to reach the reward. 
In this study Weir and Kacelnik aimed to discover how Betty would perform on a task in 
which repeating previously successful actions would lead to failure. Betty successfully 
modified the tool by unbending on three of the four trials she was given. Despite Betty’s 
success Weir and Kacelnik were cautious about the claims they made. It was not possible 
to state whether Betty had full causal understanding because she continued to make errors 
and enter unmodified materials throughout trials. Entering unmodified materials into the 
tubes on subsequent trials following successful ones where correct modifications were 
Introduction 
16 
 
made appears to suggest that Betty did not have full understanding of what was required 
for the task. However, there may have been a logical reason for her actions. Until recently 
non-human primates were thought to lack understanding about non-functional upside-
down traps on a trap-tube task, but recent evidence has shown that human adults did the 
same thing despite verbalising knowledge that the trap was non-functional. This 
demonstrated that even if actions are not relevant for the task these actions may not be 
maladaptive, especially if there is no cost to conducting them (Silva, Page & Silva, 2005). 
Weir and Kacelnik suggested that rather than causal knowledge being an all-or-nothing 
phenomenon, causal understanding is more likely to be a continuum. 
Taken together these studies on animal tool making provide evidence for abilities 
to make tools via detaching, subtracting, adding and reshaping. The success rates from 
Bania et al.’s (2009) study with chimpanzees suggest that making tools by subtraction may 
be easier than making tools by adding pieces of material together. Results from 
Visalberghi et al. (1995) suggest that detaching may be an easier method of tool making 
than subtracting. Kacelnik, Chappell, Kenward and Weir (2006) proposed a tool making 
complexity hierarchy based on the degree of transformation that a tool-making episode 
requires. Adapting and extending the definitions of B. Beck (1980) Kacelnik et al. suggest 
there to be four levels of tool making complexity. The first level ‘none’ refers to the use of 
unmodified materials to act as tools. The second level consists of ‘detach’ and ‘subtract’ as 
defined by B. Beck. The third level consists of ‘add/combine’ and ‘reshape’, again as 
defined by B. Beck. Finally the fourth level consists of multi-step manufacture and fine 
crafting. These involve two or more manufacturing steps or sculpting of three-dimensional 
raw material respectively. Despite the suggestion of a tool making hierarchy and studies 
that appear to support aspects of it (Bania et al.) to my knowledge there have been no 
studies which directly investigate whether the different tool-making modes differ in 
complexity. 
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1.2.2 Human Children’s Tool Making 
After extensive literature searches there appear to be only two studies investigating 
human children’s tool making. Mounoud (1996) investigated the construction of a tool 
from Lego blocks in children between 4 and 9 years old and Beck, Apperly, Chappell, 
Guthrie and Cutting (2011) used a simpler hook-bending task based on studies with 
corvids (Weir et al., 2002). I will discuss the findings from these studies here. 
Mounoud (1996) devised a task which required children to construct a tool needed 
to push a cube located inside a box to another location. This task was made more complex 
by the addition of barriers which the tool was required to go around. Children were given 
Lego blocks that were easily connected together in order to construct their tool. Four-and-
five-year-olds predominantly used a trial-and-error step-by-step approach. Six-to-nine-
year-olds were more likely to make the whole tool before entering it in to the apparatus 
and then made corrections as required. The younger children in this latter age group 
conceived the tool in segments and did not consider the relationships between the different 
tool components. From the age of 7 children began to see the tool as a whole and were 
better able to reason about the changes that needed to be made. 
Mounoud’s (1996) study suggested that tool making might be very difficult for 
young children; however it is a very complex task which leaves us unsure as to what 
aspects children might find difficult. There is no way of knowing if tool making itself is 
the difficult part, or whether the difficulty lies in children’s understanding of exactly what 
the task requires of them.  
Beck et al. (2011) tested children’s abilities on a different tool-making task and 
more closely defined different aspects of tool making in order to discover the extent of 
children’s difficulties. Based on the hook-making study with New Caledonian crows Beck 
et al. (2011) used similar apparatus to test human children’s tool-making abilities. Children 
were presented with a clear vertical tube containing a bucket with a wire handle that 
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contained a sticker, with the instruction that if they could get the sticker out they could 
keep it. Children were unable to reach into the tube with their hands to retrieve the sticker 
and as such were required to make a tool from the materials they were given; a 
pipecleaner, a piece of string and 2 short coloured matchsticks. The easiest solution to the 
task would be to bend the pliable pipecleaner in to a hook and use it to fish out the bucket 
and retrieve the sticker. 
Beck and colleagues (2011) divided tool making in to two distinct types: tool 
manufacture and tool innovation. Tool manufacture was defined as the physical 
transformation of materials in to a tool. Tool innovation required a prior step where the 
tool maker must first imagine what tool they needed to make before constructing it. Beck 
et al. first tested children’s ability to imagine the tool they needed and construct it using 
the materials given (tool innovation). If unsuccessful at tool innovation the experimenter 
demonstrated how to bend a pipecleaner hook, and children were then tested on their 
ability to manufacture a hook tool following this demonstration. Children were found to be 
surprisingly poor at innovating the hook tool required. Under the age of 5 children very 
rarely innovated a hook. Success levels gradually improved between the ages of 5 and 11, 
but by age 8 only around half of children successfully innovated a hook. A mature 
comparison group of 16 and 17-year-olds demonstrated that 100% of adults could 
successfully complete the task and innovate the required tool. Despite difficulties in tool 
innovation children in all age groups showed a great aptitude for tool manufacture with 
120 out of 124 children successfully manufacturing a hook tool following the 
demonstration. 
In a preliminary study children’s understanding of hooks was tested using a forced 
choice paradigm. Children were presented with the apparatus and told it was their job to 
retrieve the bucket to win the sticker; they were then given the choice between a hooked 
pipecleaner and a straight pipecleaner. Children as young as 4 years old were above chance 
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at picking up the hooked pipecleaner first and entering it into the tube, demonstrating an 
understanding for the use of hook tools.  
In experiment 31 of the same paper Beck and colleagues (2011) checked to ensure 
that failure at tool innovation was not due to the experimenter poorly communicating the 
task to the children. It is possible that the children may have been unaware they were 
allowed to transform the materials, alternatively children may not have known about the 
pliable function of pipecleaners. To test for these alternative explanations in the third 
experiment half of the children were given the opportunity to manipulate the materials 
prior to the main task. In this familiarisation phase children watched as the experimenter 
demonstration transformations with the materials which they then had the opportunity to 
copy. The pipecleaner was wound around a pen and the pulled off to show that it keeps its 
shape. The string was laid over an s-shaped pattern printed onto card. Finally, the 
matchsticks were laid on the table to make a square shape. As before success levels for the 
innovation phase were very low and the familiarisation phase did not aid children’s 
performance suggesting that difficulty in tool-innovation tasks could not easily be 
explained by a lack of knowledge about the properties of materials or lack of awareness 
about permission to alter the materials. 
1.3 Why might tool innovation be so difficult? 
 Beck et al.’s (2011) studies demonstrate a divergence in children’s tool-making 
abilities. Despite being excellent tool manufacturers following instruction, children 
displayed great difficulty innovating simple novel tools, with most children not succeeding 
until they were 8 years old. Building on this new finding this thesis aimed to determine the 
extent of children’s difficulty and discover why tool innovation is so complex. In the 
                                                     
1 Experiment 3 in Beck et al. (2011) was the first study conducted as part of my PhD. As it was part of a published series 
of studies and more usefully provides background to the rest of this thesis the results of this study are only reported here.  
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sections below I review different areas of the literature that may help to shed some light on 
why tool innovation is so hard. 
1.3.1 Functional Fixedness 
 Children appear to have a disposition to learn about object functions, this leads to 
them adopting a design stance as described in section 1.1.2. One possible explanation for 
children’s tool-innovation difficulties could be that children are unable to use the materials 
they are given to create tools because they allocate functions to them which then become 
fixed. This has been demonstrated in numerous tasks where as children develop the design 
stance they become slower at recognising alternative uses for objects (Defeyter & German, 
2003; German & Defeyter, 2000). There are two reasons why functional fixedness is 
unlikely to explain children’s tool-innovation difficulties. First, the hook-innovation task 
requires children to make a hook from a pliant wire pipecleaner. Pipecleaners are a 
common material for children that are often used in crafts, their known function is that 
they can be bent into whatever shape one requires. As such they do not have one particular 
function that one can become fixed upon. Second, studies demonstrating functional 
fixedness have shown that it develops around age 6, meaning that younger children often 
perform better than older children. In Beck et al.’s extensive developmental study 
children’s success levels for innovating a hook tool were shown to increase with age, if 
functional fixedness was the cause of children’s difficulty we would expect there to be a 
dip in performance around age 6.  
 Based on these two inconsistencies I do not believe functional fixedness to be the 
cause of children’s tool-innovation difficulty and as such will not actively pursue this line 
of research. The studies in this thesis will however ensure that children have full awareness 
of the pipecleaner properties and affordances, and it will be made clear that they have 
permission to modify the materials they are given.  
Introduction 
21 
 
1.3.2 Executive Function 
 Tool making may place cognitive demands on a child. During childhood vast 
development of executive control is observed. Executive control is an umbrella term used 
to describe the psychological processes involved in goal-directed actions. The executive 
system is made up from three dissociated but connected components: inhibitory control, 
working memory (needed for monitoring and updating knowledge) and switching (also 
known as shifting) (Diamond, 2006; Miyake et al., 2000). 
 Broadly speaking inhibitory control refers to the ability to stop what one is doing. 
Most research in to inhibitory control defines inhibition as the ability to overcome a 
prepotent response. Tasks to measure inhibitory control typically consist of a situation 
where the participant must choose between two responses. One of these responses is 
incorrect but proves to be prepotent; this situation arises because it is the more habitual or 
practiced response. An example of an inhibitory control task used with children is the day-
night stroop task. This task consists of cards that either have a picture of a sun or a moon 
on them. Children are instructed to answer day to the picture of the moon and night to the 
picture of the sun. This requires children to engage their inhibitory control because they 
must suppress their prepotent response of answering with the word that corresponds with 
the picture on the card. Inhibitory control develops markedly between the ages of 3 and 5 
(Davidson, Amso, Anderson & Diamond, 2006), and continues to develop through 
childhood into adulthood (Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan & Tannock, 1999). 
 The ability to monitor and update knowledge is interchangeably known as 
‘updating’ or ‘working memory’. In this thesis I will use the term working memory. 
Working memory is the ability to monitor incoming information and code it according to 
its relevance for the task at hand. This involves reviewing items held in memory with new 
incoming information and replacing old information with new where relevant (Morris & 
Jones, 1990). Working memory is not merely a passive store for information but plays an 
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active role in the manipulation and revision of knowledge (Lehto, 1996; Morris & Jones). 
In fact neuroimaging studies have shown that different brain areas are responsible for the 
different components of memory. Storage and maintenance are associated with premotor 
areas of the prefrontal cortex and the parietal lobe, whereas working memory has been 
associated with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Jonides & Smith, 1997). 
 Task switching, also known as ‘attention switching’ or ‘shifting’ refers to the 
ability to switch between different tasks or operations (Monsell, 1996). In simple terms 
task switching requires disengagement with a current but now irrelevant task, and re-
engagement with a new relevant task (Miyake et al., 2000). However, Allport and Wylie 
(2000) suggest there to be additional difficulties due to proactive interference. When 
switching to a new task interference from the previous task must be overcome in order to 
switch successfully. Children’s task switching abilities are demonstrated in card-sorting 
tasks such as the Dimension Change Card Sort (DCCS) task (Espy, 1997; Frye, Zelazo, & 
Palfai, 1995).  In this task children are presented with cards depicting images that differ in 
two dimensions, for example flowers and cars that are depicted in either blue or red. 
Children are first instructed to sort the cards by one dimension i.e. category, cars vs. 
flowers. They are then instructed to sort by the second dimension, i.e. colour. Independent 
of which order children are asked to sort the cards young children fail to switch to the new 
rule on their second go. That is they perseverate with the sorting strategy they used for 
their first turn. Children’s task switching ability improves dramatically between the ages of 
three and five (Chevalier & Blaye, 2009; Diamond, 2006), with further advances between 
the ages of 5 and 11 where we see improvements in speed and accuracy (Meiran, 1996). 
 Innovation of novel tools is likely to place demands on children’s executive 
functions. When given a tool-innovation problem children must use their working 
memory. They must hold in mind the rules of the task and the different components of 
information. As they engage with the task they must update their knowledge based on 
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feedback and coordinate this knowledge in to a useful solution. Children must use their 
inhibitory control to suppress irrelevant actions. They must also be able to stop what they 
are doing if their current strategy is unsuccessful. Finally, children must be able to switch 
between different strategies. If their current strategy is unsuccessful children must 
disengage with the task and re-engage using a new more efficient strategy. Based on this it 
appears likely that children’s tool-innovation difficulties could be explained by 
underdeveloped executive function. 
 Another possibility for the difficulty of tool innovation is that it may be a more 
complex form of executive task that uses executive functions in a different way to the tasks 
outlined above. In the section below I review evidence to suggest that tool innovation may 
be an ill-structured problem. 
1.3.3 Ill-structured problem solving 
The distinction between well-structured and ill-structured problems was first made 
by Reitman (1965). Reitman defined problems in terms of their start state, goal state and 
the transformation required to go between the two. If information regarding all three of 
these components were present problems were regarded as being well-structured. If 
information was missing from one or more of the components Reitman defined the 
problem as being ill-structured. An example of a well-structured task is the Dimension 
Change Card Sort (DCCS) (Frye et al., 1995). This task has a well-defined start state and 
stimuli, cards with coloured pictures; a clearly defined endstate, cards should be in correct 
boxes; and a clearly defined set of transformations, sort the cards into boxes based on the 
rules given, e.g. sort by colour or sort by category. In contrast ill-structured tasks such as 
preparing a meal for others have ill-defined start and end states (Goel & Grafman, 2000). 
A cook may not completely know the start state as they will not know how hungry their 
diners will be. They may not fully know the goal state if they are unaware of how many 
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courses they should make or whether their guests like what they plan to cook. The 
transformations would also be ill-defined as there are many different options as to how to 
make the meal i.e. cook it yourself or order a take-away. Well-structured problem solving 
has been widely studied; however there has been much less research in to ill-structured 
problems. In this section I will first discuss explanations for the difficulty of ill-structured 
tasks from the problem solving literature. I will then go on to discuss more recent 
developments for the use of ill-structured problem solving in the domain of cognitive 
neuroscience. 
One strand of research investigating ill-structured problems has suggested that 
these types of problem are particularly difficult because simply having domain knowledge 
may not be sufficient to solve them (Chen & Bradshaw, 2007). To be able to use the 
domain knowledge we have flexibly in the context of an ill-structured task that knowledge 
must be well-integrated into what researchers term structural knowledge. Only when 
people have structural knowledge are they able to flexibly access this knowledge and 
manipulate it in to a successful solution to solve a problem (Jonassen, Beissner & Yacci, 
1993). This has been demonstrated in tasks comparing experts and novices (Voss, Blais, 
Means & Greene, 1986; Wineburg, 1998). Although novices may have the component 
pieces of information needed to solve a problem they find themselves unable to coordinate 
this knowledge into a useful solution. Conversely, the experts could flexibly consider all of 
the relevant pieces of information and coordinate them in the required way. 
Ill-structured problems have been used to advance understanding of the executive 
deficits seen in clinical populations. In turn this research has led to a greater understanding 
of brain function. As early as the 1930s it has been reported that some brain damaged 
patients display a huge discrepancy between scores on clinical tests in the laboratory and 
ability to function in everyday life (Penfield & Evans, 1935). Patients have been observed 
to perform at normal levels in tests given to them by experimenters, yet these same 
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patients had difficulty in carrying out everyday simple tasks such as cooking a meal or 
doing the shopping (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Mesulam, 1986; Goel & Grafman, 2000). 
Based on these peculiar findings Shallice and Burgess (1991) devised new ill-structured 
tasks that were more closely related to everyday scenarios and required multi-tasking and 
prospective memory. One task, the Multiple Errands Test, took place in a shopping centre 
and required patients to retrieve items and information listed for them whilst following 
simple rules such as only being able to enter each shop once, and only entering a shop if 
they purchased something. Another, laboratory based task, the Six Element Test, required 
patients to complete six tasks of three sub-types whilst following a set of rules such as not 
completing two parts of the same sub-type in a row. Shallice and Burgess found that their 
clinical patients performed comparatively worse on these ill-structured tasks than age and 
IQ matched controls, despite performing at similar levels on traditional executive 
measures. These findings have been extended to other clinical patients ( Goel, Pullara & 
Grafman, 2001) and autistic children (White, Burgess & Hill, 2009). 
In the last ten years research in to this area has progressed rapidly. The use of 
brain-imaging has enabled researchers to discover that patients who display difficulty on 
ill-structured tasks despite performing normally on traditional executive function tasks 
have damage to an area of the brain termed Brodmann Area 10, also known as the rostral 
prefrontal cortex. Brodmann Area 10 has been shown to have a protracted maturation 
throughout childhood and adolescence (Dumontheil, Burgess, & Blakemore, 2008), and 
has the highest rate of growth for any area of the brain between the ages of five and eleven 
(Sowell et al., 2004; Burgess, Dumontheil & Gilbert, 2007). 
Ill-structured problem solving research could help to inform us about the 
difficulties children display in tool-innovation tasks. The defining feature of ill-structured 
problems is to generate solutions that are not directly supplied by the task (Goel, 2010). 
Tool innovation is therefore an ill-structured problem. Innovation is a complex task 
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involving multiple components, much like the devised ill-structured tasks described above. 
There is little research in to children’s performance on ill-structured problems. However 
evidence of the protracted maturation of Brodmann Area 10 between five and eleven years 
could explain the development seen in children’s tool-innovation abilities between these 
ages (Beck et al., 2011).  
1.4 This thesis 
 The ability to innovate and manufacture tools is a vital component of human 
cumulative culture. Current research has focused on children’s capacity for social learning 
and has neglected to investigate children’s innovative abilities. Using Beck et al.’s 
surprising finding that children have great difficulty in innovating novel tools as a starting 
point, this thesis aimed to discover the extent of children’s difficulty and explored possible 
explanations. Chapter 2 replicated the findings from the original hook-innovation task and 
demonstrated children’s difficulties to extend to a new task requiring the innovation of a 
different tool. Chapters 3 and 4 drew on definitions of tool making from the comparative 
literature and tested children’s tool-innovation abilities for different methods of tool 
making. Chapters 5 and 6 investigated possible explanations for children’s difficulties 
examining the roles of executive function and aspects of ill-structured problem solving 
respectively. Finally in chapter 7 I summarise the findings of this thesis and propose a new 
framework in which tool making should be studied in both developmental and comparative 
literatures. 
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Chapter 2 
Why do children lack the flexibility to innovate tools? 
 
This chapter, largely in its current form, is published as: 
Cutting, N., Apperly, I. A., & Beck, S. R. (2011). Why do children lack the flexibility to 
innovate tools? Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 109, 497–511. 
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2.0 Abstract 
Despite being proficient tool users, young children have surprising difficulty in 
innovating tools (making novel tools to solve problems). Two experiments found that 4-to-7-
year-olds had difficulty on two tool-innovation problems, and explored reasons for this 
inflexibility. Experiment 1 (N=51), showed that children’s performance was unaffected by 
the need to switch away from previously correct strategies. Experiment 2 (N=92) suggested 
children’s difficulty could not easily be explained by task pragmatics or permission issues. 
Both experiments found evidence that some children perseverated on a single incorrect 
strategy, but such perseveration was insufficient to explain children’s tendency not to 
innovate tools. We suggest children’s difficulty lies not with switching, task pragmatics or 
behavioural perseveration, but with solving the fundamentally “ill-structured” nature of tool-
innovation problems. 
2.1 Introduction 
Human life revolves around the use of tools. It is almost impossible to consider life 
without them. How would we cook without pans and utensils? How would we even catch or 
dig up our food? Humans are believed to be experts in all tool-related behaviours (Defeyter & 
German, 2003; Herrmann, Call, Hernàndez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007). However, 
despite extensive research indicating children’s early competence for tool use, children’s 
tool-making abilities have been neglected in the developmental literature. In this paper we 
distinguish between two types of tool-making: tool-manufacture – the ability to make tools 
after instruction or observation; and tool-innovation - independently making a novel tool to 
solve a problem. The present studies focused on children’s tool innovation, and explored 
whether children’s difficulty with tool innovation was due to mental inflexibility.  
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Early hominid tool use is thought to have propelled human evolution, making us the 
advanced social beings we are today (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Kacelnik, 2009). Tool-related 
activities are implicated in the development of social behaviours such as imitation, teaching, 
and language (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gibson & Ingold, 1993). The Cultural Intelligence 
Hypothesis proposes that the advancement of these social capacities has allowed humans to 
develop cognitive skills not possessed by our nearest primate relatives (Herrmann et al., 
2007). Our ability to collaborate and share knowledge permitted massive technological 
advances in our manufacture and use of an extensive range tools. Tools quite clearly have, 
and continue to play, an integral part in human life. 
There is a substantial literature on the development of children’s tool-related 
behaviours. Competent tool use is evident from an early age, demonstrated, for example, by 
the skilful manipulation of spoons (Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989), hooks and rakes (Brown, 
1990), and many more tools in the second year of life.  A large literature on social learning 
shows that young children are also able to learn about novel tools by imitating others from 2 
or 3 years of age (McGuigan & Whiten, 2009; Meltzoff, 1995; Want & Harris, 2002). Young 
children can not only use tools, but show early abilities to infer their intended use (Casler & 
Kelemen, 2005), design (Casler, Terziyan, & Greene, 2009) and how they should be 
categorized (Defeyter, Hearing, & German, 2009).  
 Furthermore, a recent study has shown children to be competent in tool manufacture 
(making tools after instruction) (Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie & Cutting, 2011). 
Children as young as 3 years old readily manufactured a simple hook tool when the hook-
making action was demonstrated. This is in line with the findings of research investigating 
infant memory for actions, which shows that at around 30 months children readily imitated a 
model who constructed a non-tool object e.g. a rattle (Hayne, Herbert & Simcock, 2003; 
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Herbert & Hayne, 2000; Barr & Wyss, 2008). In this paper we explore a possible limit on 
children’s excellent tool-related capabilities. 
Tools were once thought to be a uniquely human phenomenon, but tool-related 
behaviour is now widely studied comparatively. Recent research has focused on the making 
of tools. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), have demonstrated the ability to manufacture a 
wide range of tools both in the wild (Boesch & Boesch, 1990), and in captivity (Bania, 
Harris, Kinsley, & Boysen, 2009; Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995; 
Povinelli, 2000). However, there is some debate as to whether such behaviour, especially 
when seen in the laboratory, is insightful, or merely results from a trial-and-error approach 
(Povinelli, 2000). 
 New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) are also well-known for their tool-
manufacturing abilities. Specifically, they manufacture hooks from twigs to retrieve food in 
the wild (Hunt & Gray, 2002). More recently, impressive tool-manufacturing abilities have 
been seen in the laboratory. To retrieve a bucket from a tall narrow tube, one crow, Betty, 
bent a piece of wire into a hook, which she then used to solve the task. What was impressive 
was that Betty made a tool from a piece of wire, a material that crows would not encounter in 
the wild. Furthermore, on repeated trials she employed a variety of bending techniques, 
suggesting that her success was not the result of associative learning (Weir, Chappell, & 
Kacelnik, 2002). More recently, four rooks, a species that does not use tools in the wild, have 
also solved this tool-manufacture task (Bird & Emery, 2009). 
Tool Innovation 
Being able to make tools allows individuals to perform a much wider range of acts 
than they could without tools or with only found tools. However, we should remember that, 
in the corvid and child studies described above, when individuals make tools they have 
already seen an example of the required tool, and in the child study (Beck et al., 2011) when 
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children made tools successfully it was when the experimenter had even demonstrated how to 
make the tool. We term the ability to make tools having been instructed or having seen an 
example, tool manufacture. This begs the question of where tools come from in the first 
place. Tool innovation - making a novel tool to solve a problem - has been largely neglected 
by the comparative and developmental literatures. This is surprising because tool innovation 
must be the foundation for all other tool-related behaviour: children’s (and adults’) evident 
capacity to make tools and use tools that they see used by others would be of little use if 
nobody innovated tools in the first place.  
There has been only one study to date of tool innovation. Using an apparatus based on 
that used by Weir et al. (2002), Beck et al. (2011) investigated children’s ability to innovate a 
simple hook tool needed to retrieve a bucket from a narrow vertical tube. Children were given 
a straight pipecleaner, a long piece of string, and some small matchsticks. The most obvious 
solution was to bend the pipecleaner into a hook. This is what most adults did when 
confronted by the task (a few individuals made a functional tool by attaching a matchstick to 
the pipecleaner to make an inverted “T”). The critical difference between this study and the 
studies with corvids (Bird & Emery, 2009; Weir et al., 2002) is that the child participants had 
not seen an example of the appropriate tool within the context of this task. Instead they had to 
imagine the solution themselves; that is, they had to innovate a novel tool. As mentioned 
above, when children in the same study saw the experimenter demonstrate making the 
appropriate tool, they had no difficulties repeating this tool manufacture. 
Children performed remarkably poorly on the tool-innovation task. Children aged 3- 
to 5- rarely made a hook, or any other functional tool; fewer than half of 7-year-olds 
succeeded; and children did not perform at high levels until the age of 9 or 10. These findings 
are even more striking in the context of further evidence presented by Beck et al. (2011). 
Even 4-year-olds understood that a hook was the best tool for the job and chose it over a 
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straight pipecleaner significantly more than chance (Experiment 1). Children’s difficulties 
persisted even after receiving a warm-up exercise with the materials that ensured they knew 
manipulation of materials was allowed and the pipecleaner is pliable (Experiment 3). Finally, 
the fact that tool innovation was the limiting step for children was underscored by the finding 
that almost all children successfully completed the task when they received a demonstration 
of hook-bending after their initial failure. This is consistent with literature that shows children 
are very successful at social learning. The question that arises from this finding is why do 
children find tool innovation so difficult? 
Since young children clearly have the competence to manufacture and use tools, it 
seems unlikely that any difficulty with tool innovation would be due to a lack of 
understanding of what tools are, or any difficulty with the practical business of shaping a tool 
and executing tool-using actions. Instead we look to a cognitive explanation. Difficulty with 
tool innovation might be a consequence of the mental inflexibility that is commonly observed 
in early childhood. One way to characterize this mental inflexibility is to think about 
children’s developing executive control. 
Executive control is an umbrella term for psychological processes involved in the 
conscious control of thought and action (Zelazo & Muller, 2002; Anderson, 1998). Executive 
control is needed for novel tasks, or situations that require concentration, planning, strategy 
development, coordination, or choosing between alternative options (Diamond, 2006; 
Anderson, 1998; Brocki & Bohlin, 2004). Imagining what kind of tool is needed to solve a 
problem and how to make it (tool innovation) is likely to tap many of these demands and to a 
greater extent than simply using or manufacturing tools, which rely mainly on imitating 
actions. 
There are different ways in which we might construe the role of mental flexibility in 
tool innovation. One possibility is that children are able to generate potential tool-innovation 
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solutions to the task, but find it difficult to move on from unsuccessful ideas, and so tend to 
become “stuck in set”. The ability to select and switch between multiple perspectives, tasks 
or strategies to determine the optimal option for the current situation is a well-known 
component of executive function that develops significantly between 3 and 5 years (e.g., 
Diamond, 2006; Chevalier & Blaye, 2009). This is demonstrated in simple card-sorting tasks 
(Frye, Zelazo & Palfai, 1995; Espy, 1997), where children begin to demonstrate the ability to 
shift flexibly between rules. Between the ages of 5 and 11 further improvements in cognitive 
flexibility occur, with children passing more complex tasks (Luna et al., 2001) and improving 
in speed and accuracy (Meiran, 1996). It seems plausible that difficulty with switching 
between alternatives might contribute to children’s difficulty with tool innovation.  
Thus, in Experiment 1 we investigated the role of switching in tool innovation. We 
tested children on two tool-innovation tasks that required ‘opposite’ solutions (hook-making 
required a pipecleaner to be bent; the new task required a pipecleaner to be unbent). We 
speculated that if children’s difficulty was with switching between strategies then having 
succeeded (before or after a demonstration) using one strategy on one task, children might 
find it particularly difficult to adopt a different strategy on the second task. Furthermore, 
introducing a second tool-innovation task also allowed us to generalize Beck et al.’s claims, 
which were based only on a hook-making task.  
A second possibility is that children have the capability to innovate the tools required 
for the tasks, but other features of our tool-innovation task created unintended difficulties, 
making it difficult for them to demonstrate this flexible behaviour. For example, in the hook-
innovation task a straight pipecleaner is presented along with other distracter items as 
materials that can solve the task. Children may perseverate with the first material with which 
they attempt to solve the task and fail to switch to another material if the first proves 
unsuccessful. Alternatively, they may restrict themselves to using only unmodified materials 
Chapter 2 
 
34 
 
rather than making them in to a new tool. We will discuss this further in the introduction to 
Experiment 2, where we adapt the task instructions so as to reduce the chances that children 
will perseverate with unmodified materials. 
A third possibility is that, despite being able to make and use tools, young children 
lack the mental flexibility necessary to innovate tools because tool innovation is an “ill-
structured” problem. Executive function researchers distinguish between “well-structured” 
and “ill-structured” problems (Burgess et al., 1996; Goel, 1995). Most commonly-used tests 
of executive function (including those used with children) are well-structured insofar as they 
have a clearly-defined set of stimuli (e.g., cards with coloured pictures) a clearly-defined set 
of responses (boxes in which to sort the cards) and a clearly-defined set of rules (sort 
according to the colour of the picture; then switch to sorting according to shape).  In contrast, 
ill-structured tasks lack information either in their start or goal states or in the transformations 
needed to get from one to the other, and so part of the task requirement is for the participant 
to supply this for themselves. The difference between well- and ill-structured executive tasks 
is underscored by the observation that some brain-injured patients (Shallice & Burgess, 1991) 
and children with autism (White, Burgess & Hill, 2009) may pass traditional, well-structured, 
executive function tasks, yet show impairment on ill-structured tasks, and experience 
difficulties with mental flexibility in their everyday lives. 
Tool innovation is an excellent example of an ill-structured task. The participant has 
information about the start and goal states, but lacks information about how to get from one 
to another. They must devise and hold in mind a solution to the problem, inhibit irrelevant 
actions and plan a sequence of actions to achieve their goal. We return to whether tool 
innovation might be thought of as an ill-structured task in the General Discussion, in the light 
of our tests of the role of cognitive flexibility. 
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2.2 Experiment 1 
The first experiment replicated Beck et al.’s (2011) hook study, with the addition of a 
second tool-innovation task, unbending. In the new task a pipecleaner was presented bent in 
half and had to be unbent to make it long enough to push a ball from a tube. An unbending 
task was chosen as it requires the opposite action to the hooks (bending) task. Following 
Beck et al. children were given a piece of string as a distracter as well as a pipecleaner 
(although unlike Beck et al. we did not include small sticks, in order to prevent the making of 
other functional tools). The distracter material allowed us to see if the first material children 
selected was the functionally relevant pipecleaner.  Also, all children received a warm-up 
exercise in which they manipulated materials (as in Experiment 3: Beck et al.) to ensure they 
had experience of the materials’ properties. Although we did not explicitly check, all children 
were expected to have had previous experience working with pipecleaners in a craft context 
in school. 
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
The final sample consisted of 24 4- to 5- year olds (13 boys), mean age 4 years 10 
months (4; 10), (range 4; 3 to 5; 3), and 27 6- to 7-year-olds (10 boys), mean age 6; 8 (range 
6; 3 to 7; 2) from a Primary School in South Birmingham, UK. The ethnic composition of the 
sample was 91% Caucasian, 7% Black and 2% other/unknown. A further 5 children were 
tested but excluded from analysis, 3 children from the 6 to 7 age group retrieved the sticker 
without making a functional tool (e.g. by catching the bucket on the folded end of the wire 
pipecleaner) and 2 children from the 4 to 5 age group, one who retrieved the sticker without 
making a tool and one who had seen another child perform the task. 
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2.2.1.2 Materials 
For the warm-up task a pipecleaner (length 29cm), pen (length 14cm), a piece of 
string (length 29cm) and a template of an S-shape printed onto A4 card (height 12cm, width 
9cm) were used. For the hooks task the materials were a transparent plastic tube (height 
22cm, width of opening 4cm) attached vertically to a cardboard base (length 35cm, width 
21cm), a bucket with a wire handle, a pipecleaner (length 29cm), a piece of string (length 
29cm), and a sticker (See Figure 2. 1). For the ‘Unbending’ task  the materials were a 
transparent plastic tube (length 22cm, width of opening 4cm) attached horizontally to a 
cardboard base (length 33cm, width 15cm), a pipecleaner bent in half (unbent length 22cm), a 
piece of string (length 29cm), and a small spherical pompom (like those used in crafts; 
diameter 4cm) with sticker attached (See Figure 2. 2). We used a small clock to time the task. 
 
 
Figure 2. 1 Tall tube containing bucket (with sticker inside), pipecleaner and string. 
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Figure 2. 2. Horizontal tube containing pompom with sticker attached, bent pipecleaner and 
string. 
 
2.2.1.3 Procedure 
Before testing began children were instructed by their class teacher not to tell other 
children how to play the games they would be playing with the experimenter in order for 
them to be a nice surprise for everyone. Participants were tested by a female experimenter in 
a quiet area just outside the main classroom. The child and experimenter sat facing each other 
across a table. First, children completed the warm-up exercise. After this, all children 
received both the hook and unbending tasks. The order was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
 
2.2.1.3.1Warm-up task 
Children watched as the experimenter demonstrated actions with the string and 
pipecleaner (order counterbalanced), which the child then copied. The pipecleaner was 
wound around a pen, and then removed to demonstrate that it kept its shape. The string was 
laid over the template to follow the S-shaped pattern. 
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2.2.1.3.2 Hooks task 
Children were shown the vertical transparent tube with the bucket containing a sticker 
already in place in the bottom. They were told that if they could get the sticker out of the tube 
they were allowed to keep it. The experimenter then brought out the string and pipecleaner 
and told the child that these were things that ‘may help’ to get the sticker out. The children 
were then given one minute to try to retrieve the sticker. No feedback was given, but children 
were given neutral prompts if required. Examples of prompts used include ‘Can you think 
how you might be able to get the sticker out?’ and ‘Maybe you could use these things to help 
you.’ If, after one minute, the child had not retrieved the sticker, they were encouraged by the 
experimenter to put down the materials they were using. With the materials remaining on 
view in front of the participant, the experimenter then said ‘watch this,’ and using another 
pipecleaner held in the middle, bent one end to form a hook. The children were again 
encouraged to retrieve the sticker. They were not given the experimenter’s hooked 
pipecleaner. 
 
2.2.1.3.3 Unbending task 
Children were shown the horizontal tube with the sticker attached to a pompom held 
in the middle. As in the hooks task, they were told that if they could get the sticker out they 
could keep it. The experimenter introduced the string and the bent pipecleaner as things that 
‘may help’ to retrieve the sticker. If, after one minute had elapsed, the child had not retrieved 
the sticker, then they were encouraged to put down the material they were using. With the 
materials remaining on view in front of the participant, the experimenter then demonstrated 
‘unbending.’ with another bent pipecleaner. The children were again encouraged to try to 
retrieve the sticker (using their own materials). 
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2.2.1.4 Measures  
Children’s behaviours were recorded online, using a coding system to differentiate 
their actions across time. The system coded materials selected (including whether they were 
touched, picked up, or entered into the tube), whether the material was manipulated and what 
shape was made, and whether the participant was successful before and after the 
experimenter’s demonstration. 
2.2.2 Results 
 There was no difference in success based on gender (Hooks – Fisher’s Exact Test, 
p=.739, Unbending - χ² (1, N=51) =.123, p=.723), and so all data were combined for 
subsequent analyses. 
 
Note. ªHooks task: pipecleaner presented straight, unbending task: pipecleaner presented bent in half.  bHooks 
task: pipecleaner bent into hook, unbending task: pipecleaner unbent. cSubject combined string and pipecleaner, 
usually by tying them together
 
 
 
 
 
 
Touched first 
 
 
 Used first  
 
Success 
 
Age 
Group 
Pipe-
cleaner String  
 
Pipe-   
cleaner as 
presented ª String 
Pipe-
cleaner 
adaptedb Combo c 
 
Before 
demo 
 
Only after 
demo 
    
                       
 
                      Hooks Task 
 
  
4- to 5- 
n=24 
21 3  20  3 1 0 
 
2 (8%) 19 (79%) 
6-to 7- 
n=27 
25 2  23  1 2 1 
 
8 (30%) 18 (67%) 
   
                     
 
                  Unbending Task 
 
  
4- to 5- 
n=24 
17 7  17  5 1 1 
 
8 (33%) 14 (58%) 
6-to 7- 
n=27 
22 5  20  4 3 0 
 
15 (56%) 11 (41%) 
Table 2. 1. Children’s Behaviours during Innovation Tasks for Experiment 1.  
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As can be seen in table 2.1 children did not assume all materials to be equally 
useful; there was a strong bias for children to both touch and use the pipecleaner first in 
each task. Furthermore, children tended to use the materials as they were presented and 
very rarely made any attempt to adapt them. However, as is clear in the final column of the 
table, once tool-manufacture was demonstrated, children easily succeeded in these tasks. 
 First we focused on the main variable of interest: successful tool innovation before 
demonstration. Children were coded as successful in the hooks task if they bent the 
pipecleaner into a hook, within the one minute time limit, and used this to retrieve the 
bucket from the tube. Children were coded as successful in the unbending task if they 
unbent the pipecleaner (within the time limit) making it long enough to push the pompom 
from the tube. It was occasionally unclear whether unbending had been an intentional act 
as exerting force on the bent pipecleaner sometimes allowed it to unbend. As insight is 
difficult to establish all cases of unbending were coded as successful. 
The low success rates before demonstration for the hooks task are consistent with 
Beck et al. (2011), demonstrating a stable finding that children display difficulties in 
innovating a simple hook tool. The new unbending task also yielded low success rates, 
with only a third of 4- to 5-year-olds and half of 6- to 7-year-olds unbending the 
pipecleaner to make it long enough to push the pompom from the tube. Since these results 
may include a small number of children who unbent the pipecleaner unintentionally, the 
results for true insightful tool innovation may be lower still. 
Comparison of success across age groups reveals a trend that older children 
successfully innovate more tools than younger children, but unlike Beck et al. (2011) we 
did not find a significant difference between age groups (Fisher’s Exact Test, Hooks,  p = 
.081; Unbending,  p = .160). Therefore, data for the two age groups were combined for 
subsequent analyses.  
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Success before demonstration on the unbending task was better than on the hooks 
task (McNemar test, p = .011). We used Chi-square tests to investigate whether task order 
affected children’s performance. Whether the hooks task was presented first or second had 
no effect on whether children succeeded in making a hook (Fisher’s Exact Test, p >.999). 
Similarly order had no effect on success in the unbending task (χ² (1, N=51) = .167, p = 
.683). These results indicate that children’s success on one task (whether spontaneous, or 
following demonstration) neither aided nor hindered their spontaneous success on the 
second task. 
Having established there to be no relationship between behaviours between tasks, 
we decided to look more closely at both unsuccessful and successful (before 
demonstration) children’s behaviours within each task.  Although children were not 
perseverating on techniques across tasks, one possible reason for failure could be that 
children were perseverating on techniques within a task. We coded unsuccessful children 
as perseverators if they only ever entered one ‘tool’ into the tube and persisted in trying to 
retrieve the sticker  with this ‘tool’ for the whole time period (1 minute). As can be seen in 
Table 2.2 perseveration was not a common occurrence for either the 4- to 5-, or 6- to 7-
year-olds. Chi-square analyses show there to be no difference in perseveration between the 
two age groups (Hooks: ²(1, N=41) =.149, p=.699; Unbending: Fisher’s Exact Test, 
p=.613). Although it is a potential stumbling block to overcome if you first approach the 
task with the wrong ‘tool’, perseveration cannot explain why children are not successful in 
innovating tools in this study. 
 Although unsuccessful children rarely perseverated with one material for the 
whole time period, few manipulated the materials in any way, i.e. bent the pipecleaner or 
combined materials. In the hooks task only 18% of 4- to 5-year-olds and 26% of 6- to 7-
year-olds manipulated materials, and similarly in the tube task the figures were only 25% 
(4 to 5 years) and 17% (6 to 7 years). 
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Table 2. 2 Frequencies of perseveration in unsuccessful children, and number of insertions 
into tube for successful children for Experiment 1. 
 
 
Next we examined the actions of successful tool-innovators within each task. 
Successful tool-innovators were coded as to the number of different items inserted into the 
tube before retrieving the sticker. Table 2.2 shows the majority of successful tool-
innovators either entered a successful tool into the tube immediately (i.e. a hook or unbent 
pipecleaner), or entered one unsuccessful ‘tool’ (always an unmodified material) before 
making and entering a successful one. These results suggest tool innovation resulted more 
from insightful solving of the task, rather than trial and error learning. 
Age 
Group 
(years) 
Unsuccessful  
 
Successful 
  
 
Perseveration 
  
  
Insertion Into tube 
N  No Yes  N  
Immediate 
Tool 
1 
unsuccessful  
then tool 
2+ 
unsuccessful 
then tool 
Hooks 
4 to 5 22  15 7  2  1 1 0 
6 to 7 19  14 5  8  2 4 2 
Unbending 
4 to 5 16  13 3  8  2 4 2 
6 to 7 12  11 1  15  3 7 5 
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2.3 Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 children’s difficulties in tool innovation were shown to extend 
beyond hooks to another task: unbending. Investigation of children’s success showed there 
was no effect of task order, which indicates that children’s inflexible behaviour on one 
tool-innovation task was not modified by a prior experience of making a tool on another 
task. Importantly, children’s inflexibility did not appear due to perseveration on one 
unsuccessful strategy. Unsuccessful children in both tasks rarely perseverated with the 
same material for the whole time period. However, it was also notable that unsuccessful 
children made few attempts to modify the materials they were given. In our second 
experiment we explored the possibility that children may fail to modify the materials 
because they think that they are not allowed to. 
Although children in Experiment 1 experienced a warm-up task in which they 
manipulated string and pipecleaner materials, it remains possible that these children did 
not realize that they were allowed to alter the materials given in the context of the main 
task. Alternatively, children may have failed to modify materials due to the pragmatics of 
the task. Children were presented with the materials as things that ‘may help’ to retrieve 
the sticker. This may have been interpreted by children as the experimenter proffering the 
materials as tools that could be used as presented as a solution to the task, thus preventing 
modification. In Experiment 2, we sought to minimize the likelihood of permission or 
pragmatics playing a role in children’s poor performance on the tool-innovation task by 
telling children they needed to make something with the materials. 
 
2.3.1 Method 
There were two conditions. In the control condition, children received the same 
instructions as in Experiment 1. In the experimental condition, children received the new 
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instruction to make something with the materials. This instruction was used to avoid any 
assumption children may have had that the materials must be used as they were to solve 
the task. Also, we tried to reduce any possibility that children thought the experimenter 
was giving them pre-made tools to solve the task by introducing the children to a puppet 
that happened to have some materials with him. The aim of the puppet was to draw 
attention away from the experimenter; making the task appear more general rather than 
one which the experimenter had created and had the answer to. Because of this we 
excluded the warm-up phase of the experiment in which children completed an unrelated 
task that involved manipulating the materials. Previous results (Beck et al., 2011: 
Experiment 3) indicated that the warm-up exercise had no effect on task success. The 
materials in the control condition were also presented by a puppet, and the wording 
changed to ‘Here are some things that can help you.’ We used the word “can” rather than 
“may” (as we had in Experiment 1) to match the certainty implied by the instructions in 
the experimental condition. Thus, the only difference between the experimental and 
control conditions was the instruction to make something. 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
The final sample consisted of 44 4- to 5-year-olds (17 boys), mean age 4; 10, 
(range 4; 5 to 5; 5), and 48 6- to 7-year-olds (25 boys), mean age 6; 10 (range 6; 5 to 7; 4) 
from a Primary School in South Birmingham. The ethnic composition of the sample was 
48% Caucasian, 27% Black, 10% Asian, and 15% other/unknown.  
 
2.3.1.2 Materials 
The materials for Experiment 2 were the same as in Experiment 1 except for the 
addition of a short stick (5cm) presented as an additional distracter material (this matched 
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the materials used by Beck et al., 2011), a puppet, and a box (20cm x 13 cm x 5cm) in 
which the puppet carried the materials. 
2.3.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested in a similar environment to that outlined in Experiment 1. 
All participants received both the hooks and unbending tasks, order counterbalanced. 
Children were alternately assigned to either the control (help) group or to the experimental 
(make) group based on the teacher’s class list.  Children were introduced to the puppet, 
‘Heinz’, and told ‘Heinz really likes to play games, so he might come back later to see 
what we are doing’. The procedure for both groups was identical apart from the 
instructions given by Heinz. 
Both the hooks and unbending tasks followed the same procedure as in Experiment 
1, but after showing the tube apparatus, the experimenter exclaimed, ‘Oh look here’s 
Heinz; let’s see what he has to say’. The experimenter then listened as Heinz spoke in her 
ear and then told the children either, ‘Heinz says he has some things here that can help you 
to get the sticker’ (control group) or ‘Heinz says he has some things here you can make 
something with to get the sticker’ (experimental group). As before, if the children had not 
retrieved the sticker after one minute, bending or unbending was demonstrated by the 
Experimenter. 
2.3.2 Results 
 Examination of success rates showed there to be no effect of gender (Hooks - χ² (1, 
N=92) =.058, p=.809, Unbending - χ² (1, N=92) =.097, p=.755), and so all data were 
combined for subsequent analyses.
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Note. ªHooks task pipecleaner presented straight, unbending task pipecleaner presented bent in half.  bHooks task pipecleaner bent into hook, unbending task pipecleaner 
unbent. cSubject combined string and pipecleaner, usually by tying them together. d1 participant in this group did not attempt to use a ‘tool’ and spent their time trying to 
make something. 
 
    
Touch First 
  
Use first 
 
Success 
Age 
group 
Condition N  
Pipe- 
Cleaner 
String 
Match- 
stick 
 Pipe- 
cleaner as 
presentedª 
string 
Match- 
stick 
Pipe-
cleaner 
adapted b 
Combo c 
 
Before demo 
After 
demo 
        Hooks    
4 to 5  
 
Help 22  20 0 2  19 1 1 1 0  1 (5%) 19 (86%) 
 
 
Make 22  21 1 0  17 2 0 1 2  2 (9%) 17 (77%) 
6 to 7  
  
Help 23  21 2 0  19 3 0 1 0  8 (35%) 14 (61%) 
 
 
Make 25  23 1 1  17 1 0 4 3  12 (48%) 13 (52%) 
        Unbending    
4 to 5 
 
Help 22  14 7 1  11 7 1 3 0  10 (45%) 11 (50%) 
 
 
Make 22  16 2 4  11 2 4 3 2  8 (36%) 9 (41%) 
6 to 7 
 
Help 23  14 1 8  7 1 4 9 2  16 (70%) 7 (30%) 
 
 
Make 25  19 2 4  9 1 1 8 5  18 (72%) 4 (16%) 
Table 2. 3. Tool-innovation Behaviours as a Function of Age and Condition for Experiment 2.  
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 Both the hooks and unbending tasks showed the same pattern of behaviour seen 
previously (see Table 2.3). Children had a strong bias to both touch and use the 
pipecleaner first, but very few then went on to manipulate the pipecleaner and innovate a 
tool. 
  This Experiment provides further evidence for the stability of the finding that 
young children do not readily innovate a hook tool to solve a task, with only 3 out of 44 4- 
to 5-year-olds and 20 out of 48 6- to 7-year-olds innovating a hook to solve the task. The 
results for the new unbending task are also found to be consistent with the previous 
success rates, with 18 out of 44 4- to 5-year-olds and 34 out of 48 6- to 7-year-olds 
unbending the pipecleaner to retrieve the sticker. As in Experiment 1, the unbending task 
was easier for children to achieve than the hooks task, (McNemar Test, p < .001). Chi-
square tests were used to investigate whether task order affected children’s performance. 
Whether each task was presented first or second had no effect on whether children 
succeeded in making a hook (χ² (1, N = 92) = .000, p >.999) or unbending (χ² (1, N = 92) 
= .003, p =.956), indicating the absence of transfer effects. 
 There was significant improvement in performance with age. Older children were 
more successful in innovating tools on both the hooks task (χ² (1, N =92) = 14.869, p < 
.001), and the unbending task (χ² (1, N = 92) = 8.365, p =.004). Although no age 
difference was found in Experiment 1, age effects were observed in this age range by Beck 
et al. (2011) and we conclude that the most likely reason for the difference between 
Experiment 1 and 2 is the larger sample size in Experiment 2. 
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to test whether instructing children to make 
something with the materials helped them to be more flexible at innovating tools. Chi-
square analyses revealed no difference between success rates for the Experimental and 
Control conditions for either Hooks (χ² (1, N = 92) =1.174, p = .278) or for Unbending (χ² 
(1, N = 92) =0.057, p = .812). This was also true for the two age groups independently (4- 
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to 5-year-olds – Hooks: Fisher’s Exact Test, p >.999; Unbending: χ² (1, N = 44) = 0.376, p 
= .540: 6- to 7-year-olds – Hooks: χ² (1, N = 48) = 0.861, p = .353; Unbending: χ² (1, N = 
48) = 0.034, p = .853). This suggests that it is unlikely that children’s difficulty with 
innovating a tool is due to a mis-perception that they are not allowed to modify the tool-
making materials. 
Note.  aTwo participants retrieved the sticker without making a hook. bOne participant retrieved the 
sticker without unbending the pipecleaner. 
 
As in Experiment 1 we then examined children’s behaviours more closely (see 
Table 2.4). For unsuccessful participants we again coded whether they perseverated on one 
technique for the whole time period. Six- to 7 year olds’ performance was consistent with 
Experiment 1. They did not perseverate with one object. In contrast, 4-to-5-year-olds 
Age 
Group 
(years) 
 
Unsuccessful 
 
Successful 
  
 
Perseveration 
  
 
Entry Into tube 
N  No Yes  N  
Immediate 
Tool 
1 unsuccessful  
then tool 
2+ 
unsuccessful 
then tool 
Hooks 
4 to 5 41  17 24  3  2 1 0 
6 to 7 28  24 4  20a  7 8 3 
Unbending 
4 to 5 26  19 7  18b  10 1 6 
6 to 7 14  13 1  34  20 8 6 
Table 2. 4. Frequencies of perseveration in unsuccessful children, and number of entries 
into tube for successful children for Experiment 2. 
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displayed higher levels of perseverative behaviour. Chi-square analysis of the hooks task 
revealed 4-to-5-year-olds to be significantly more likely than 6-to-7-year-olds to 
perseverate on one unsuccessful technique for the whole time period (²(1, N = 69) = 
13.511, p < .001). This same trend was seen for the unbending task, but did not reach 
significance (Fisher’s Exact Test, p=.222), most likely due to the lower number of 
unsuccessful participants. 
Examination of the behaviours of successful tool innovators paints a similar picture 
to Experiment 1. In both tasks the majority of successful participants succeeded 
immediately or after just one unsuccessful insertion, suggesting a role for insight rather 
than trial and error learning.  
2.4 General Discussion 
The present experiments suggested that young children show striking inflexibility 
on two tasks that require them to innovate a simple tool, and investigated alternative 
reasons for this inflexibility. 
An important first objective was to test whether difficulties previously observed by 
Beck et al. (2011) when children were required to innovate a hook tool would also be 
apparent on another task. Our novel “unbending” task was easier to solve than the hooks 
task, yet, overall performance was still poor. Around two-thirds of 4- to 5-year-olds and a 
third of 6- to 7-year-olds spent their time probing with inadequate materials rather than 
performing the simple action of unbending the pipecleaner needed to solve the task. A 
reason why the unbending task may be easier for children to solve could be because the 
final shape of the required tool is much simpler to manufacture than the hook. The fact that 
unbending is easier is consistent with research in the comparative literature that has shown 
chimpanzees have more difficulty assembling tools than disassembling them (Bania et al., 
2009). In this study chimpanzees were given a tool composed of a long stick with two 
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short sticks that could be added to each end to make an H-shape. Chimpanzees either had 
to assemble a hook to retrieve an object, or they had to disassemble the H-shape to form 
the long stick needed to probe in a tube. As stated above chimpanzees found it easier to 
disassemble the tool, which fits with our finding that children found it easier to unbend and 
therefore disassemble what they had been given, than they did assemble a hook. Further 
developmental research is needed to investigate different types of tool manufacture that 
may have differing levels of complexity. 
Having established that tool-innovation difficulties are robust across two different 
tasks, we next considered whether the findings could be explained by children having 
difficulty with switching between possible task solutions. Experiment 1 revealed that in 
their second task children did not perseverate on techniques that had been successful in the 
first task. For example, children who, before the demonstration, successfully bent the 
straight pipecleaner to make a hook on their first task were just as likely to switch to the 
correct strategy of unbending for their second task, compared with children who did not 
bend the pipecleaner on their first task. However, it is also noteworthy that children did not 
demonstrate any positive transfer effects, meaning that succeeding or being shown how to 
succeed in the first task did not allow children to gain insight and facilitate their tool-
innovation ability, and so did not increase the likelihood of success on the second task. 
This suggests that tool innovation may not be an all-or-nothing insight that generalizes 
easily from one task to another.  
Experiment 2 investigated whether children’s inflexible behaviour was due to a 
misunderstanding that they should not alter the given materials. By telling children they 
could make something with the materials we aimed to overcome any tendency for children 
to believe that the materials were things that should be used without modification. In fact, 
children who were prompted to make something were no more likely to make a tool than 
children who were only told that the materials “could help” with retrieving the sticker. 
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Further evidence against the possibility that children thought they were not permitted to 
modify materials comes from the absence of transfer effects (in experiment 1) after the 
warm-up phase and (in both experiments) after their first task. Given that, in experiment 1, 
children modify a pipecleaner in the warm-up phase, and again when they either solve or 
are shown the solution to their first task, it seems even less likely that they still believe 
they are not permitted to modify the materials when they begin their second task. Yet, we 
observed no difference in children’s levels of success between their first and second tasks. 
We believe that these considerations make it unlikely that task pragmatics or 
misunderstanding about permission to modify the materials are adequate explanations of 
children’s tool-innovation difficulties. Nonetheless, it would be valuable for future work to 
include yet more explicit indications that the puppet or experimenter no longer needed the 
materials and that the child was allowed to change the materials. 
To gain a better understanding of what children were doing within each task we 
analysed the behaviours of both unsuccessful and successful participants. For unsuccessful 
participants we focused on perseverative behaviour. Although perseveration was rare in 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2 yielded much higher perseveration rates for the younger, 4 to 
5 year old children, with these children perseverating significantly more than the older 
children.  As the levels of perseveration in each experiment are similar for the 6- to 7- year 
olds we suggest that the difference seen in the younger children is likely to be due to task 
differences between the two experiments, rather than differences between the two samples. 
In this regard it is notable that in Experiment 1 all children received a warm-up exercise in 
which they manipulated the task materials whereas this was excluded from Experiment 2 
in order to make the materials appear more incidental to the overall task. It is possible that 
the warm-up exercise in Experiment 1 helped the younger children avoid perseverative 
behaviours, perhaps by priming them to manipulate the materials given in the main task. 
However, despite this finding it is clear from our results that children’s tool-innovation 
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difficulties are not merely due to an inability to overcome such perseverative behaviour. 
First, many children did not display perseverative behaviours yet were still not able to 
innovate tools. Second, for many of the children who succeeded, there was no apparent 
need to overcome perseveration on an initial unsuccessful solution because they 
immediately innovated successful tools. Nevertheless, although the current studies suggest 
that overcoming such perseveration is not the limiting step for tool-innovation success, the 
data do suggest that it may be a necessary condition for success. For if children initially 
use an unsuccessful ‘tool’ and then fail to stop using it, they can never go on to succeed in 
innovating a tool. 
Together, then, Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that children’s difficulty with tool 
innovation may not derive from difficulty with switching between alternative tool-
innovation solutions nor from difficulty overcoming a bias to view the tool-making 
materials as having pre-established, fixed functions. We can also rule out the possibility 
that difficulty arises from the need to overcome a tendency to perseverate with incorrect 
solutions. This raises the question of what other factors might lead to children’s apparent 
lack of flexibility on tool-innovation tasks. One possibility is that, unlike many tasks 
examining the development of mental flexibility and executive function in young children, 
which are “well-structured” problems, tool innovation is an intrinsically difficult, “ill-
structured” problem (Shallice & Burgess, 1991). 
To see why it might be appropriate to view tool innovation as an intrinsically ill-
structured task, it is useful to compare the tool-innovation tasks to a well-structured tool 
task. In Experiment 1 in Beck et al. (2011) children were given the same goal of retrieving 
a bucket containing a sticker from a deep, narrow container, but with the choice between a 
straight or a hooked pipecleaner. This is a well-structured task that has clear initial and 
goal states, and clearly defined strategies for how to move between them, and on this task 
children performed very well from the age of 4. Together with the evidence of children’s 
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success after the experimenter’s demonstration of tool making, this clearly demonstrates 
that children can recognize the solution to the problem when they see it, and can execute 
all of the relevant actions necessary to make and use the tool. What they find difficult is 
generating their own solution when it is not directly supplied. 
A requirement to generate a solution that is not directly supplied by the task is the 
defining feature of “ill-structured” executive tasks. For example, in the Six Elements Test 
(Burgess et al., 1996) participants are presented with six tasks to complete and are asked to 
achieve as many points as possible by completing as many of the tasks as they can within a 
time limit, and whilst following rules, such as having to attempt every task. Thus, the task 
explicitly supplies the starting conditions (the games and the rules) and the objective 
(maximizing points scored on the games), but it is ill-structured because participants must 
devise their own strategy for tackling the problem. Such problems undoubtedly require 
multiple executive processes (including memory, inhibition, and switching), but as noted 
in the introduction, they do not seem to reduce simply to the sum of these components. It 
is possible to be impaired on ill-structured problems despite showing no impairment on 
standard, well-structured tests of executive function (e.g., Shallice & Burgess, 1991; White 
et al., 2009). We suggest that children’s difficulty with tool innovation may stem from the 
ill-structured nature of such problems. Although there is little evidence on the development 
of children’s performance on ill-structured executive tasks, it is noteworthy that the ability 
to solve ill-structured tasks has been specifically associated with regions of medial 
prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area 10) that show protracted maturation throughout 
childhood and adolescence (Dumontheil, Burgess, & Blakemore, 2008). If children’s 
difficulty with tool innovation is derived from a broader, domain-general, difficulty with 
solving ill-structured problems, then it would be expected that individual differences in 
performance at tool innovation should be correlated with individual differences in 
performance on other ill-structured problems in non-tool contexts, and this relationship 
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should be independent of general intelligence and other executive functions, such as 
inhibition and working memory. 
Alternatively, it could be that children’s difficulty with generating structured 
solutions for tool-innovation problems lies with a lack of domain-specific knowledge 
about the mechanical properties of tool-making materials, rather than with a domain-
general problem with ill-structured tasks. If this were the explanation for children’s 
difficulties with tool innovation then individual differences in successful innovation should 
correlate with other tasks that require knowledge of the mechanical properties of tools but 
do not require ill-structured problem solving. Moreover, such a correlation should persist 
even if children’s performance on an ill-structured problem of another kind were partialled 
out. Future work would be necessary to distinguish between these possibilities. 
Finally, whatever the detailed reason for children’s difficulties, perhaps the most 
important conclusion from our studies is the simple and robust finding that tool innovation 
is a difficult and late-developing ability. Even when children are excellent tool users and 
tool manufacturers they fail to innovate simple tools. It is often noted that children are 
excellent social learners (e.g. Csibra & Gergely, 2009). Our findings highlight the 
importance of social learning in children’s developing ability to use tools, since 
“reinventing the wheel” for themselves is comparatively difficult. We might speculate that 
two factors were critical in the historical evolution of humans’ tool-rich cultures. The 
ability to innovate tools is clearly vital for technological advancement, but it is equally 
important that the valuable products of this effortful process are preserved and passed on 
through social learning. Either of these abilities has the potential to be the limiting step on 
the development of tool-rich cultures. However, we venture that the capacity for 
cognitively demanding tool innovation, rather than tool use, or tool manufacture, is what 
makes human tool culture stand out as uniquely complex. 
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Is There a Complexity Hierarchy in Human Children’s Tool Making? 
 
 
This chapter, largely in its current form, is under submission as the paper: 
 
Cutting, N., Beck, S.R., & Apperly, I.A. (under submission). Is There a 
Complexity Hierarchy in Human Children’s Tool Making? 
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3.0 Abstract 
The belief that humans are experts at all tool-related behaviour has been 
undermined by research showing children to have great difficulty in tool innovation 
(making novel tools to solve problems). The current paper investigated whether children’s 
tool making follows trends for a hierarchy of difficulty seen in non-human animals. We 
tested 4-to7-year-olds (N=192) on tool-making problems requiring different levels of 
transformation complexity. Children showed poor innovation for all levels of complexity. 
In a second phase, children’s tool-manufacturing ability was tested following two stages of 
demonstration. No hierarchy was observed, but many children manufactured tools 
successfully. Patterns of success suggest children’s ability to recognize relationships 
between their raw materials and the target tool demonstration is critical to their 
performance. 
3.1 Experiment 3: Introduction  
Humans are thought to be the ultimate tool users and tool makers (Defeyter & 
German, 2003; Herrmann, Call, Hernàndez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007). 
Comparative research uses our abilities as a benchmark with which to compare non-human 
animal behaviour. But are we really as good with tools as we think we are? There is no 
doubt that very young children show impressive abilities in tool use (Connolly & 
Dalgleish, 1989; Casler & Kelemen, 2005; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009), but evidence from 
tool making shows a divergence in children’s abilities. 
Tool making can be split into two distinct types – tool manufacture and tool 
innovation. Children demonstrate great aptitude for tool manufacture – making a tool 
following instruction (Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie & Cutting, 2011). Conversely, 
tool innovation – the ability to design and make a novel tool to solve a task – was 
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surprisingly difficult for young children, even when the tools needed were very simple 
(Beck et al., 2011; Cutting, Apperly & Beck, 2011). 
3.1.1 Children’s Tool Innovation 
Although the ability to both use tools and learn by observing others how to 
manufacture tools have no doubt been essential skills in the evolution of human culture, 
tool innovation could be the key skill that set humans apart from other animals (Beck, 
Chappell, Apperly, & Cutting, 2012). An aptitude for innovation seems a likely 
explanation for our complex tool-rich culture.  The ability to learn tool manufacture 
(fashioning a tool having seen a model tool or demonstration c.f. tool innovation) from 
others is essential for transmission between individuals, but without innovation human 
culture would not have evolved to the extent that it has. However, as stated above, the 
ability to innovate simple tools is thought to have a long developmental trajectory, 
appearing much later than the ability to manufacture tools based on imitation. So, although 
tool-innovation ability may be the key skill in the advancement of human culture, it may 
also dictate some limits on the ontogeny of tool cognition in children. 
Children’s innovation difficulties were first demonstrated in a task requiring the 
retrieval of a bucket from a narrow vertical tube. Children failed to innovate a hook tool by 
the simple action of bending a pipecleaner until the surprisingly late age of 8 years (Beck 
et al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011). Of course, it would be of limited interest if children only 
had difficulty with innovating hooks. It is therefore of critical importance to test whether 
children’s difficulty generalizes to different materials, and also to different categories of 
tool problem. Cutting et al. (2011) found evidence that children’s difficulty was not 
restricted to hook-making, but extended to another task requiring innovation of a long 
straight tool to push a ball out of a horizontal tube, by unbending a pipecleaner. However, 
this still required children to understand the physical properties of the same pliant material 
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(a pipecleaner), and still required the material to be transformed by re-shaping. The latter 
point is particularly important because comparative researchers suggest that the difficulty 
of tool-making may be strongly influenced by the kind of transformation that is required 
(Kacelnik, Chappell, Weir, & Kenward, 2006). A key aim of the current study was to test 
whether young children’s success at tool-making also varies as a function of the required 
physical transformation, and whether this follows the same pattern as proposed in non-
human animals.  
3.1.2 Non-human Animal Tool Manufacture 
 There are many ways in which to make tools, and it seems plausible that some 
methods of tool making will be easier and more common than others.  As there is little 
research on the simple tool-making skills of modern humans, we look instead to the non-
human animal literature. An important point to note is that the animal studies cited below 
demonstrate tool manufacture rather than tool innovation, as the animals had seen or were 
sometimes even instructed how to make the required tools. Although there is evidence of 
animals innovating new methods to make known tools (e.g. crows bending hooks, Weir, 
Chappell & Kacelnik, 2002) to our knowledge there are no experimental studies of tool-
innovation in the comparative literature in which animals innovated novel tools. 
In his influential work on animal tool use, Benjamin Beck (1980) defined four 
modes of tool making. The most commonly catalogued mode of tool making is termed 
Detaching, and is defined by the severation of a fixed attachment between two objects. 
Subtracting is the removal of parts of an object to leave behind a more functional tool. 
Adding is when two or more objects are combined to form a tool. And finally, reshaping is 
defined as restructuring material into a functional tool (see table 3.1 for examples). 
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Table 3. 1 Beck’s (1980) Tool making definitions. 
Mode of tool 
making 
Description Example 
   
Detach Severing a fixed attachment between two 
objects, so that the removed object can be 
used as a tool. 
Breaking a branch off a tree 
to use as a weapon 
   
Subtract Removing parts of an object to make it into 
a more useful tool. 
Removing leaves from a 
twig. 
   
Add/Combine The connection of 2 or more objects to 
form a tool. 
Connecting 2 short sticks to 
make a longer stick. 
   
Reshape Fundamentally restructuring an object’s 
material to produce a tool. 
Scrunching up leaves to 
make a sponge. 
 
 
An example of an experimental task requiring detaching comes from Visalberghi, 
Fragaszy and Savage-Rumbaugh (1995) who tested primates (great apes and capuchin 
monkeys) on a task requiring them to push a food treat out of a narrow horizontal tube. In 
one condition participants were required to detach a suitable stick from a bundle of sticks 
held together with either an elastic band or tape. The bundle itself was too large to fit into 
the tube and so detaching a single stick was the only solution to the task. All participants 
from both species solved the task on every trial. Great apes found the task trivially easy 
and never attempted to insert the whole bundle. In contrast capuchin monkeys made many 
errors before solving the task on a given trial, and these errors did not significantly 
decrease over trial blocks. It should be noted that it is not perfectly clear that this task 
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really requires detachment. The task does not require animals to sever any fixed 
attachments and as such does not operationalise detaching as defined by B. Beck (1980). 
Alternatively, one might construe it as ‘just’ a tool selection task, i.e. if the bundle of sticks 
is seen as a collection rather than a single object. We will return to this point in the 
discussion. 
Tasks with chimpanzees illustrate the subtracting and adding modes of tool making 
(Bania, Harris, Kinsley, & Boysen, 2009). In this experiment participants were presented 
with pieces of dowel or PVC. There was one long piece into the ends of which two shorter 
pieces could be inserted to make an H-shape. Participants were presented with two tasks: 
in a hook retrieval task they were required to add a smaller piece in to the long piece of 
dowel to make a hook tool to retrieve a reward. In a second task they were required to 
subtract the smaller pieces of dowel to leave a straight stick tool that would fit inside a 
tube to push out a reward. Although levels of success were high for both tasks, 
chimpanzees performed better when they had to disassemble a tool (subtract) than they had 
to assemble (add). Thus, in addition to Beck’s observation of a hierarchy in the frequency 
of different modes of tool making in non-human animals, there is experimental evidence 
that some modes of tool making may be harder than others. 
The reshaping mode of tool manufacture is exemplified by the hook-making and 
unbending tasks with children, cited above (Beck et al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011). These 
experiments were based on a study with New Caledonian crows in which one crow 
spontaneously bent a piece of wire into a hook to retrieve a bucket containing a reward 
from a narrow vertical tube (Weir et al., 2002. See Bird & Emery, 2009 for success on this 
task by rooks). 
Although in his catalogue of natural tool behaviour B. Beck (1980) did not 
explicitly describe a hierarchy of difficulty for tool making, he did suggest that detaching 
was the simplest and most commonly seen mode. Kacelnik et al. (2006) went one step 
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further and suggested four levels of tool-making complexity based on the amount of 
modification required. Level 0, ‘none’, is the simplest and refers to when unmodified 
materials are used as tools (n.b. selecting a tool would fall under this level). Level 1 
comprises detach and subtract as defined by B. Beck. Level 2 comprises adding/combining 
and reshaping. Finally, level 3 consists of multi-step manufacture and fine crafting. The 
suggestion that detaching and subtracting are less complex modes of tool making requiring 
less transformation than adding and reshaping fits with the animal evidence cited above: 
Detaching was reported to be remarkably easy for great apes (Visalberghi et al., 1995); and 
chimpanzees found adding more difficult than subtracting (Bania et al., 2009). However, 
the full hierarchy has yet to be tested empirically in any species, including humans.  
3.1.3 Testing for a hierarchy in children’s tool innovation. 
In humans there is no systematic evidence on tool-making abilities in different 
modes. The aim of this current work was to test for the presence of a hierarchy based on 
transformation complexity in young children’s tool making, and whether this follows the 
same pattern as proposed in the comparative literature. A hierarchy was tested for in 
children’s ability to innovate tools via different methods, and children’s ability to 
manufacture tools given different levels of instruction. We tested children because 
previous work had shown that their tool-making abilities were under development and so 
we would be more likely to see a hierarchy emerging than if we had focused on adults 
whose tool-making is good (see Beck et al., 2011). 
Using both the vertical tube and bucket apparatus (requiring a hook tool) (Beck et 
al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011) and the horizontal tube apparatus (requiring a long, straight 
tool) (Cutting et al., 2011), the present work examined children’s tool-innovation abilities 
using B. Beck’s (1980) four modes of tool making. The previous reshaping tasks (Beck et 
al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011) were compared to tasks requiring participants to innovate 
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tools by detaching, subtracting and adding materials. Note that by using B. Beck’s four 
tool-making modes this study only tests for a difference in complexity between Levels 1 
and 2 as defined by Kacelnik et al. (2006). 
For the vertical-tube task children were required either to detach the relevant hook 
tool from a bundle containing other non-functional tools, subtract pieces of dowel from a 
hooked tool to allow it to fit inside the vertical tube, add a small piece of dowel into a long 
stick to form a hooked tool, or reshape a pipecleaner into a hook as in the previous 
experiments (Beck et al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011). For the horizontal-tube task children 
were required to either detach the relevant tool from a bundle, subtract parts of the tool 
that make it non-functional, add pieces of dowel together to make a longer tool, or reshape 
a pipecleaner in to a long straight tool as previously (see figure 3.1).  
3.1.4 Testing for a hierarchy in children’s tool manufacture following demonstrations. 
If children were unsuccessful at spontaneous tool innovation within the given 
timeframe, they progressed to a tool manufacture phase of the experiment, in which we 
assessed children’s ability to make different kinds of tool following two phases of 
demonstration. This is potentially important because much of children’s abilities to use 
tools may derive from social learning rather than first-person innovation (Vaesen, 2012). 
Previous research has demonstrated high success levels in children after witnessing a 
demonstration of the action required to reshape a tool (Beck et al., 2011; Cutting et al., 
2011). However, based on previous findings we do not know whether children benefitted 
from the provision of a solution to the problem (e.g. they saw an example of a functional 
hook tool) or whether they needed to see the action required to form the tool. In the present 
work we used a two-stage demonstration to explore this. In the initial demonstration 
children were shown a pre-made example of the tool they were trying to create with the 
simple instruction ‘Look at this’. If this demonstration did not elicit tool manufacture, they 
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then received the original manufacturing action demonstration with the instruction ‘Watch 
this’. These two stages of demonstration allowed us to see how much information about 
the manufacturing process children needed to be shown before they were able to 
manufacture a tool. 
As well as seeking the existence of a tool-making hierarchy, testing children on the 
different tool-making modes addressed two major limitations of the previous research into 
children’s tool innovation. First, it allowed us to test whether children’s innovation 
difficulties extend to other modes of tool making as well as reshaping. Second, we needed 
to check that children’s difficulties were not limited to tasks involving pipecleaners – the 
only material that had been used in previous studies. Demonstrating such generalization is 
crucial for the conclusion that children’s difficulty is with tool innovation per se, and not 
with understanding the physical properties or affordances of particular materials, such as 
pliant wire pipecleaners. 
Children aged 4 to 7 years were tested on the tasks. This age group was chosen as 
previous work has shown that 4-year-olds rarely innovate tools, and so any improvement 
with the other modes of tool making would be easy to see. Children’s success gradually 
increases, and around age 7 50-75% of children succeed at reshaping, and so if detaching 
and subtracting were easier modes we would expect to see near ceiling performance in this 
age group. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Ninety-seven 4- to 5- year-olds (49 boys), mean age 5 years 2 months (5; 2), (range 
4; 3 to 5; 11), and 95 6- to 7-year-olds (49 boys), mean age 6; 10 (range 6; 0 to 7; 9) 
participated. Mean ages and ranges were based on the data available from 65 younger and 
Chapter 3 
64 
 
69 older children. Children were recruited from and tested at urban schools serving a 
working and middle class population. 
3.2.2 Materials 
Table 3.1 depicts the task apparatus and the materials available to the children in 
each condition. For the vertical-tube task the main apparatus was a plastic tube (length = 
22cm, width of opening = 4cm) attached vertically to a cardboard base (length = 35cm, 
width = 21cm) and a bucket with a wire handle containing a sticker. The materials for each 
of the conditions were as follows: Detach – a bundle held together with elastic made up 
from a wooden rectangular block (width = 4.5cm, length = 28cm, depth = 2cm), a piece of 
dowel (length = 12cm, diameter = 1.5cm), and a wooden hook composed of a piece of 
dowel (length = 28cm, diameter = 1.5cm) with three holes in, the end hole containing a 
smaller piece of dowel (length = 4cm, diameter = 0.5cm), and a separate piece of dowel 
(length = 10cm, diameter = 0.5cm). Subtract – A piece of dowel (length = 28cm, diameter 
= 1.5cm) with three holes into which were placed three pieces of dowel (end and middle 
pieces- length = 10cm, diameter = 0.5cm, other end piece length = 4cm, diameter = 
0.5cm), and a separate piece of dowel (length = 10cm, diameter = 0.5cm). Add – A piece 
of dowel (length = 28cm, diameter = 1.5cm), with three holes and two shorter pieces of 
dowel (1 x length = 10cm, diameter = 0.5cm, 1 x length = 4cm, diameter = 0.5cm). 
Reshape – a pipecleaner (length = 29cm) and a piece of string (length = 29cm). 
 For the horizontal-tube task the main apparatus was a clear plastic tube (length = 
22cm, width of opening = 4cm) attached horizontally to a cardboard base (length = 33cm, 
width = 15cm), and a pompom (diameter = 4cm) with sticker attached. The materials for 
each of the conditions were as follows: Detach - a bundle held together with elastic made 
up from a wooden rectangular block (width = 4.5cm, length = 28cm, depth = 2cm) and two 
pieces of dowel (1 x length = 24cm, diameter = 1.5cm, 1 x length = 7cm, diameter = 
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1.5cm), and a separate short piece of dowel (length = 4cm, diameter = 0.5cm). Subtract - a 
piece of dowel (length = 24cm, diameter = 1.5cm) with three holes, into the end and 
middle holes were two pieces of dowel (length = 10cm, diameter = 0.5cm), and a separate 
short piece of dowel (length = 4cm, diameter = 0.5cm). Add – Three pieces of dowel 
(length = 7cm, diameter = 1.5cm) with hook and loop squares attached to both ends and 
two pieces in the middle, and a short piece of dowel (length = 4cm, diameter = 0.5cm). 
Reshape – pipecleaner bent in half (unbent length = 22cm) and a piece of string (length = 
29cm). 
Figure 3. 1 Apparatus for vertical- and horizontal-tube tasks. 
 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Prior to testing children were instructed by their class teacher not to tell other 
children about the games they would be playing with the experimenter so they would be a 
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nice surprise for everyone. Participants were tested individually in a quiet area just outside 
the main classroom. All children received both the vertical- and horizontal-tube tasks. For 
each task children received one of the four tool-making conditions, a different mode of 
making for each task (for example, one participant would complete the vertical-tube task 
detach version and the horizontal-tube task add version, another the vertical-tube task 
reshape version and the horizontal-tube task subtract version). The order of tasks and tool-
making modes were counterbalanced across participants. 
For each task children were shown the relevant transparent tube (vertical or 
horizontal) and their attention was drawn to the sticker (either in the bucket or attached to 
the pompom). Children were told that if they could get the sticker out of the tube they were 
allowed to keep it. The experimenter then brought out the relevant materials for the 
particular condition and told the child that these were things that ‘can help’ to get the 
sticker out. The children were given one minute to try to retrieve the sticker. No feedback 
was provided, only neutral prompts if required. Examples of prompts used include ‘Can 
you think how you might be able to get the sticker out?’ and ‘Maybe you could use these 
things to help you.’ If, after one minute, the child had not retrieved the sticker, they were 
encouraged by the experimenter to put down the materials they were using. With the 
materials remaining on view, the experimenter then said ‘look at this,’ and using their own 
materials held out a pre-made target tool for the child to view (target-tool demonstration). 
The children were again encouraged to retrieve the sticker. If, after 30 seconds, children 
were still unsuccessful they were again encouraged to put down the materials they were 
using. The experimenter then said ‘watch this’ and again using their own materials (target 
tool had been returned to original state), demonstrated the action required to make a 
functional tool (action demonstration). 
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3.2.4 Measures  
Behaviours were recorded online by the experimenter. A coding system was used 
to differentiate children’s actions across time. The system coded which materials were 
selected by the child, including whether the selection involved touching, picking up and/or 
entering the material into the tube; how the materials were manipulated, for example if 
pieces were added or removed or if the material was modified into a new shape; and 
finally whether success was achieved before or after each demonstration. 
It should be noted that if children did the correct action but then failed to use the 
tool correctly they were coded as being unsuccessful pre-demonstration. However, as the 
demonstrations would have no effect due to the child already having performed the 
required action, these children received a verbal prompt as to how to use the tool they had 
created. 
3.3 Results 
The data were first analysed for any differences due to gender, age, and task order, 
including whether success on children’s second task was affected by the mode of tool 
making required for their first task. Then for each of the tasks independently (vertical and 
horizontal) we ran chi-square analyses to compare the success rates for the different modes 
of tool making. Finally chi-square tests were again used to compare each mode directly 
against each other to determine where the significant differences could be found. 
3.3.1 Tool Innovation 
Following the coding of Cutting et al. (2011) and Beck et al. (2011), children were 
coded as successful on each of the tasks if they retrieved the sticker having made an 
appropriate tool within the one minute timeframe. For the horizontal tube-add task children 
were coded as successfully innovating a tool if they added the pieces of dowel together 
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prior to entering them into the tube. Pushing extra pieces of dowel into the tube once a 
piece had already been inserted was not deemed to be true tool innovation (seen in 11 
younger and 13 older children). 
There were no effects of gender for either the vertical, χ² (1, N = 176) = 0.571, p 
=.45, or the horizontal tube tasks, χ² (1, N = 190) = 0.00, p =.988, on all modes combined, 
or for any mode independently (all ps ns). No difference in success was found based on 
whether tasks were presented first or second. Similarly, participants’ success on the second 
task was unaffected by the mode required for the first task. As such, data for each mode of 
manufacture on each task were combined irrespective of whether participants received the 
task first or second. 
For the vertical-tube task, the detach and reshape modes yielded ceiling and floor 
success rates respectively and so no difference between the two age groups was observed. 
Chi-square tests revealed an improvement with age for both the subtract, χ² (1, N = 45) = 
4.874, p = .027, and add modes, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .048. For the horizontal-tube task 
no difference in age was observed for the detach (100% success) or add modes. Older 
children were more successful on the subtract, χ² (1, N = 51) = 11.004, p = .001 and 
reshape modes, χ² (1, N = 49) = 3.960, p = .047. Despite these differences, separate 
comparisons for the two age groups for the following analyses did not reveal a pattern that 
differed for the data collapsed over age. Therefore, subsequent analyses will report both 
age groups combined. 
For the vertical-tube task, chi-square analyses found a significant difference in 
success between the different modes of manufacture χ² (3, N=176) = 64.574, p < .001. 
Children were significantly more successful on the detach task than on the subtract, add or 
reshape tasks when compared individually (all chi-squares, p<.001, see Table 3.2). There 
were trends for differences between the subtract, add and reshape tasks, but these were 
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smaller (lowest p = .035) and were not statistically significant once a Bonferroni correction 
for the 6 multiple comparisons were made (the alpha level was set at p < .008). 
 
Table 3. 2 Frequencies of success before and after demonstrations for the vertical-tube 
task. 
 
Age group 
(years) N 
 
Success 
Before 
Demo 
Only after 
Demo 1 
Only after 
Demo 2 
Detach 
4-5 23 18 (78%) 5* (22%) - 
6-7 20 17(85%) 3* (15%) - 
Subtract 
4-5 22 3 (14%) 5 (23%) 10 (45%) 
6-7 23 10 (43%) 5 (22%) 7 (30%) 
Add 
4-5 21    0  2 (10%) 8 (38%) 
6-7 22 5 (23%) 4 (18%) 9 (41%) 
Reshape 
4-5 23 1 (4%) 7 (30%) 5 (22%) 
6-7 22 4 (18%) 11 (50%) 6 (27%) 
Note: * Verbal prompt only, as had already carried out the required action. 
These results were mirrored on the horizontal-tube task (see table 3.3). Once again 
chi-square analyses found a significant difference in success between the different modes 
of manufacture, χ² (3, N = 190) = 69.677, p <.001. Children were significantly more 
successful on the detach task than on the subtract, add or reshape tasks when compared 
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individually (all chi-squares, p <.001). Again there were trends for differences between the 
subtract, add and reshape modes (lowest p = .06) which did not reach significance. 
 
Table 3. 3 Frequencies of success before and after demonstrations for the 
horizontal-tube task. 
 
Age group 
(years) N 
 
Success 
Before Demo 
Only after 
Demo 1 
Only after 
Demo 2 
Detach 
4-5 24 24 (100%) - - 
6-7 21 21 (100%) - - 
Subtract 
4-5 28 2 (7%) 5 (18%) 5 (18%) 
6-7 23 11 (48%) 4 (17%) 6 (26%) 
Add 
4-5 22 4 (18%) 4 (18%) 3 (14%) 
6-7 23 7 (30%) 3 (13%) 1 (14%) 
Reshape 
4-5 22 6 (27%) 4 (18%) 5 (23%) 
6-7 27 15 (56%) 6 (22%) 6 (22%) 
 
3.3.2 Tool Manufacture following demonstration 
First, we excluded children who had already succeeded in the spontaneous 
innovation of a tool, because they could not benefit from any demonstration. We also 
excluded results from the detach mode of manufacture as the small number of children 
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who made errors in this condition were only coded as unsuccessful due to using the tool 
incorrectly and failing to retrieve the sticker. These children, therefore, did not receive the 
demonstrations as in the other conditions but merely received a verbal prompt as to how to 
us the tool correctly. As in previous research children were very likely to succeed at the 
tasks having seen a demonstration (see tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
Using chi-square tests we analyzed whether there were differences with age in the 
success levels following the two types of demonstration for all remaining modes of 
manufacture combined. Following the first, ‘target-tool’, demonstration chi-square tests 
showed trends for older children to be more successful than younger children (Vertical 
Tube: p = .03, Horizontal Tube: p = .057). Following the second, ‘action’, demonstration 
older children were more successful than younger children (Vertical Tube: p=.006, 
Horizontal Tube: p=.001). These analyses suggest that older children benefitted more from 
both of the experimenter’s demonstrations than younger children. 
Next, we looked for differences in success for the modes of manufacture 
independently for both age groups combined. Following the first ‘target tool’ 
demonstration there were some significant differences in children’s rate of success for 
different modes of manufacture, but they were inconsistent across the two tasks. The only 
difference on the vertical-tube task was that children were significantly more successful at 
reshaping following demonstration than they were at adding (Combined ages: χ² (1, N = 
76) = 7.04, p =.008). For the horizontal-tube task, children were more likely to succeed 
following the first demonstration in the adding task rather than the subtracting task 
(Fisher’s Exact Test, p =.01).  
Following the second, ‘action’ demonstration there were no differences in success 
rates in either the vertical- or horizontal-tube tasks. 
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3.3.3 Comparing modes across tasks. 
The following analyses will not be discussed in this current chapter, but will be referred to 
in Chapter 4.  
We compared success levels for each of the tool-making modes across the two 
tasks (vertical-tube task and horizontal-tube task). We did not compare success across the 
two detaching tasks due to ceiling performance. There was no difference in the level of 
success for the two subtracting tasks, χ2 (1, N = 96) = 1.40, p = .708. Nor was there any 
difference in the level of success between the two adding modes on each of the tasks, χ2 (1, 
N = 88) = 2.428, p = .119. However, we found that the horizontal-tube reshaping task was 
significantly easier than the vertical-tube reshaping task, χ2 (1, N = 91) = 9.456, p = .002. 
3.4 Discussion 
Children’s tool-innovation difficulties were shown to extend to both new materials 
and new methods of tool making. We did not, however, find a hierarchy of complexity for 
the different modes as suggested in the comparative literature. In the unsuccessful 
innovators we observed differences with age as to the amount of instruction children 
needed to manufacture the required tool. Children’s difficulties spanned different materials 
and different modes of tool making. Thus, the current study significantly extends previous 
findings that tool innovation is a difficult and late developing aspect of tool-related 
behaviour.  
The first aim of this study was to test for the presence of a mode of tool-making 
hierarchy in tool innovation as suggested by Kacelnik et al. (2006). We did not find 
evidence for any such hierarchy based on transformation complexity. There were no 
differences in the levels of success between the subtract, and the add and reshape modes of 
tool making. Success on these modes in both age groups was relatively low. At best there 
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was a 50% success rate in the older age group. However, there were three aspects of our 
findings and our data coding that warranted further consideration. 
First, we considered the possibility that the low success rates in the new tasks could 
be explained by the crafted nature of the materials presented, which may have prevented 
children from modifying them. However, this explanation seems unlikely given that 
children perform at the same level on both their first and second tasks. If children were 
unaware they had permission to alter their materials we would expect children’s success 
rates to dramatically improve on their second task after they had manipulated materials in 
their first task (see also Cutting et al., 2011). 
Second, the only evidence that appeared to support a hierarchy was that the 
detaching task was substantially easier than the three other modes of tool making. There 
are two alternative explanations for the high success rates on these tasks. The first 
explanation is that the operation of detaching is truly easy. The high success rates for the 
detaching tasks are consistent with the comparative literature (both capuchins and great 
apes succeeded in the task when it was given in a manufacturing rather than innovation 
format (Visalberghi et al., 1995), and fit with the complexity hierarchy in the sense that it 
is easier than adding or reshaping. However, Kacelnik’s hierarchy also predicts that 
subtracting should be as easy or difficult as detaching (Kacelnik et al., 2006). An 
alternative explanation is that these tasks did not truly represent detaching. Although we 
based our task directly on one previously used in the comparative literature (Visalberghi et 
al.), it is a concern that this does not in fact correspond to detaching as defined by B. Beck 
(1980). B. Beck defines detaching as the severation of a fixed attachment between objects, 
and examples given include breaking a branch off of a tree. Merely separating a tool from 
a bundle does not really capture this mode of tool manufacture, which appears to be more 
like a tool-selection task. If we take this second explanation, then the ‘detaching’ task in 
this current work more closely represents Kacelnik et. al.’s (2006) baseline Level 0, where 
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unmodified materials are used as a tool. If this is the case then these results indicate 
significantly greater difficulty for tasks requiring tool modification (Kacelnik et al.’s 
Levels 1 and 2) compared with those that do not (Level 0). This provides support for the 
first stage of Kacelnik’s complexity hierarchy but does not provide evidence for levels of 
complexity in tool manufacture or innovation.  
Of course, if we interpret this “detach” task as measuring tool selection rather than 
tool modification this calls in to question claims that non-human primates were making 
tools in the task used by Visalberghi et al. (1995). Perhaps a better example of a detaching 
task would be one more closely modelled on behaviour seen in the wild, such as the 
detaching of branches from trees by elephants, which they then used as fly switches (Hart, 
Hart, McCoy &, Sarath, 2001). Future work in both children and non-human primates 
might take this as inspiration for developing better tests of detachment operations. 
Third, one might question whether the horizontal-tube-add task results may not 
have given a true indication of children’s abilities. Children were only coded as successful 
on this task if they added materials together outside of the tube, as we felt that adding extra 
material once a piece had been inserted did not represent true tool making. This poses a 
problem as children were not instructed to make the whole tool prior to entry, and so 
children that were coded as unsuccessful may have been successful if they were aware of 
this. However, children also performed poorly on the vertical-add task, and so our results 
appear to be representative of the difficulty of this mode. 
In sum, we do not believe that any of these considerations affect our conclusion 
that children in our study failed to show a clear hierarchy of difficulty for tool innovation. 
However, the current findings extend knowledge by suggesting that innovation difficulties 
are not limited to a single mode of tool making, and are not due to the specific material 
used in the tasks. 
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Our second aim was to conduct the first study to investigate children’s learning 
about tools from demonstrations, and to examine whether the ease of such learning 
followed the hierarchy described by Kacelnik et al. (2006).  
We introduced a two-stage demonstration procedure. After failure on the 
innovation part of the task, the participant was first shown the target tool that they needed 
to produce, and then, if required, were shown the action needed to make that tool. Older 
children benefitted more from both demonstrations than younger children. Although there 
has been much research on children’s observational learning of tool use (McGuigan & 
Whiten, 2009; Meltzoff, 1995; Want & Harris, 2002), these results are the first steps in 
understanding children’s observational learning of how to manufacture tools. Only about 
half the children succeeded having seen just the target tool, whereas the rest also needed to 
see the required action. 
Comparison of success rates following the first ‘target-tool’ demonstration reveals 
that children were more successful for certain modes of manufacture than others. 
However, the same pattern was not seen across the two tasks. For the vertical task children 
were more successful after the first demonstration for the reshaping mode than the adding 
mode, but no differences were seen between the reshaping and subtracting or the 
subtracting and adding modes. In contrast, for the horizontal task children were more 
successful following the first demonstration for the adding task than for the subtracting 
task, but no differences were observed between the subtracting and reshaping or adding 
and reshaping modes. Notably, these varied patterns add to the view that there is no 
systematic hierarchy in children’s difficulty with different modes of tool manufacture. 
Instead, a possible reason for the differences between the two tasks could be that the 
relation between the target tool and the raw materials the participant possesses may be 
clearer in some cases than others. Success in tool manufacture may be dependent on 
children’s ability to recognize the relationship between their raw materials and the target 
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tool. For example, in the horizontal-tube experiment the demonstration for the add mode 
may be a clearer transformation from the materials the participant possesses (3 blocks 
combined together to make a long stick versus 3 small individual blocks) than the 
demonstrated tool for the subtract mode (straight stick versus straight stick with smaller 
pieces inserted). Despite these differences the high success levels following the 
demonstrations highlight how much easier it is to learn how to manufacture a tool from 
others than it is to innovate a tool for oneself.  
Altogether this current work makes two important advances on our understanding 
of children’s tool-related behaviour. First, children showed surprising difficulty in 
innovating novel tools via a variety of methods and with a number of materials, and this 
showed little evidence of following the hierarchy of tool difficulty described by (Kacelnik 
et al., 2006). Second, this work demonstrates that success following tool manufacturing 
instruction increases with age and may be affected by the transparency of the 
transformation required. These findings pave the way for future research into children’s 
social learning of tool manufacture. Finally, this work, with other recent studies, confirms 
that innovation is a difficult and late-developing aspect of tool-related behaviour. Though 
late developing, our ability to overcome this challenge could explain how human tool 
behaviour has advanced so far beyond our nearest relatives.  
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Chapter 4 
Is tool making complexity due to the transformation required? 
Chapter 4 
78 
 
4.1 Experiment 4: Introduction 
Chapter 3 explored Kacelnik, Chappell, Weir and Kenward’s (2006) suggestion 
that different methods of tool making differ in complexity. Three different modes of tool 
making were compared on two different tasks; a vertical-tube task requiring a hooked tool, 
and a horizontal-tube task requiring a straight tool. No differences in success levels 
between the different modes of tool making were found within each task (vertical or 
horizontal tube).  It was concluded that all tool-making modes were equally difficult for 
young children. In this current chapter tool-making complexity was explored further. This 
chapter investigated the suggestion that comparing tool-making modes was too broad a 
categorisation of methods, and instead attention should focus at a lower level of tool 
making. 
In the main analyses in chapter 3 the different tool-making modes were only 
compared within each task. Chapter 3 did not consider how difficulty of modes (i.e. 
subtracting/adding/reshaping) may vary across tasks (i.e. vertical-tube/horizontal-tube). In 
additional analyses, reported in chapter 3 but not discussed, (see chapter 3, section 3.3.3) 
the different modes of tool making were compared across the two task types. These 
additional analyses found no difference in success levels on the different tasks for the 
subtract or add modes of tool making, but did find a difference in the levels of success for 
the reshaping mode, with the horizontal-tube task that required unbending being 
significantly easier than the vertical-tube task that required the bending of a hook. This is a 
stable finding that has been demonstrated in previous experiments (Cutting et al., 2011, 
experiments 1 and 2). In this current chapter we aimed to explore why there might be 
differences in success rates within the different tool-making modes for some tasks but not 
for others.  
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We suggest the possibility that in chapter 3 we were focusing at the wrong level of 
tool making. Perhaps the level of tool-making mode was too broad and instead attention 
should be focused at a lower level, because a different level might be the determining 
factor for task difficulty. We propose three levels of tool making (see Figure 4. 1). The 
first and highest level being the general level of tool-making mode as defined by B. Beck 
(1980). B. Beck defined four types of tool-making; detaching, subtracting, adding and 
reshaping (see chapter 3 for full details of B. Beck’s work). The second level proposed is 
the transformation of materials required to create each tool, for example for the reshaping 
mode this could be bending or unbending. Lastly, we suggest a third level termed action 
that refers to the specific action required to create each tool, for example two tasks may 
require bending, but one may require the specific action of bending a pipecleaner in to 
hook, whereas another may require bending of a different material in to a hook or bending 
a material in to another type of tool. Tool-making complexity may lie at the level of 
transformation or at the level of action. 
 
 
 
 
Reshape Subtract 
Bend Unbend* Remove* 
Bent 
pipecleaner → 
Straight* 
Bent wire strip 
→ Straight* 
Remove 
dowel from 
stick* 
Remove 
stick from 
shelf* 
Straight 
pipecleaner → 
hook 
Mode 
Transformation 
Action 
Figure 4. 1 Diagram to show the different levels of tool making. * denotes the transformations and 
actions used in the current experiment. 
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The tool-making modes tested in the two tasks in chapter 3 can be examined more 
closely in terms of the transformations and specific actions that were required to create 
each tool. Comparing the transformations and actions required for the same mode of tool 
making across the two tasks may provide some insight in to the differences in success 
levels that were seen. First, for the tools made via reshaping, the specific transformations 
required on each of the tasks were different. In the vertical-tube task, participants were 
required to take a straight pipecleaner and transform it by bending it in to a hook, 
conversely in the horizontal-tube task, participants were required to take a bent pipecleaner 
and transform it by unbending it in to long tool. The mode of tool making for both of these 
tasks was the same – reshaping, however, they clearly differ in the type of transformation 
required – bending vs. unbending. It is therefore possible that the reshaping tasks in 
chapter 3 differ in difficulty due to differences in the transformation required. Further 
evidence for the potential importance of transformation comes from the subtracting tasks 
in chapter 3. In the subtracting versions of the tasks children were required to alter the 
materials using the same transformation - removing. An example of a different 
transformation for the subtract mode of tool making would be breaking or snapping off 
parts of a tool to leave a more functional core behind. Children performed comparably on 
the two subtracting trials in chapter 3 and it is possible that this was because they were also 
the same at the level of transformation. These findings suggest the possibility that 
differences in the level of difficulty found in tool-making could lie at the level of 
transformation rather than at the level of tool-making mode. 
From the chapter 3 findings however we cannot disentangle whether difficulty lies 
at the level of transformation (e.g. bending vs. unbending) or at a lower level we have 
termed action (see Figure 4. 1). The action level refers to the specific manipulation that is 
carried out to form a tool. In the case of the two subtraction tasks in chapter 3, both the 
transformation and the action required by the child were very similar if not identical. Both 
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tasks required children to not only transform the materials via removal, they both required 
the specific action of removing a piece of dowel from a stick. The identical 
transformations and actions required in these tasks means it is not possible to disentangle 
whether the similar success levels found in these two tasks was determined at the level of 
transformation or at the level of specific action. 
The two reshaping tasks reported in chapter 3 present the opposite confound. These 
two tasks not only differed at the level of transformation (one required bending and the 
other unbending) they also differed at the level of specific action, straight pipecleaner to 
hook or bent pipecleaner to straight. In this case it is not possible to disentangle whether 
the differences seen between the two reshaping tasks were due to them differing at the 
level of transformation, or due to them differing at the action level.  
In order to discover at which of these levels tool-making complexity might lay, in 
the current study we held mode of manufacture and transformation constant and varied the 
specific actions required. This design produced tasks that separated transformation and 
action allowing for direct comparison of these components that had previously covaried in 
chapter 3. Children were tested on four tasks. The tasks were split in to two sets that 
differed on the mode of manufacture required – subtracting or reshaping. Having two sets 
of tasks provided us with two opportunities to explore tool-making complexity. Each set of 
two tasks were identical at the level of mode and level of transformation (subtracting tasks 
required removal, reshaping tasks required unbending) but they required different specific 
actions. If children found one of the tasks in each set more difficult than the other, this 
would tell us that difficulty was due to the specific action that the task required. However, 
if children performed comparably on the two tasks in each set then this would suggest that 
task difficulty was due to either the tool-making mode or the type of transformation.    
 We also manipulated another dimension at the level of action which we termed 
directness. Within each pair, one of the tasks required children to make a tool that was 
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needed to act directly on the target, whereas the other task required the tool to act 
indirectly by altering the structure of the apparatus. Evidence from studies with 
chimpanzees suggests that directness of action might alter task difficulty. 
Chimpanzees were significantly hindered in their success on trap-tube problems 
when they had to use a tool and could not retrieve the target with their hands. A trap-tube 
task involves the subject retrieving a reward from a tube. The reward is placed in the 
middle of the tube and there are two traps, one at each end of the tube. During a trial only 
one of these traps is functional, subjects must therefore work out which is the functional 
trap and avoid it by pushing the reward out of the other end of the tube. Seed, Call, Emery 
& Clayton (2009) tested chimpanzees on two types of trap-tube problem. One version 
required subjects to retrieve the reward by pushing it out of the tube with a stick tool. The 
second version had finger holes along the length of the tube which enabled chimpanzees to 
move the reward with their fingers and as such did not require a tool. Chimpanzees were 
much more successful when they did not have to use a tool and they were able to act 
directly on the target reward. This finding suggests that difficulty on physical problem 
solving tasks could be moderated by the distance between the participant and their means 
for acting on the target. Acting more directly on the target reward is easier. 
In the current study the distance between the subject and the means for acting on 
the target was moderated by the directness of the action. In two of the tasks children were 
required to make a tool which could act directly on the target object, i.e. children could 
physically move the target with the tool. In the other tasks children were required to make 
and enter something which altered the structure of the apparatus and made it possible to 
retrieve the target, but would not form a physical link between the subject and the target, 
i.e. children could not push or pull the reward towards them using the artefact they had 
made. Based on the findings of Seed et al. (2009) it is possible that children would be able 
to solve the physical problem we give them more readily if the solution enabled them to 
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act directly on the target with the tool. Creating something which acts further away and 
isn’t merely an extension of the hand that can contact the reward may be much more 
difficult for children. If children perform differently on the direct and indirect tasks, we 
will need to perform a second experiment to determine whether differences were due to 
directedness or due to the different specific actions. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-one 4-to-5-year-olds (11 boys) mean age 5 years 4 months (5; 4) (range 4; 
11 – 5; 10), and 21 5-to-6-year-olds (9 boys) mean age 6; 4 (range 5; 10 – 6; 10) 
participated in the study. Children were recruited from an infant school in South 
Birmingham that served a working and middle class population.  
4.2.2 Materials 
The apparatus and materials used for the hooks and tube tasks were identical to 
those used in the subtract version of the hooks task and the unbending version of the tube 
task from chapter 3.  
The apparatus for the shelf task consisted of a clear plastic box (height = 22.5cm, 
width = 18.5cm, depth = 8cm), which had a hole (5.5cm x 4cm) cut into the middle of the 
front face. A rubber ball (4cm diameter) with sticker attached was placed on a shelf (5.5cm 
x 8cm) inside the top left hand corner of the apparatus. There was a hole (2cm x 3cm) on 
the left-hand side of the box to allow children access to push the ball. Inside the box were 
wooden sticks attached from the back to the front, on which the cardboard shelf (length 
5.5cm, width = 5.5cm) could be placed. The reward could be retrieved by inserting the 
piece of cardboard through the hole and balancing it on the wooden sticks such that a shelf 
was created. Once children had pushed the ball through the top opening the cardboard  
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shelf would ‘catch’ it and children could retrieve the ball through the front opening. The 
cardboard shelf was presented with a piece of dowel (length = 10cm, diameter = 0.5cm) 
through a hole in the middle. The distracter item was a piece of blue cloth (length = 5.5cm, 
width = 5.5cm). A plastic barrier (length = 27.5cm, height = 22.5cm) was attached to the 
left-hand edge of the box to prevent children from pushing the ball and catching it with 
their other hand. 
The apparatus for the bridge task consisted of a clear plastic box (length = 20cm, 
height = 12cm, depth = 14cm), mounted in an open box (length = 31cm, width = 18cm, 
height = 5.5cm) on top of a piece of dowel (diameter = 1.5cm) to allow the plastic box to 
pivot. Inside the plastic box at both ends (left and right) were mounted two ledges (length 
= 8cm, width (4.5cm), on the left hand-side of which a rubber ball (diameter = 4cm) was 
placed. On the right-hand side of the box was a slot (height = 4.5cm, length = 7cm) from 
which the ball could be retrieved. There was also a slot along the front of the box (length = 
16cm, height = 2cm), into which materials could be inserted. The materials presented to 
solve the task were a silver bendy strip (length = 15cm, width = 8cm) made from duct tape 
with lengths of wire inside, and a blue piece of cloth (length = 15cm, width = 8cm). 
The materials for the warm-up exercise were a black bendy strip (length = 6cm, 
width = 6cm), black cloth (length = 9cm, width = 9cm), a 5cm piece of dowel (diameter = 
1.5cm) with a hole drilled in one end, a 4cm piece of dowel (diameter = 0.5cm), a piece of 
cardboard (length = 4cm, width = 2cm) with a hole in one end, a green pipecleaner (length 
= 20cm) and a piece of black string (length = 44cm). 
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4.2.3 Procedure 
4.2.3.1 Warm-up 
 Children first received a warm-up exercise in which they experienced each of the 
materials. Children were shown versions of each material that were used in the main task 
one at a time and were given demonstrations of their properties before being able to handle 
them themselves. The materials used in this warm-up phase differed in colour, size, and in 
some cases shape from those used in the main task. The pipecleaner and bendy strip were 
introduced as being ‘bendy’ and bent in the middle to demonstrate. The string and cloth 
were introduced as being ‘wiggly’ and then shaken to demonstrate. The small dowel along 
with the card and the larger dowel each with a hole drilled through were introduced with 
* 
* 
* 
Subtract  
Removal  
Remove dowel from stick 
Subtract     
Removal 
 Remove stick from shelf 
Reshape  
Unbend    
Bent strip → Straight 
Reshape    
Unbend     
Bent pipecleaner → Straight 
Hooks Task Tube Task Shelf Task Bridge Task 
* 
Successful retrieval: 
Figure 4. 2  Apparatus used for the four tasks. 
Note: * indicates distracter material, green arrow indicates direction of movement. 
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the experimenter saying look what I can do with these, and the small dowel was passed 
through the holes in the larger dowel and the cardboard. 
 
4.2.3.2Main Task 
Children received all four innovation tasks. The tasks were presented so that 
children alternated between the types of transformation needed; the tasks were also 
grouped so that the two direct action tasks and the two indirect action tasks were 
performed together. The order of presentation was counterbalanced across participants. 
For all tasks the experimenter drew the child’s attention to the sticker in the bucket 
(hook task) or attached to the ball (shelf and bridge task) or pom-pom (tube task), she then 
told the child ‘If you can get that out of there you can win that sticker’ and then traced with 
her finger the route required to get the sticker out. For the shelf and bridge tasks children 
were given additional information to ensure they were aware of how the apparatus worked. 
In the shelf task children were told ‘you can poke the ball through this hole here (point to 
hole at top of apparatus) and it’s your job to try and get it out of this hole here (point to 
hole on front of apparatus)’. For the bridge task the additional information children 
received was ‘You need to get the ball out of this hole here, and you can tip this like this 
(demonstration of tipping)’. After these instructions children were told on all tasks ‘here 
are some things that can help you’ and the experimenter brought out the relevant materials. 
Children were given one minute to interact with the apparatus to try and solve the task. If 
they were not successful during this time they were encouraged to put down the materials 
they were using and then taking her own materials the experimenter said ‘look at this’ and 
showed children the endstate-tool they were trying to achieve. Children were given a 
further 30 seconds to try and complete the task. If they were still unsuccessful the 
experimenter again encouraged them to put down their materials and then after saying 
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‘watch this’ demonstrated, with her own materials,  the action that needed to be done with 
the materials to make the required tool. Children were then allowed to interact with the 
apparatus again. 
4.3 Results 
 There were no gender differences (lowest p = .220) and no differences with age 
(lowest p = .102) on any of the four tasks, as such all data were collapsed into one sample. 
Order of presentation also made no difference to success levels (lowest p = .183). 
At all stages of the tasks children were coded as being successful only if they made 
the required tool and then used it correctly to retrieve the target. A Cochran’s Q test was 
used to compare children’s performance across all tasks. McNemar tests were then used to 
make individual comparisons with a Bonferroni correction applied (p <.008). Comparisons 
were made between children’s performance on tasks requiring different specific actions for 
each mode/transformation type individually. This enabled us to discover whether the 
specific action or direct vs. indirect actions varied performance. Second we compared 
performance across mode/transformation type to determine whether children performed 
comparably on all tool-innovation tasks. 
 
Table 4. 1 Numbers of successful children in experiment 4 for all tasks pre- and post-
demonstrations. 
 
Mode/ 
Transformation Task N 
Success 
pre-demonstration 
Success after 
endstate demo 
Success after 
action demo 
Subtracting/ 
Removing Hooks 42 13 14 12 
 
Shelf 40 15 11 14 
Reshaping/ 
Unbending Tube 42 32 8 2 
 
Bridge 41 27 10 4 
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Significant differences in children’s success on the four tasks pre-demonstration 
were found, Cochran’s Q test = 24.946, p < .001 (see table 4.1). McNemar tests were then 
used to compare performance for the two tasks requiring different actions within the same 
mode/transformation. There was no difference in success levels between the two 
subtracting/removing tasks which required different specific actions, McNemar test, p = 
.424. Similarly for the reshaping/unbending tasks, there was no difference in success levels 
between the two tasks requiring different specific actions, McNemar test, p = .332. As well 
as differing in terms of the action required, the two tasks within each mode/transformation 
also differed based on whether they acted directly or indirectly on the target object. A lack 
of difference in success levels between the two tasks within each set suggests no difference 
in complexity based on directness of action. 
 Next we compared performance across the two different tool-making 
modes/transformations in order to discover whether children performed comparably on all 
tool-innovation tasks. First we compared success across modes/transformations by 
grouping tasks based on directness of action. For the two tasks requiring children to act 
directly on the target, the reshaping/unbending task (tube unbend) was significantly easier 
than the subtracting/removing task (hook removal), McNemar test, p < .001. When 
comparing tasks requiring children to act indirectly, a trend was found that the 
reshaping/unbending task (bridge unbend) was easier for children than the 
subtracting/removing task (shelf removal) but this did not reach significance after applying 
a Bonferroni correction for the 6 multiple comparisons (the alpha level was set at  p < 
.008), McNemar test, p=.031.  Further evidence that the reshaping/unbending tasks were 
easier to achieve comes from comparisons between the hook subtracting task and the 
bridge reshaping task, McNemar test, p = .001, and between the shelf subtracting task and 
the tube reshaping task, McNemar test, p = .001. These results demonstrate that children 
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did not simply perform comparably on all tool-making tasks, the reshaping tasks were 
found to be significantly easier. 
 Coding success as outlined above does not give a full picture of the complexity of 
behaviours observed during the tasks. Table 4.2 shows that many children transformed the 
materials in to the required tools but then failed to use the tool correctly to retrieve the 
target. In the analyses above these children would have been coded as unsuccessful which 
would put them in the same category as children that made no such attempt to transform 
materials. By coding behaviours in more detail we are given a richer insight into how 
children behave when confronted with tool-innovation tasks. In table 4.2 children were 
categorised as either succeeding on the task (making a tool and using it correctly), 
transforming the materials (transformed correctly but did not use to retrieve target) or 
being unsuccessful (did not transform correctly or retrieve target). The most noticeable 
pattern from table 4.2 is that, except for one child, all children who transformed the 
materials in to the required tool but then failed to use the tool correctly to retrieve the 
target did so in the indirect tasks (shelf and bridge). Examination of table 4.2 shows that in 
the innovation phase of the tasks (pre-demonstration) only a few children transformed 
materials but did not use them correctly. Of these children those in the subtraction tasks 
then went on to use the subtracted piece (the dowel) on the apparatus. In the bridge 
reshaping task children who correctly transformed the material either entered the tool in 
the wrong slot or entered the narrow end of the material and tried to carry the ball from 
one platform to the other.  
The most interesting differences in transformation behavior were seen following 
the endstate-tool demonstration. For the two subtracting tasks similar levels of success are 
seen following this demonstration for the two tasks. However, whereas children in the 
direct task made no attempts to make the required tool, the majority of children in the 
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indirect task transformed the material correctly but did not then use the tool they created to 
retrieve the target. A similar pattern may exist for the reshaping tasks, however due to 
lower numbers of children requiring demonstrations this is not clear. Possible reasons for 
the differences in behavior between the direct and indirect tasks will be addressed in the 
discussion. 
 
Table 4. 2 Number of children succeeding and transforming materials in experiment 4. 
4.4 Discussion 
 The current chapter built on the findings from chapter 3 and queried whether 
Kacelnik et al.’s. (2006) suggestion that tool-making complexity is determined at the level 
of tool-making mode also applies to humans. In chapter 3 no differences in success levels 
were found between different modes of tool making within two different tasks. The current 
study investigated whether the study in chapter 3 was focusing at the incorrect level of tool 
making. Additional analyses comparing the tool-making modes across tasks found 
differences in success within the different modes, however, it could not be determined if 
these differences were determined at the level of transformation or the level of specific 
action. The current study manipulated action within two types of mode/transformation in 
order to discover whether complexity is determined at the level of action. No differences in 
   Success 
   Pre-demonstration  After end-state demo  After action demo 
Mode Task 
 
No 
Trans-
formed Yes  No 
Trans-
formed Yes  No 
Trans- 
formed Yes 
Subtract 
Hooks 
 
28 1 13  15 - 14  3 - 12 
 
Shelf  
 
21 4 15 
 
1 13 11 
 
1 - 13 
Reshape 
Tube 
 
10 - 32  2 - 8  - - 2 
 
Bridge  
 
9 5 26 
 
1 3 10 
 
- 1 3 
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success levels were found suggesting that tool-making complexity is not determined by the 
specific action a tool-making episode requires. 
 In the current work children were tested on four tasks, two subtracting and two 
reshaping. Within each pair, the tasks were identical at the level of tool-making mode and 
transformation but differed in the specific action required. No differences were found 
between the success levels within each pair. There were however differences in success 
between the different types of mode/transformation, with the reshaping/unbending tasks 
being significantly easier than the subtracting/removal tasks. This suggests that children 
did not merely find all tasks equally difficult.  
At first glance the finding that the two unbending tasks were easier to achieve than 
the subtracting tasks appears to contradict the findings from chapter 3 that found no 
hierarchy of tool-making mode complexity. In chapter 3 the different tool-making modes 
were compared within the same task. In the current study different transformations, which 
were purposefully confounded with mode due to the findings from chapter 3, were 
compared across different task types. As the success levels for the different modes arise 
from different tasks, it is not possible to directly compare children’s success rates for the 
different tool-making modes as there are many different factors that may be influencing 
the results. 
 The current work also tested how ‘distance’ between the participant and the target 
influenced tool-innovation difficulty. Children were given tasks in which the ‘tool’ to be 
made either acted directly on the target object or indirectly by altering the structure of the 
apparatus. As well as testing whether directness alters task difficulty this manipulation 
may have further-reaching consequences. Some researchers have recently suggested a 
narrower definition of what constitutes tool use. A new definition suggests that to be a tool 
an object must have a ‘dynamic mechanical interaction’ (St. Amant & Horton, 2008, p. 
1203) that is the tool must act directly on a target, i.e. it must be an extension of the hand, 
Chapter 4 
92 
 
and not merely something that can be placed somewhere and left to its own devices. The 
design of the current study had potential to provide supportive evidence for this narrow 
definition. Comparison of direct vs. indirect tasks could provide insight in to differences 
between children’s ability to innovate tool and non-tool objects. The hook and tube tasks 
clearly required the making of a tool as they acted directly on the target, whereas the shelf 
and bridge tasks required the creation of a non-tool object, as they acted indirectly by 
altering the structure of the apparatus. No differences between indirect and direct actions 
for tasks requiring the same transformation were found. This could be taken as evidence 
against a narrower definition of what constitutes a tool or alternatively it could provide 
evidence that there is nothing particularly special about tool use. The complexity of 
innovation may be comparable for all tasks requiring physical cognition and manipulation 
of materials whether or not the end product turns out to be a tool. Whatever definition of a 
tool one decides to use, the clear finding from the current study is that there is no 
difference in difficulty between the innovation of artefacts that act directly or indirectly on 
a target. 
 The directness of the action did not affect children’s success rates, however, 
differences in children’s behaviours were observed. In the indirect action tasks many 
children transformed the materials correctly but did not then go on to use the tool they 
created to retrieve the target. This was most noticeable following the first endstate-tool 
demonstration. As no differences in success levels were seen in either the innovation phase 
or following the endstate-tool demonstration this finding appears odd. One potential 
explanation could be that the transformation required was clearer to see in the indirect 
tasks. For example in the indirect subtracting tasks children were shown the piece of 
cardboard (the shelf) they needed to achieve. It may have been easier for children to see 
how this had been transformed from the initial dowel and cardboard they were presented 
with than it was for children to notice that a piece of dowel was missing from the hooks 
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tool. In the case of the shelf tool, the tool was made up from only two materials, cardboard 
and dowel, it would therefore be easy to recognize that one of these pieces was missing 
and work out the transformation required. Conversely, the hook tool was made up of four 
pieces and therefore it would have been more difficult for children to realize which piece 
was missing and how the materials would need to be transformed. 
The suggestion that there was a clearer transformation in the indirect tasks may 
address why children more readily transformed the materials but it does not address why 
there is no difference in success rates. If children have managed to transform the materials 
correctly then why did they not then go on to use the created tool to solve the task? 
Previous tool-making studies have shown that once a child has created a tool they almost 
always go on to use that tool correctly and retrieve the target (Beck et al., 2011; Cutting et 
al., 2011). We suggest these children are unsuccessful in retrieving the target in the 
indirect tasks due to there being a greater number of potential actions that could take place 
on the apparatus. In the direct tasks once a tool has been made there are very few options 
as to what the child can do with the tool. In the hooks task there is only one opening with 
which to insert the tool and in the tube task it does not matter which opening one chooses 
as entering the tool will always contact the target. In contrast the shelf and bridge tasks 
each have two openings, only one of which can be utilized effectively. This provides the 
child with more options as to where to insert their tool and as such the correct course of 
action may be less obvious. We suggest that these greater degrees of freedom could 
explain why in the indirect tasks children did not use their correctly transformed materials 
to retrieve the target reward. We will return to this point in more detail in the general 
discussion chapter.   
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4.5 General discussion of chapters 3 and 4 
 Taken together the results from chapters 3 and 4 lead to the tentative suggestion 
that tool-making complexity might be determined at the level of transformation, i.e. 
removing or unbending, but is not dependent on the general level of tool-making mode or 
the specific action required.  First, the findings from chapter 3 suggested that tool-making 
complexity is not determined by the mode of tool making. No differences were found 
between the subtract, add and reshape modes of tool making when compared within a task. 
Additional analyses from this chapter found differences in success levels within the 
different tool-making modes when compared across the two different tasks for some 
modes but not for others. This finding led to the suggestion that tool-making complexity 
might be determined at a lower level. 
 In chapter 4 two lower levels of tool making were suggested: transformation and 
action. As these two levels were confounded in chapter 3, experiment 4 separated them by 
holding transformation and mode constant and varying the actions that tasks required. 
Experiment 4 found no difference in success levels between tasks requiring the same 
mode/transformation and different specific actions. This suggested that tool-making 
complexity is not determined at the level of action; however from this study it was not 
possible to disentangle mode and transformation.  
No single study could directly address where tool-making complexity might lay 
due to the three levels of tool making being determined by each other, for example it 
would be impossible to hold action constant but vary the transformation. However, if 
results from experiments 3 and 4 are taken together, along with previous research showing 
there to be a stable difference in success levels between the hooks and unbending 
reshaping tasks (Cutting et al., 2011, and additional analyses, chapter 3), these findings 
suggest that complexity is determined at the level of transformation. There is no difference 
in complexity between different modes of tool making on a singular task, but there are 
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consistent differences between tasks using the same mode but different transformations. 
Additionally when holding the mode and transformation constant specific action made no 
difference to complexity. 
 The theory that complexity is determined by transformation supports the 
suggestion made at the beginning of this chapter that the previous work on complexity in 
chapter 3 and suggestions by Kacelnik et al. that focused attention on tool-making mode 
were too broad. Many different tool-making episodes may require the making of a tool 
through reshaping for example, but it would be surprising to find that all of these were 
equally difficult. For example reshaping material could not only involve bending as in the 
hook experiments (Beck et al., 2011) or unbending as demonstrated here and in previous 
work (Cutting et al.), but could include an infinite number of tools that could be created in 
an infinite number of ways. To think that innovating the solution to bend a hook is 
comparably difficult to innovating the solution of scrunching up leaves to use as a sponge 
just because they require the same tool-making mode (reshaping) not only appears 
implausible but is also improbable given the current findings. 
Altogether chapters 3 and 4 advance our understanding of tool-making complexity. 
Complexity is not simply determined at the general level of tool-making mode as 
previously suggested (Kacelnik et al., 2006), but is more likely dependent on the 
transformation of materials that is required. This finding gives us an insight into which 
elements make tool innovation so difficult for young children. Knowing that the 
transformation required determines tool-making complexity would allow for future 
research to investigate why certain transformations may be more difficult for children to 
achieve than others. The new terminology we have used in this chapter could also be 
applied to the non-human animal literature to better define and compare the tool-making 
episodes that have been observed in other species. 
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Chapter 5 
The Role of Executive Function in Tool Innovation 
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5.0 Overall chapter summary 
The current chapter investigated the role that executive function may play in tool-
innovation tasks. In experiment 5 we investigated whether children’s poor performance in 
tool- innovation tasks is due to impulsive behaviours. In this study we attempted to 
decrease impulsive behaviours in children by introducing a delay before children 
encountered the innovation task. Additionally children were given the opportunity to 
explore the materials prior to engaging in the main task, as there is anecdotal evidence that 
children do not take time to do this independently. 
In experiment 6 we investigated the role of executive functions in tool innovation 
in more detail by examining children’s performance on a battery of executive function 
tasks in addition to the hook-innovation task. Children were tested on a series of tasks 
testing their abilities in inhibitory control, task switching, working memory and ill-
structured problem solving to see whether any of these abilities correlated with 
performance on a tool-innovation task. 
5.1 Experiment 5: Impulsivity and Exploration. 
Being able to stop what one is doing is termed inhibitory control and is a key 
component of executive function (Miyake et al., 2000). In previous studies we have used 
perseveration as an indirect measure of children’s inhibitory control. In chapter 3 we 
defined perseveration as children entering an unsuccessful tool/material in to the task 
apparatus and then failing to stop using that material for the whole time period. Overall we 
observed very little perseverative behaviour in young children during our tasks. As such 
we ruled out the possibility that children’s poor tool-innovation performance was due to an 
inability to overcome perseveration of incorrect strategies. Many children in these studies 
did not display any perseverative behaviour, but were still unable to successfully innovate 
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tools. Additionally, for many successful children they had no need to overcome 
perseveration because they immediately innovated a successful tool without implementing 
an unsuccessful initial solution. It was concluded that overcoming perseveration is not the 
limiting step for children to succeed in these tasks; however it is a necessary obstacle to 
overcome. In the current chapter we explored inhibitory control more directly by 
examining how impulsiveness can affect children’s performance on tool-innovation tasks. 
Impulsivity is a multi-dimensional construct that is characterised by an inability to 
wait, failure to inhibit inappropriate actions or behaviours, and the inclination to act 
without forethought or any consideration of the consequences (Reynolds, Ortengren, 
Richards & De Wit, 2006). Whereas the measure of perseveration in chapter 2 measured 
children’s inhibitory control by assessing ability to stop implementing an unsuccessful 
action, in the current study we use impulsivity as a wider measure of inhibitory control 
which is most characterised by children’s tendency to act quickly without any thought of 
the consequences.  
 It has been observed by the experimenter during tool-innovation tasks that children 
have a tendency to pick up materials and act on the apparatus immediately after receiving 
instructions. Very few children appeared to take time in considering their options. We 
suggest that children’s difficulty on tool-innovation tasks may be due to their impulsive 
behaviour, more specifically their inability to inhibit using the presented materials 
immediately without any thought of the effects the materials will have or any consideration 
of how they might modify the materials. 
Children may act impulsively on tool-innovation tasks because they allow their 
attention to be caught by irrelevant stimuli (Schachar & Logan, 1990), or they may act on 
naïve theories which prevent them from thinking through their actions more rationally. 
Children’s poor performance due to naïve theory is demonstrated in Karmiloff-Smith & 
Inhelder’s (1975) balance rod experiment in which children aged 6 who were in the grips 
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of a naïve theory performed poorly in comparison to both older and younger children. In 
this task children were presented with a series of unevenly weighted rods that needed to be 
balanced on a pivot. Four-year-olds had no theory with which to approach the task, and as 
such adopted a flexible trial-and-error approach, successfully completing the task. 
Children aged six and eight had a theory that all rods must balance in the middle, a 
strategy that did not work with the weighted rods they were presented with. Eight-year-
olds were able to overcome this theory and flexibly adapted their actions to succeed on the 
task, however, the six-year-olds who were in the grip of their naïve theory were unable to 
overcome their conviction that rods must balance in the middle and as such performed 
poorly, often giving up.  
Further evidence for the detrimental effects of young children’s naïve theories 
comes from studies reporting children’s gravity errors (Hood, 1995; Hood, 1998; Hood, 
Wilson & Dyson, 2006). In tasks requiring children to search for a ball dropped down one 
of three opaque tubes which were interwoven and then each connected to three hiding 
boxes, children were shown to persistently look for a ball directly underneath the tube 
where it had been dropped. The 2-to-4-year-olds in these tasks were argued to be in the 
grips of a naïve theory surrounding gravity. They had a belief that all objects must fall 
directly downwards and were so entrenched in this theory they did not consider the effects 
of the tubes on the outcome. Support that these findings were due to a naïve theory 
surrounding gravity comes from evidence that children performed successfully on the tasks 
when the direction of the ball was reversed, i.e. the balls were sucked up the tubes (Hood, 
1998). Naïve theories are not only limited to children, many adults possess naïve theories, 
and often answer physics problems incorrectly (McCloskey, 1983).  
In our hook-innovation task it is possible that children have a naïve theory about 
how to solve the problem. All children in our tasks display behaviours that demonstrate 
their understanding about the need for contact, i.e. all children immediately use the 
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materials to contact the bucket containing the reward; perhaps children act on a naïve 
theory surrounding contact. Children are aware of the need for contact from a very young 
age, with infants as young as 6-months demonstrating this awareness (Leslie & Keeble, 
1987; Oakes & Cohen, 1990). Children may become so entrenched in their theory about 
contact that they are unable to inhibit their prepotent response of merely contacting the 
bucket containing the sticker with the materials they are given. Once children have acted 
impulsively on this naïve theory they may not be able to inhibit their actions and think 
about the problem in a different way. This may mean that they act perseveratively with one 
material; although as evidence from chapter 2 shows this is not usually the case, or may 
mean that they use multiple materials and strategies but ultimately are confined by their 
naïve theory of merely contacting the bucket. 
In the current study we aimed to reduce children’s impulsive behaviour by 
introducing a delay between the introduction to the task and their opportunity to act on the 
apparatus. Previous research has shown that a delay can significantly improve children’s 
performance on tasks requiring inhibition. In a study using a typical inhibition task for 
children – the day-night stroop – Diamond, Kirkham and Amso (2002) found that 
introducing a short delay between showing children the card and asking for their response, 
significantly improved children’s performance. Children were shown a set of cards that 
either had a sun or a moon on them and were required to respond day to the moon card and 
night to the sun card. This required inhibitory control, as children had to inhibit their initial 
reaction of what the cards depicted and respond with the opposite.  Diamond et al. 
concluded that it takes children several seconds to compute the correct answer for the day-
night stroop task, and making children take extra time to construct their answers 
significantly improved their success rates. This delay strategy has been used in other 
studies where inhibitory control is thought to aid performance. Beck, Carroll, Brunsden 
and Gryg (2011) introduced a delay by asking children to wait until a doll had gone down 
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a slide before giving their responses to counterfactual questions. Children in the delay 
condition performed significantly better on counterfactual questions than children who did 
not experience the delay. 
It has also been observed in previous tool-innovation studies that children rarely 
explore the materials prior to using them in the task. This may mean that children are 
unaware of the properties of the materials, or that the properties are not highlighted for 
them and so they do not consider them in the context of solving the task. Previous studies 
have provided structured exploration activities in the form of warm-up exercises in which 
children have wound the pipecleaner around a pen and placed the string on an s-shaped 
pattern for example (Beck et al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011). However, research in to 
children’s exploratory behaviours has shown that children learn more about materials 
when they are allowed to explore them for themselves rather than being shown ways they 
might work. Bonawitz et al. (2009) measured children’s exploratory behaviours under 
different pedagogical conditions, and found that children who were shown one action that 
could be done with a toy in a pedagogical context, were less likely to explore and find 
other actions than children in the accidental demonstration and no demonstration 
conditions. It is possible that in studies where we have demonstrated actions with the 
materials that we have inadvertently reduced children’s explorative behaviours. Children 
did not perseverate on the actions they were shown in demonstrations within the main task; 
however they may have thought that apart from using the materials as they were presented 
that this was the only thing that could be done with them. In the current study we allowed 
children to explore the materials for themselves to enable them to discover the materials’ 
properties, which in turn may aid them in the innovation task. 
In experiment 5 we gave half of children a delay before interacting with the task, 
during which they were given opportunity to explore materials. If children in the delay-
explore condition were more successful at innovating the required tools than children in 
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the control condition we planned to perform further studies to disentangle whether children 
were aided by the delay or the opportunity for exploration. 
5.1.1 Method 
5.1.1.1 Participants 
The final sample consisted of 29 4- to 5- year olds (13 boys), mean age 4 years 8 
months (4; 8), (range 4; 3 to 5; 2), and 24 6- to 7-year-olds (11 boys), mean age 6; 9 (range 
6; 3 to 7; 2) from a Primary School in South Birmingham, UK. The ethnic composition of 
the sample was 91% Caucasian, 6% Black and 3% other/unknown. 
 
5.1.1.2 Materials 
The materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1, chapter 2. 
 
5.1.1.3 Procedure 
Children were alternately assigned to either the control group or to the 
experimental (delay/explore) group based on the teacher’s class list. Participants were 
tested by a female experimenter in a quiet area just outside the main classroom. The child 
and experimenter sat facing each other across a table. All children received both the hook 
and unbending tasks. The order was counterbalanced across participants. 
Children were shown the relevant transparent tube, either the vertical-tube with the 
bucket containing a sticker already in place in the bottom or the horizontal-tube containing 
the pom-pom with sticker attached. Children were then told that if they could get the 
sticker out they were allowed to keep it. The experimenter then brought out the string and 
pipecleaner (either straight or bent in half) and told the child ‘Here are the things you’re 
going to use. This one’s bendy (bend pipecleaner slightly and straighten) and this one’s 
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wiggly (wiggle string)’. The materials were placed on the base of the apparatus which was 
out of the child’s reach. In the control condition, the apparatus was then put in front of the 
child and the experimenter said ‘Can you work out how to get the sticker out?’ In the 
experimental condition after the demonstrated materials were placed on the base of the 
apparatus, the experimenter brought out identical new materials and said ‘These are just 
the same as the ones you are going to use. But before you try to get the sticker for real, you 
can play with these and try to work out how you will get the sticker out’. Children were 
given 10 seconds to explore the materials. The materials were then taken away and the 
apparatus and original materials were placed in front of the child and the experimenter said 
‘ok, can you get the sticker out?’ The children were then given one minute to try to 
retrieve the sticker. No feedback was given, but children were given neutral prompts if 
required. Examples of prompts used include ‘Can you think how you might be able to get 
the sticker out?’ and ‘Maybe you could use these things to help you.’ If, after one minute, 
the child had not retrieved the sticker, they were encouraged by the experimenter to put 
down the materials they were using. The experimenter then gave the child an endstate-tool 
demonstration followed by the action demonstration if required. See experiment 3 for full 
details of the demonstration procedure.  
 
5.1.2 Results 
There were no differences due to gender for either age on each task (Vertical-tube 
task: 4-to-5-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .123, 6-to-7-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact Test, 
p = .192; Horizontal-tube task: 4-to-5-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .688, 6-to-7-year-
olds, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .408)  and so all data were collapsed across gender for 
subsequent analyses. We will first report descriptive data of the exploratory behaviours 
conducted by children during the delay. We will then report Chi-square analyses 
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comparing performance between the experimental and control groups on both the vertical- 
and horizontal-tube tasks. After excluding successful children we then compared 
performance between the two groups following the two demonstrations.  
 
Table 5. 1 Behaviours displayed by children in the Delay/Explore condition during the 
delay. 
 
Age 
Group 
 
Actions 
N Touch Pick up Combine 
Bend 
(non-target tool) 
Bend/unbend 
Target tool 
  Vertical-tube task 
4 to 5 14 2 8 2 1 1 
6 to 7 11 1 2 1 4 3 
  Horizontal-tube task 
4 to 5 14 2 7 1 2 2 
6 to 7 11 2 3 4 0 2 
 
Table 5.1 displays the behaviours carried out by children during the delay/explore 
period. The younger children had a tendency to just pick up the materials, and explored 
them very little. Older children showed more exploratory behaviours such as combining 
and bending. These descriptive data show that children engaged with the materials in the 
delay/explore condition, meaning that they had a different experience to children in the 
control condition. Whether children were in the delay/explore condition or the control 
condition made no difference to children’s first choice of material in either of the main 
innovation tasks. All except 3 children chose the pipecleaner first in the vertical-tube task, 
all children that chose the string were in the control group but there was no difference 
between conditions, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .238.  Nine children in total chose the string 
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first in the horizontal-tube task, 4 children were in the delay/explore group and 5 were in 
the control group again demonstrating no difference between the two conditions, Fisher’s 
Exact Test, p >.999. 
For the vertical-tube task Chi-square analyses reveals no difference in success 
levels between children who were in the delay-explore condition and children in the 
control condition, χ² (1, N = 49) = .783, p = .376. This finding was seen in both age 
groups; 4-to-5-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact Test, p =.596, 6-to-7-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact 
Test, p > .999. There was also no difference in success levels between the two groups for 
the horizontal-tube task, χ² (1, N = 53) = .305, p = .581. Again this finding was the same 
across both age groups; 4-to-5-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact Test, p > .999, 6-to-7-year-olds, 
Fisher’s Exact Test, p > .697 (See table 5.2). 
Table 5. 2 Behaviours and number of children succeeding at different task stages. 
   
Touched First 
 
Used First  Success 
Age 
Group Condition N 
Pipe-
cleaner String  
Pipe-
cleaner String 
 
Pre-
demo 
After 
Endstate 
Demo 
After 
Action 
Demo 
Vertical-tube task 
4 to 5 Delay 14 13 1  14 -  3 4 5 
 Control 13 12 1  10 3  1 6 4 
            
6 to 7 Delay 11 11 -  11 -  5 5 1 
 Control 11 11 -  11 -  4 6 1 
 Horizontal-tube task 
4 to 5 Delay 14 9 5  10 4  4 5 3 
 Control 15 12 3  10 5  5 3 3 
            
6 to 7 Delay 11 7 4  11 -  4 5 1 
 Control 13 13 -  13 -  6 3 4 
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Condition made no difference to success levels following the first endstate 
demonstration for either age group on both tasks (Vertical-tube task: 4-to-5-year-olds, 
Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .680, 6-to-7-year-olds,  Fisher’s Exact Test, p > .999; Horizontal-
tube task: 4-to-5-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .650, 6-to-7-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact 
Test, p = .266). For the vertical-tube task, the 6- to- 7- year- olds were more successful 
following the endstate demonstration than were the younger 4- to- 5- year- olds, χ2 (1, N = 
36) = 5.783, p = .016. No difference between the age groups was seen following the 
endstate demonstration for the horizontal-tube task, χ2 (1, N = 3) = 1.463, p = .226. 
Condition also made no difference to success levels following the second action 
demonstration for the 4-to-5-year-olds for either task (both tasks = Fisher’s Exact Test, p > 
.999). No comparisons could be made for the 6-to-7-year-olds as all children in both 
conditions were successful following the action demonstration. There was also no 
difference in success levels between the two age groups on both tasks, (Vertical-tube task, 
Fisher’s Exact Test, p > .999; Horizontal-tube task, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .102). 
 
5.1.3 Discussion 
In experiment 5 children between the ages of 4 and 7 were given a delay between 
being introduced to the tool-innovation problem and being allowed to interact with the 
apparatus. During the delay children were given the opportunity to explore the materials 
they would be using to solve the problem. The delay and opportunity for exploration did 
not help children on the subsequent tool-innovation task. We concluded that neither 
impulsive behaviour nor failure to explore materials was sufficient to explain children’s 
difficulty with tool innovation. 
The objective of this study was to investigate whether children’s tool-innovation 
difficulty could be explained by either impulsive behaviour or the lack of exploration of 
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the materials. Observations made in previous studies suggested that when confronted with 
a tool-innovation task young children spend very little time considering their options or 
planning a strategy before embarking on a solution. Children had a tendency to pick up the 
materials and insert them into the apparatus immediately after they were presented, 
sometimes even before the experimenter had fully finished giving the instructions. It was 
suggested that this impulsive behaviour may have been the cause of children’s tool-
innovation difficulty. Perhaps children were unable to inhibit their impulsive response of 
going directly for the reward and as such were prevented from thinking about the problem 
more rationally.  
Research into children’s inhibition has shown that children significantly improve 
on tasks requiring inhibition if there is a delay between the question or setting of the 
problem and their response. Diamond et al. (2002) suggested that the delay improves 
performance as it gives children time to compute their answer. Beck, Carroll, Brunsden 
and Gryg (2011) have argued that this explanation does not adequately explain the effects 
of a delay in their counterfactual tasks as children were capable of computing the correct 
answers for future hypotheticals even if there was no delay. Instead Beck et al. suggest that 
children have a tendency to act impulsively based on their current prepotent response. The 
addition of a delay allowed children to avoid errors caused by their impulsive behaviours 
rather than aid inhibition of a particular response. Children’s difficulty in tool innovation 
might have been due to impulsive behaviours based on a default theory regarding the need 
for contact, if so a delay may have helped children avoid errors based on this 
impulsiveness. However, we found no improved performance in the current study when 
this manipulation was adopted. This suggests that behaving impulsively is not the limiting 
step in tool innovation.  
The second identified possible constraint on children’s tool-innovation 
performance was the failure to explore the task materials. In previous studies children 
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engaged in a regimented warm-up exercise in which they manipulated the materials in 
certain ways as defined by the experimenter. Research into children’s exploratory 
behaviour has shown that children are better able to find the properties of materials if they 
are allowed to explore for themselves rather than being shown one way of manipulating 
them (Bonawitz et al., 2009). Based on this finding, rather than showing children things 
that the materials could do, we let them explore the materials for themselves. If children’s 
poor tool-innovation ability was due to them not exploring the materials they were given 
then we might expect improved performance in the group of children who got to explore 
the materials. This was not the case. Children who independently explored the materials 
were no more likely to innovate a tool than children who did not explore the materials. 
This suggests that a lack of exploration is not sufficient for explaining children’s tool-
innovation difficulties. 
In the current study we gave half of children both a delay and the opportunity to 
explore the materials with the view that if children in this group were more successful we 
would investigate further to determine what was driving this effect. As there was no 
improvement in this group, we conclude that neither impulsivity nor lack of exploration 
was sufficient to explain tool-innovation difficulties, and as such we leave our 
investigations on these lines of research here. 
5.2 Experiment 6: Executive Function Battery 
 In experiment 6 we investigated the role of executive function in tool innovation 
more fully by testing children on a series of executive function tasks, and correlating them 
with tool-innovation performance. In the current and previous chapters we have suggested 
various components of executive function as possible explanations for children’s poor 
tool-innovation abilities. In chapter 2 we discussed the possibility of switching difficulties, 
and in experiment 5 we investigated impulsivity, an aspect of inhibitory control. In the 
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current experiment we expand on these ideas and test children’s executive abilities more 
fully through an extensive executive control battery. Children’s performance on executive 
tasks tapping inhibition, working memory and task switching, as well as an ill-structured 
executive task that tests these constructs in combination were related to performance on 
the hook-innovation task. 
5.2.1.1 Inhibitory Control  
 In previous experiments various aspects of inhibitory control were explored. In 
experiment 2 perseveration was used as an indirect measure of children’s ability to inhibit 
their incorrect actions. Perseveration of an incorrect strategy for the whole task period was 
taken as an indicator of children’s lack of inhibitory control. Very low levels of 
perseveration were observed in experiment 2 and consequently inability to overcome 
perseveration was ruled out as a reason for children’s poor tool-innovation performance. 
 Experiment 5 directly investigated the role of impulsivity, the inability to inhibit 
the tendency to act without waiting, on children’s poor innovation ability. This study 
concluded that children’s poor performance was not due to them acting impulsively as 
preventing children from acting immediately on the apparatus did not improve task 
performance. Whilst both of these studies gain us some insight in to the role of inhibitory 
control in tool innovation they do not provide a general measure of children’s inhibitory 
abilities. In the current study tasks specifically thought to tap inhibition were used to 
provide a baseline measure of children’s general ability. Measures of simple and complex 
inhibition were gained and then compared to tool-innovation performance. Based on 
definitions put forward by Surtees, Burns, Beck, Riggs and Apperly (under review) we use 
simple inhibition to refer to measures obtained when tasks are thought to tap inhibitory 
control without the involvement of other executive functions. Complex inhibition is used 
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to refer to measures that tap inhibitory control but also require additional components of 
executive control such as working memory. 
5.2.1.2 Task Switching 
In chapter 2 (Cutting et al., 2011) children’s ability to switch between different 
strategies on two different tool-innovation tasks was examined. Performance on the hook-
bending task and the unbending task were compared to see how well children could switch 
between the different solutions each of the tasks required. It was concluded that children’s 
poor performance was not due to the need to switch away from previously correct 
strategies. On their second task children did not perseverate on techniques and strategies 
that had been successful in their first task. This finding provides evidence against task 
switching difficulty between tasks; however it does not address how well children can 
switch between alternative strategies within a tool-innovation task. In the studies in this 
thesis children have been observed to switch between different materials in varying 
amounts. A measure of children’s ability to switch between different strategies would 
enable us to discover whether readiness for switching ability might aid children’s 
performance. Although we have observed children’s ability to switch between different 
strategies in tool-innovation tasks, as evidenced by a lack of perseveration, this switching 
may be cognitively demanding and as such limit children’s success. Obtaining measures of 
children’s general task-switching abilities in the current executive function tests will allow 
for a fuller understanding of how task-switching capacity may affect tool-innovation 
performance. The current study will provide measures of both local and global switching 
abilities and compare these to success on the tool-innovation task. Local switch costs occur 
when one must switch between different rules or strategies within a task. Global switch 
costs refer to the decrease in performance when one knows that there is a possibility that a 
switch may be needed (Burns, Riggs & Beck, 2011). The tool-innovation task is most 
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likely to engage local switching ability, as children will need to switch between different 
strategies within a single task. However, if children are aware that there are many different 
strategies to try then there may also be global switch costs. 
5.2.1.3 Working Memory 
 To date no studies have investigated the role of working memory in children’s tool-
innovation performance. fMRI studies have however indicated that working memory may 
be important for tool-using actions (Johnson-Frey, Newman-Norlund & Grafton, 2005). It 
is reasonable to assume that working memory ability may be important when confronted 
with an innovation task. Children must be able to remember the goals of the task, they 
must remember what strategies and techniques they have already tried and they must hold 
in mind what they plan to try next. By including a measure of working memory in our 
executive battery we will be able to discover the extent of the relationship between 
working memory and tool innovation and discover whether poor working memory may be 
a limiting factor on children’s performance. 
5.2.1.4 Ill-structured tasks 
 In chapter 2 it was suggested that tool innovation may be an ill-structured problem. 
An ill-structured problem is one that is missing information from either the start state, goal 
state or the transformation required to go between the two (Reitman,1965). The defining 
feature of an ill-structured problem is the need to generate this additional information for 
oneself (Goel, 2010). To generate this knowledge and use it to solve the task requires 
multiple executive functions in combination but does not simply reduce down to the sum 
of its parts.  
Recent experiments with brain damaged patients (Goel, Pullara & Grafman, 2001) 
and children with autism (White, Burgess & Hill, 2009) have used ill-structured tasks to 
demonstrate the poor performance of clinical populations compared to normal controls. 
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Previously patients had performed comparatively to controls on traditional executive tasks 
measuring inhibitory control, task switching and working memory such as the ones used in 
the current study (Shallice & Burgess, 1991). This finding was unexpected as many of the 
patients had difficulty performing seemingly simple tasks in everyday life, for example 
visiting the shops or cooking a simple meal. Ill-structured tasks have provided a useful 
measure of executive function that more closely resemble the tasks faced by participants in 
everyday life. These tasks more readily captured the difficulties seen in clinical groups 
when compared to controls. Researchers concluded that the difficulty of these ill-
structured tasks lies in the fact that they require multiple executive functions as described 
above and do not simply reduce down to the sum of their parts. Tool innovation fits the 
definition of an ill-structured problem. The start and goal states are well-defined but there 
is information missing about the transformation required to go between the two. As such 
tool innovation, like the studies cited above, is likely to require the use of executive 
functions, but may do so in conjunction with each other and may not simply be explained 
by individual executive components. 
Based on this suggestion the current experiment tested for a relationship between 
tool innovation and another ill-structured task, namely the Six Part Test (Emslie, Wilson, 
Burden, Nimmo-Smith, Wilson, 2003). The Six Part Test requires children to engage with 
three different subtests each containing two parts. Children must achieve as much as 
possible whilst following rules laid out for them.  The Six Part Test requires children to 
engage multiple executive functions.  Children must to use their working memories to hold 
in mind the rules and what they have done and need to do next. They must also engage 
their inhibitory abilities to stop on a task and move on to a different one, and to prevent 
themselves from simply moving along the line of tasks that would mean a rule break. 
Finally children must be able to switch between different tasks.  
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5.2.2 Method 
5.2.2.1 Participants 
The final sample consisted of 43 participants aged 6 to 8 years (25 boys), mean age 
7 years 6 months (7; 6), range 6; 8 to 8;5, from a Primary School in South Birmingham, 
UK.  
5.2.2.2 Design 
Children were tested individually in two sessions by the same experimenter. Each 
session lasted around 15 to 20 minutes. The two sessions were administered to children at 
least 3 days apart and a maximum of 14 days apart. In the first session, participants first 
completed the Six Part Test from the Behavioural Assessment for Dysexecutive Syndrome 
for Children (BADS-C) battery (Emslie et al., 2003) and then the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale-II (BPVS-II, Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997). In the second 
session children were given the hook-innovation task and the EF tasks in a fixed order: 
Hooks task (Beck et al., 2011), simple inhibition (‘the pictures task’, Burns et al., 2012, 
adapted from Davidson, Amso, Anderson & Diamond, 2006), working memory (a 
counting recall task based on Alloway, Gathercole, Willis & Adams, 2004; Burns et al.), 
and finally a task of complex inhibition and task switching (‘the eyes task’, Burns et al., an 
adaptation of the arrows task from Davidson et al.). The tasks were presented in a fixed 
order to children to ensure that they received as closely as possible the same experience. 
5.2.2.3 Materials and Procedure 
5.2.2.3.1 Six Part Test 
 The Six Part Test is a subtest from the BADS-C battery (Emslie et al., 2003). The 
test is a version of the Six Elements Test for adults (Burgess et al., 1996) that has been 
modified to be suitable for use with children. The task is laid out as per Figure 5. 1(a), and 
contains three types of task that each have two versions. The green ‘How Many?’ tasks 
Chapter 5 
114 
 
required children to turn over cards to reveal a number of pictures (see Figure 5. 1 (b)). 
Children counted the number of pictures and wrote their answers down on the paper 
provided. The blue ‘What is it?’ cards required children to turn over cards to reveal 
pictures (see Figure 5. 1 (c)). Children were then required to write down what the picture 
was on the paper provided. All words were short in length consisting of 3-5 letters; 
children were aided with the spelling of the words if required. The red ‘Sort me’ tasks 
consisted of two boxes, one containing multiple types of beads, the other containing nuts 
and bolts. The lids of the boxes contained a picture, and children were required to find the 
relevant beads or nuts from the boxes that matched the picture and put them in the lids. 
Children were given instructions as to how to carry out each task and were told they had 5 
minutes to complete as much as they could of each of the six tasks and it was emphasised 
that they would not be able to complete all of the tasks because they did not have enough 
time. Additionally children were given two simple rules to follow. First, they were told 
they must complete a little bit of every single task during the 5 minutes. Second, they 
could not do two types of the same task in a row, e.g. if children were working on the 
green ‘how many? 1’ task they could not move on to work on the green ‘how many? 2’ 
task next, they must switch to work on one of the blue ‘what is it?’ or red ‘sort me’ tasks. 
Children were given 5 minutes to engage with the task and a timer was in view so that they 
could check their progress. 
 Children received an overall score out of sixteen for the Six Part Test. The score 
was calculated in the following way: children were awarded 2 marks for each subtask they 
attempted (maximum of 12 marks). One mark was deducted for any rule breaks on each of 
the three types of tasks (up to a maximum of 3 marks), additional rule breaks within each 
type of task were not penalised. Marks were then added or deducted based on the strategies 
children used. If children used a clear pattern of responses to avoid breaking the order rule 
they were awarded 2 marks, for example, G1, B1, R1, G2, B2, R2. If children had a clear 
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strategy for trying to attempt all 6 parts they were awarded an additional 2 marks, 
examples of strategies include undertaking a set number of items on each subtest before 
switching, or attempting a task for a set amount of time, or a combination of both of these. 
Children had one mark deducted if they returned to any part 3 or more times. 
 
 
Figure 5. 1 Materials for the Six Parts Test. (a) Layout of cards and materials for the test. 
(b) An example of a ‘How Many?’ Card. (c) An example of a ‘What is it?’ card. (d) The 
‘Sort Me’ beads task. 
 
5.2.2.3.2 BPVS II 
 The British Picture Vocabulary Scale-II (BPVS-II, Dunn et al., 1997) is a measure 
of children’s receptive vocabulary. On each trial children were presented with four outline 
drawings and were asked to point to the picture that corresponded to a target word spoken 
by the experimenter. Trials were administered in sets of 12 which increased in difficulty. 
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Children started with the set which was indicated as being appropriate for their age. The 
test was terminated if children only succeeded on four or fewer trials within a set. The 
dependent measure was the total number of correct responses. 
5.2.2.3.3 Hooks Task 
 Children were presented with the hook-innovation task using the same instructions 
as in experiment 1. There was no familiarisation warm-up but children received the two-
stage demonstration procedure as required (see experiment 3 for details of 
demonstrations).   
5.2.2.3.4 Executive Function tasks 
 The executive function tasks were presented on a 17 inch screen laptop using E-
Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools Inc.) For the ‘Eyes’ and ‘Pictures’ tasks children 
made responses using two custom built button boxes. The top faces of the boxes were 
12cm x 14cm and they had a depth of 3.5cm at the back sloping to 2.5cm at the front.  A 
circular plastic button (diameter 2.5cm) was present on the top of each box. On the left-
hand box this button was blue and on the right-hand box this button was green. Responses 
in the counting recall task were made verbally. All tasks had a pseudorandom trial order to 
ensure that all children had a very similar experience. It also ensured that there were equal 
numbers of congruent and incongruent trials in the pictures and eyes tasks, and equal 
numbers of switch and non-switch trials in the eyes task. The pictures and eyes tasks had 
similar training procedures, where after receiving instructions children received four 
practice trials with feedback. Children were required to succeed on three out of four 
practice trials to proceed to the main task. If children did not reach this threshold they 
received additional sets of four trials until the criterion was reached. The maximum 
iteration that any child required was two sets. 
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5.2.2.3.4.1 Pictures task 
The pictures task (Burns et al., 2012, adapted from Davidson et al., 2006) gives a 
measure of inhibitory control and takes the form of a classic spatial Simon task. Children 
were first presented with two pictures (a monkey and a cat) which were paired with the 
two response buttons positioned in front of the participant. Children were instructed to 
press the left-hand (blue) button when they saw the cat and the right-hand (green) button 
when they saw the monkey. A small picture of each stimulus printed onto card was placed 
above the relevant response button so as to reduce memory demands. This was done to 
reduce extraneous variance allowing us to measure the variable of interest – inhibitory 
control. The task consisted of 20 trials in which the pictures were presented individually in 
a pseudorandom order on either the left-hand side or right-hand side of the computer 
screen. Half of the trials required a congruent response, such that the stimulus was 
presented at the same side as the response button, and half of trials were incongruent, 
meaning that the picture was presented at the other side to the response button (see Figure 
5. 2). The incongruent trials were the main source of interest as these allowed 
measurements of children’s ability to inhibit their prepotent response of pressing the 
response button on the same side as stimulus presentation. Accuracy and response times 
were recorded by the E-Prime software. To account for children merely pressing buttons or 
getting distracted, anticipatory responses, less than 200ms, were removed prior to analyses. 
Responses greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean were also removed, as per 
Davidson et al. (2006). A trade-off between accuracy and reaction time was calculated to 
give an overall processing cost for both the congruent and incongruent trial types. This was 
calculated by dividing each child’s mean reaction time (ms) by the proportion of correct 
responses such that larger scores equalled greater processing costs. The measure of simple 
inhibitory control used in subsequent correlational analyses was determined by the 
processing costs for the incongruent trials in comparison to the congruent trials that did not 
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require inhibition. We term this measure simple inhibition due to there being few other 
executive demands at play. 
 
 
Figure 5. 2 An example of a congruent trial (left) and incongruent trial (right) for the 
pictures task. 
 
5.2.2.3.4.2 Counting Recall 
The counting recall task measured children’s verbal working memory (Alloway, 
Gathercole, Gathercole & Pickering, 2000; Burns et al., 2012). On each trial children were 
presented with an array of red dots and blue squares on the laptop screen (see Figure 5. 3), 
and were instructed to only count the red dots. The arrays contained between 4 and 7 red 
dots. The array then disappeared and children were asked to verbally recall how many red 
dots they had counted. Children began by recalling one screen at a time, and succeeded in 
a block if they were correct on at least four out of six trials. If they reached this threshold 
they then proceeded to the next block in which each trial consisted of recalling the 
numbers of dots in two arrays, then three arrays and so on up to a maximum of five. Each 
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block consisted of 6 trials, and children needed to achieve 4 trials correctly to proceed, if 
children got the first four trials correct they proceeded automatically and were credited as 
achieving all 6 correctly. The test was terminated when children were incorrect on three 
trials within a single block or they had completed all of the available trials. The total 
number of correct trials was calculated as the dependent measure of working memory. 
Children received four warm up trials with feedback prior to starting the task. Two of the 
warm-up trials had one array and two contained two arrays. 
 
 
Figure 5. 3 Example of an array from the Counting recall task. 
 
5.2.2.3.4.3 Eyes Task 
 The eyes task (Burns et al., 2012) is an adaptation of Davidson et al.’s (2006) 
arrows task. The task has both inhibitory and task switching demands. The stimuli in the 
task were faces presented on the laptop screen. Faces could be presented on either side of 
the screen and had eyes that looked either straight downwards or downwards and across at 
a 45° angle (see Figure 5. 4). Children were instructed to press the button the eyes were 
looking towards. When the eyes looked downwards the response children were required to 
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give was congruent with the side of the screen where the face was presented. When the 
eyes looked across the screen the response was incongruent with the position the face was 
presented. To succeed on this task children must learn two rules, when the eyes are looking 
downwards they must press the button on the same side as the stimulus, and when the eyes 
are looking across they must press the button on the opposite side. Burns et al. found local 
switch costs indicating that children treated these as two separate rules and did not 
combine them in to one simpler rule, i.e. press where the eyes are looking, as one might 
expect. Children received 3 blocks of 20 trials; the first block contained all eyes looking 
downwards, the second block was all eyes looking downwards and across, and the third 
block was a mixture of the two. 
 Three measures were obtained from the eyes task; complex inhibition, local switch 
cost and global switch cost. The complex inhibition measure was obtained using the same 
method as the simple inhibition measure outlined in the pictures task, and provided a 
measure of the processing cost involved in responding to incongruent trials in comparison 
with congruent trials in the mixed block. In the eyes task this is termed complex inhibition 
due to the increased working memory demands, as unlike in the pictures simple inhibition 
task children were not provided with pictures of the relevant stimuli above the response 
buttons. Local switch cost refers to children’s ability to switch between different rules 
within the mixed trial block, that is switching between eyes downwards and eyes 
downward and across trials. The local switch cost measure is calculated by comparing 
performance on switch versus non-switch trials within the mixed block. As per the 
inhibition measures a processing cost was produced by dividing accuracy on each of the 
trial types by the proportion of correct trials. The difference between the processing costs 
for switch and non-switch trials was used as a measure of local switch cost. Global switch 
cost refers to the cost to children’s performance in the mixed block when they know that 
they might have to switch between rules relative to performance in the congruent or 
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incongruent blocks where no switching is required. Global switch cost was calculated by 
comparing processing costs for congruent trials that follow congruent trials in the mixed 
block to congruent trials following congruent trials in the congruent block, and similar for 
incongruent trials. An average of these two differences was then used as the global switch 
cost measure. 
 
 
Figure 5. 4 An example of a congruent trial (left) and incongruent trial (right) for the 
‘eyes’ task. 
 
5.2.3 Results 
Preliminary analyses revealed no gender differences for any of the tasks as such 
data were collapsed for all subsequent analyses. First we will report descriptive data for all 
tasks, before examining individual differences in task performance. 
5.2.3.1 Six Parts Test 
 Children achieved a wide range of scores of the Six Parts tests (see table 5.3). 
Children were able to score a maximum of 16 points on the task, and so the mean score of 
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7.65 means that children were not performing at floor or ceiling and provided a good 
spread of results. 
Table 5. 3 Six parts test mean scores. 
 Range Mean (standard deviation) 
Overall Score 2 - 15 7.65 (3.91) 
Number subtasks completed 1 - 6 3.95 (1.93) 
 
5.2.3.2 Counting Recall Task 
 Children provided a wide range of scores on the counting recall task (7 to 21, out of 
a possible maximum score of 30). The mean score achieved was 14.09 (standard deviation 
2.877), showing that there was a good spread of scores and that we were not seeing ceiling 
or floor performance. 
5.2.3.3 Hook Innovation Task   
 Just under half of children (47%) were successful in innovating a hook tool to solve 
the task prior to receiving any demonstration from the experimenter (see table 5.4). 
Unsuccessful children then received the endstate demonstration; following this first 
demonstration the majority of the children (76%) successfully manufactured the required 
tool. All four of the remaining unsuccessful children successfully manufactured the 
required hook tool following the second action demonstration. 
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Table 5. 4 Hook innovation task success levels 
 Success 
 No Yes 
Pre-demonstration 23 20 
After endstate demonstration 4 19 
After action demonstration - 4 
 
5.2.3.4 Executive Measures 
Table 5.5 presents the mean score for the counting recall task, plus the mean 
accuracy and reaction times for the different trial types on the pictures and eyes tasks. I 
will first compare the accuracies and reaction time measures within different tasks before 
going on to use the calculated processing costs in the correlation analyses.  
For the pictures task children were significantly more accurate, t (42) = 7.445, p< 
.001, Cohen’s d = 1.14, and faster at responding, t (42) = -6.205, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
0.95, on the congruent trials than on the incongruent trials. For the mixed block in the eyes 
task children were more accurate for the congruent trials than they were on the incongruent 
trials, t (42) = 5.290, p <.001, Cohen’s d = 0.81, but no significant difference was seen in 
the reaction times, t (42) = -1.722, p = .092. In the eyes mixed block children were more 
accurate, t (42) = -4.401, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.67, and quicker at responding, t (42) = 
6.774, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.03, on the non-switch trials than they were on the switch 
trials. Children were more accurate, t (42) = 17.824, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.72, and faster, 
t (42) = -5.027, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.77, in the eyes down (congruent) block than they 
were in the eyes across (incongruent) block. This finding appears to be driven by 
surprisingly poor performance for the eyes across block during which many children 
appeared to persist with the rule they had been using in the eyes downwards block.  
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Table 5. 5 Mean accuracies and reaction times for executive measures. 
 Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 Proportion Correct Response Time (ms) 
Pictures   
Congruent .90 (.11) 689.08 (139.61) 
Incongruent .67 (.19) 810.358 (140.88) 
Counting Recall 14.09 (2.88) - 
Eyes   
Mixed Block   
Congruent .85 (.15) 900.89 (223.66) 
Incongruent .63 (.26) 956.52 (304.51) 
Congruent following congruent .87(.19) 818.65 (223.00) 
Incongruent following 
incongruent 
.72 (.30) 885.84 (299.70) 
Switch .69 (.17) 1016.47 (273.92) 
Non-Switch .78 (.21) 844.55 (215.26) 
Eyes Downwards Block 
(matched trials) .95 (.11) 620.34 (192.76) 
Eyes Across Block 
(matched trials) 
.40 (.12) 768.09 (272.23) 
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Table 5. 6. Correlations between all measures (Partial correlations controlling for age 
and BPVS). 
 
 
Six 
Parts 
Simple 
Inhibition 
Counting 
Recall 
Complex 
inhibition 
Local 
Switch 
Cost 
Global 
Switch 
Costs 
Hooks 
Six Parts - 
 
-.058 
(-.098) 
-.014 
(-.032) 
.273 
(.328) 
.096 
(.084) 
.151 
(.177) 
-.073 
(-.161) 
Simple 
Inhibition 
 - 
 
-.343* 
(-.371)* 
.011 
(.039) 
.077 
(.079) 
.191 
(.207) 
.039 
(-.014) 
Counting 
Recall 
  
 
- 
 
-.233 
(-.185) 
.136 
(.042) 
-.190 
(-.130) 
.232 
(.152) 
Complex 
inhibition 
   - 
 
-.064 
(-.010) 
.669** 
(.658)** 
-.153 
(-.064) 
Local 
Switch Cost 
    - 
 
-.121 
(-.066) 
.116 
(.030) 
Global 
Switch Cost 
     - 
 
-.022 
(.057) 
 
Hooks       - 
 
*p< .05   **p < .01 
Chapter 5 
126 
 
5.2.3.5 Individual Differences  
 Correlations between all measures were conducted, this included: Six Parts Score, 
simple inhibition (Pictures task), complex inhibition (Eyes task), working memory 
(Counting Recall), local and global switch costs (Eyes task), and the hook-innovation task 
(see table 5.6). The scores for the simple inhibition, complex inhibition, and local and 
global switch costs were calculated as processing costs meaning that larger scores signified 
poorer performance. For the Six Parts test and the working memory test larger scores 
indicated better performance. For the hook-innovation task there were two possible 
outcomes, pass or fail. Significant correlations were found between simple inhibition and 
working memory (p =.024), and complex inhibition and global switch costs (p < .001). 
These correlations were still significant after controlling for age and BPVS-II performance 
(simple inhibition and working memory, p = .017; complex inhibition and global switch 
cost, p < .001). No other correlations between the executive measures were found.  Of 
most interest to the current study, none of the measures were found to significantly 
correlate with the tool-innovation measure. 
 
5.2.4 Discussion 
The main aim of the current study was to explore the relationships between 
executive functions and tool-innovation performance in children. Correlational analyses 
found no relationships between children’s ability to innovate a hook tool and their 
performance on any of the executive measures. We suggest that the difficulties children 
display in the domain of tool innovation are not due to limited capacity for a singular 
executive function. Based on the findings of this chapter we will later consider whether we 
are justified in retaining the conclusion that hook innovation might be an ill-structured 
problem. 
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In the current study children undertook a series of tasks measuring their executive 
abilities; inhibitory control, working memory, task switching, and performance on an ill-
structured task tapping all of these demands. None of these executive measures correlated 
with children’s performance on the hook-innovation task. Based on this finding we 
concluded that tool-innovation difficulty is not driven by a deficit in executive function 
when measured individually. However, we still think it likely that executive functions play 
a significant role in tool-innovation tasks as it is difficult to envisage a task analysis that 
does not involve executive function. Children must have to use their working memory 
during the tasks, if not they would be unable to keep in mind their goal and the strategies 
they have used and wish to employ. Children must have to use some form of inhibitory 
control, they have to inhibit irrelevant actions and stop what they are doing if they are 
using an incorrect strategy or technique. Similarly, if children are using the wrong strategy 
they must be able to switch to an alternative one. Executive functions surely play a 
significant role in enabling children to successfully innovate tools; however, results from 
the executive function battery indicate that none of the factors have proven to be a limiting 
step on children’s performance. 
We suggest the lack of correlation between tool innovation and the executive 
measures to be due to the ill-structured nature of tool-innovation tasks. Ill-structured 
problems have been defined as tasks that have information missing from either their start 
state, goal state or the transformation required to go between the two (Reitman, 1965) . 
Using this definition tool innovation is an ill-structured problem that is missing 
information about the transformation required to achieve the goal. To solve ill-structured 
problems solvers need to engage multiple executive functions all in conjunction with each 
other and this does not simply reduce down to the sum of its parts. Tasks may involve 
inhibition, working memory and switching, but measures of these constructs individually 
do not capture the process by which they are engaged in ill-structured tasks where they are 
Chapter 5 
128 
 
used in combination. Therefore, although none of the executive measures used in the 
current study correlated with tool-innovation performance, this does not necessarily mean 
that they are not engaged during tool-innovation tasks. Instead it means that we do not 
have the method to measure them accurately when they are used in combination.  
 One might question why, if tool innovation is an ill-structured task, it does not 
correlate with the ill-structured Six Part Test used in the current study. As stated above the 
general definition of an ill-structured problem is one that is missing information about the 
start state, goal state or transformations (Reitman, 1965). This wide definition of what 
constitutes an ill-structured problem means that ill-structuredness comes in many different 
shapes and forms. Whilst many ill-structured tasks may require some of the same 
executive functions to be deployed, these are likely to vary in amount and complexity. As 
such two tasks that require the same components of executive control may do so in varying 
amounts and therefore differ greatly in difficulty.  
In the current study we have compared two very different types of ill-structured 
problem. The hook-innovation task has a clearly defined start state (the apparatus and 
materials) and a clearly defined goal (retrieve the bucket to win the sticker). The ill-
structuredness of this task comes from the missing information regarding the 
transformation required to achieve the goal. The Six Part Test is much more open-ended. 
This task sets out the start state (3 different tasks, rules etc.) and sets constraints about 
legal transformations. The ill-structuredness of this task comes from the abstract goal that 
is set. Children are told that the goal of the task is to complete as much of the six tasks as 
they can within 5 minutes without breaking any of the rules. Although the goal is outlined 
for children it is not as concrete as the goal in the hook-innovation task. In the hook-
innovation task it is very clear for children that they have accomplished the goal as they 
will have retrieved their prize. In the Six Part Test children have nothing to gauge their 
success against, and may be unaware of any failings.  This can be seen more clearly if we 
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compare errors between these two ill-structured tasks. Children may be unaware that by 
breaking the order rule in the Six Part Test they have not achieved their goal; in contrast it 
is very obvious if children have not achieved their goal when innovating a tool as they will 
not have retrieved the target.  Due to these differences children did not perform 
comparatively on the two tasks despite them both being ill-structured problems. Although 
both may engage children’s executive abilities of inhibitory control, working memory and 
switching, they do so in varying amounts and in very different manners.  
5.3 Overall Chapter Summary 
 This chapter investigated the role of executive function in young children’s tool-
innovation difficulties. Experiment 5 concluded that difficulty could not be explained by 
children’s impulsive behaviour. In addition this experiment also ruled out lack of self-
directed exploration of the materials as a reason for children’s difficulty. In experiment 6 
executive function was investigated more fully with the use of an executive function 
battery. None of the executive measures were found to correlate with performance on the 
tool-innovation task. Despite a lack of correlation between hook innovation and the six 
part test we retain the suggestion that children’s difficulty is due to the ill-structured nature 
of tool innovation. Tool innovation requires multiple executive functions all in conjunction 
with each other but does not simply reduce down to the sum of its parts. As such, measures 
of individual executive components did not provide an indication of how well children 
might perform on these types of task.
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Chapter 6 
   
Why Can’t Children Piece Their Knowledge Together? The Puzzling Difficulty of 
Tool Innovation. 
 
This chapter in its current form is currently under submission as: 
 
Cutting, N., Beck, S. R., & Apperly, I. A. (under submission). Why Can’t Children Piece 
Their Knowledge Together? The Puzzling Difficulty of Tool Innovation. 
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6.0 Abstract 
Tool innovation – designing and making novel tools to solve tasks – is extremely 
difficult for young children. In the current studies we demonstrated different aspects of 
tool-making to children aged 4 to 6, to discover why this might be. In experiment 1 
(N=59), older children successfully innovated the means to make a hook after seeing the 
pre-made target tool only if they had had chance to manipulate the materials in a warm-up. 
Older children who had not manipulated the materials, and all younger children performed 
at floor. In experiment 2 (N=50), younger children’s poor performance was not explained 
by a failure to remember the manipulation warm-up. We conclude that children’s difficulty 
is likely to be due to the ill-structured nature of tool-innovation problems, in which 
components of a solution must be both generated and coordinated. Older children 
struggled with generating components of the solution but could co-ordinate them, whereas 
younger children could not co-ordinate components, even when explicitly provided.  
6.1 Introduction 
Tools are an essential part of everyday life; it is hard to consider how we might get 
through the day without them. It has long been argued that tools played a crucial role in 
human evolution (Gibson & Ingold, 1993), and as such we are argued to be the ultimate 
possessors of tool cognition. It is therefore unsurprising that young children are prolific 
tool users. Their tool-using capacity is evident from a young age, with children as young as 
2-years using simple tools such as spoons (Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989) and rakes 
(Brown, 1990). Despite being successful tool users and tool manufacturers following full 
instruction, children perform poorly on tasks requiring tool innovation, by which we mean 
creating a novel tool to solve a problem (Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie & Cutting, 
2011). In the current experiments we sought to discover why tool innovation might be so 
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difficult for children. Our strategy was to demonstrate different components of the task 
solution to see if this improved children’s performance. 
  Children’s tool-innovation difficulties have previously been demonstrated in a 
series of experiments requiring children to innovate the solution to a task in order to 
retrieve stickers (Beck et al., 2011; Cutting, Apperly & Beck, 2011; Cutting, Beck & 
Apperly, under submission). In these studies, children had great difficulty in generating the 
solution to bend a pipecleaner into a simple hook tool to retrieve a bucket from a narrow 
vertical tube. Children under the age of 5 rarely innovated the solution of a hook tool, and 
by the age of 8 only around half of children were successful on this task. This difficulty in 
tool innovation extends to making other tools using pipecleaners (Cutting et al., 2011), and 
to other materials and methods of tool making (Cutting et al., under submission). 
Previous research investigating children’s abilities has used the broad description 
that tool innovation is the making of novel tools to solve problems (Beck et al., 2011; 
Cutting et al., 2011). However, within this broad definition there are a number of 
potentially distinct components. In the current work, we distinguished between two types 
of tool innovation: innovation of the solution and innovation of the means required to 
succeed on tool-making tasks. Children were credited with innovating the solution to a 
task if they succeeded in making the required tool without having seen an example of that 
tool. This is what has been described as ‘tool innovation’ in previous research.  In the 
current studies, children were alternatively credited with innovating the means to solve the 
task if they had seen an example of the endstate tool they were required to create but had 
to generate how to make the tool for themselves. After initial failure at innovating the task 
solution Cutting et al. (under submission) showed 4- to 7- year olds an example of the 
endstate tool needed (a readymade pipecleaner hook). Success levels following this 
demonstration were low suggesting children may also have difficulty with innovating the 
means to solve tool-making tasks. In this previous research success following an endstate-
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tool demonstration was more broadly termed ‘tool manufacture’, but this current work 
makes a clearer distinction. Following previous research (Cutting et al., 2011) tool 
manufacture is now more strictly defined as the making of a tool having seen a full 
demonstration (i.e. having seen both the means and the solution).  
 What is most surprising about the findings that children find both types of 
innovation so difficult is that children appear to possess all the relevant knowledge 
required to solve these tasks. Children are familiar with the properties of the materials, for 
example the pliant nature of pipecleaners. In previous studies children received 
manipulation exercises in which they bent pipecleaners prior to being given the tool-
making task (Beck et al., 2011, experiment 3; Cutting et al., 2011, experiment 1). 
Manipulating the pipecleaner did not aid children on the subsequent tool-making tasks. 
This suggests that lacking knowledge about the properties of pipecleaners (or other 
materials) is not sufficient to explain children’s difficulty. 
Another possibility is that a sense of a lack of permission is a potential constraint 
on children’s tool innovation. To ensure children knew they had permission to alter the 
pipecleaners in the context of the main task, Cutting et al. (2011, experiment 2) told 
children to make something with the materials they were given. Again, this did not help 
children to innovate the solution to the task.  
As well as seemingly understanding the properties of pipecleaners and the fact that 
they are allowed to manipulate them, children also appeared to have the required 
knowledge about the physics of the problem they faced. In the hook-making task, children 
appeared to understand that a hook would be the most functional tool for the job: in a tool-
selection task children as young as four years old chose the hooked tool over the straight 
tool first, when their task was to retrieve a bucket from a vertical tube using pre-made tools 
(Beck et al., 2011, experiment 1). Furthermore, children could also recognize a functional 
tool when shown how to make one: After initial failure on the hook-innovation task 
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children readily manufactured a hook tool and used it correctly when shown a hook-
making demonstration (Beck et al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011). Note that children were 
only shown how to make the required tool; they were not given a demonstration as to how 
to use it. 
 Taken together this evidence suggests that children have the knowledge required to 
solve these tool-innovation problems. Children understand the properties of the materials 
they are given and are aware that they are allowed to manipulate them. Children 
understand the physics of the task and can recognize a hook as the most functional tool. So 
if children possess all of this knowledge why do they find tool innovation so difficult?  
One possibility is that children’s difficulty with tool innovation could be due to its 
ill-structured nature. Although there is no single agreed upon definition of what constitutes 
an ill-structured problem, a generally agreed upon framework is that an ill-structured 
problem is one that is missing information from its start state, goal state, or information 
regarding the transformation required to go between the two (Goel & Grafman, 2000). 
Following this definition tool innovation is an ill-structured problem:  children are given 
the start state (the apparatus and the materials) and told that the goal is to retrieve the 
sticker, yet they are given no information regarding how they should go about this task. 
Compare this to Beck and colleagues’ (2011, experiment 1) well-structured tool-selection 
task in which young children readily succeed. In this task children are given the start state 
(the apparatus and materials), the goal state (retrieve the sticker) and are given the choice 
between two possible means for effecting a transformation (use the straight pipecleaner or 
use the hooked pipecleaner). When information about the start state, goal and means were 
provided children found it trivially easy to retrieve the bucket. 
 The literature on ill-structured problems suggests that just having all of the 
individual items of domain knowledge is not sufficient to be successful in solving these 
types of problems (Chen & Bradshaw, 2007). Domain knowledge must be well-integrated 
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into what is termed structural knowledge to enable people to utilize it effectively 
(Jonassen, Beissner & Yacci, 1993). Structural knowledge is the knowledge of different 
concepts and how they relate to each other (Jonassen et al.). When people have well-
integrated structural knowledge they are able to represent problems more flexibly. This 
flexibility enables people to generate the required pieces of knowledge and successfully 
coordinate them. Some novices may possess all the relevant pieces of information, but 
only in experts is this knowledge integrated into structural knowledge that is flexible 
enough to solve the problem (Voss et al., 1986; Wineburg, 1998). 
 Applying this framework to tool innovation it is possible that although children 
undertaking these problems appear to possess all the knowledge required to solve the 
tasks, if this knowledge is not well integrated then they may still struggle to produce a 
solution. Children’s difficulty in these tool-innovation studies may lie with generating all 
the required pieces of information from memory, coordinating all of these different pieces 
of knowledge, or a combination of both. 
 From previous studies we know that highlighting the properties of the materials 
was not sufficient to elicit tool innovation at any age tested. Children were not aided in 
innovating the solution to the task when they were given a  warm-up manipulation exercise 
which highlighted information about the properties of the materials (Beck et al., 2011, 
experiment 3; Cutting et al., 2011, experiment 1).We also know that just seeing the 
endstate target tool that they were required to make, without any information regarding 
manipulation, was not sufficient to prompt children to innovate the means to make the tool 
for themselves (Cutting et al., under submission). This is particularly surprising given that 
children are able to see the utility of the end-state tool and select it to use themselves in the 
context of a tool-selection task (Beck et al., 2011, experiment 1).  
In the current experiments we investigated whether children were able to 
coordinate information and successfully innovate the means to make a tool if we 
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highlighted both the properties of the materials and the endstate tool required. By 
highlighting property information to half of the children before they attempted the task and 
then providing all children with an endstate demonstration after initial failure, we can 
begin to disentangle the minimum amount of information children required in order to 
successfully innovate a tool. Given previous findings we expected children who had 
information about material properties highlighted through the manipulation exercise to be 
no more successful in innovating the solution of a hook tool than children who did not 
receive the manipulation exercise. Second, if children failed to innovate the solution in this 
first stage we then compared the two groups on their ability to innovate the means to make 
the required tool following the endstate demonstration. Based on findings from Cutting et 
al. (under submission) we expected children in the no manipulation exercise condition to 
perform poorly following the endstate tool demonstration. This would demonstrate 
children’s difficulty with generating additional information. For children in the 
manipulation exercise condition examination of performance following the endstate tool 
demonstration allowed us to discover whether children could successfully coordinate 
information when it is highlighted. If children’s difficulty lies only with generating 
information we should expect to see successful coordination of information in children 
who experience having both information about properties and information about hooks 
highlighted for them (manipulation group). However, if children’s difficulty lies with 
coordinating information we should find that even if children have both pieces of 
information highlighted they will still be unable to solve these tool-innovation tasks. 
 We tested children in reception (aged 4 to 5 years) and year one (aged 5 to 6 years) 
classes as these children perform near floor on previous tool-innovation tasks, and thus 
there was room for significant improvement. 
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6.2 Experiment 7 
6.2.1 Method 
6.2.1.1Participants 
 The participants were 29 children aged 4 to 5 years (13 boys), mean = 4 years 1 
month (4;1), (range 4;1 – 5;1) and 30 children aged 5 to 6 years (17 boys), mean = 5;7 
(range = 5;2 – 6;1) from a Primary school in Birmingham, UK. The ethnic composition of 
the sample was 96% Caucasian, 3% Black and 1 % Asian. 
 
6.2.1.2 Materials  
For the manipulation exercise, we used a pipecleaner (length = 29cm), a pen, a 
piece of string (length = 29cm), and a template of an S-shape printed onto card. For the 
main task the apparatus was a clear plastic tube (length = 22cm, width of opening = 4cm) 
attached vertically to a cardboard base (length = 35cm, width = 21cm), a bucket containing 
a sticker, a pipecleaner (length = 29cm) and a piece of string (length = 29cm) (see figure 
1). The experimenter used an identical pipecleaner (length = 29cm) for the demonstrations. 
 
6.2.1.3 Procedure 
Before testing children were instructed by their class teacher not to tell other 
children how to play the games they would be playing with the experimenter to ensure 
they would be a nice surprise for everyone. All participants were tested by a female 
experimenter in a quiet area just outside the main classroom. The child and experimenter 
sat at right angles to each other at the corner of a table. Children were systematically 
allocated to either the manipulation or no manipulation group based on the teacher’s class 
list. 
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6.2.1.3.1 Manipulation exercise 
Children in the manipulation group received the exercise prior to being given the 
main task. We based the exercise on the procedure from Cutting et al. (2011). Children 
watched as the experimenter demonstrated actions with the string and pipecleaner (order 
counterbalanced), which the child then copied. The pipecleaner was wound around a pen, 
and then removed to demonstrate that it kept its shape. The string was laid over the 
template to follow the S-shaped pattern. 
 
6.2.1.3.1 Main Task 
Children were shown the vertical transparent tube with the bucket containing a 
sticker already in place in the bottom. They were told that if they could get the sticker out 
of the tube they were allowed to keep it. The experimenter then brought out the string and 
pipecleaner and told the child that these were things that ‘can help’ to get the sticker out. 
The children were then given one minute to try to retrieve the sticker. No feedback was 
given, but children were given neutral prompts if required. Examples of prompts used 
include ‘Can you think how you might be able to get the sticker out?’ and ‘Maybe you 
could use these things to help you.’ If, after one minute, the child had not retrieved the 
sticker, they were encouraged by the experimenter to put down the materials they were 
using. With the materials remaining on view in front of the participant, the experimenter 
then said ‘look at this,’ and brought out a readymade pipecleaner hook for the child to 
view (endstate-tool demonstration). The children were again encouraged to retrieve the 
sticker using their own materials. If after 30 seconds the child had not retrieved the sticker, 
they were told to put down their materials. With their materials remaining in view as 
before, the experimenter said ‘watch this’ and taking her own straight pipecleaner, held in 
the middle, bent one end to form a hook (action demonstration). Children were again 
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encouraged to use their own materials to retrieve the sticker. If children were still not 
successful in making the required hook tool they were given verbal prompts such as ‘Did 
you see what I did with mine?’ and then ‘Can you do that?’ 
 
6.2.2 Results and Discussion 
There were no effects of gender on level of success pre-demonstration (Fisher’s 
Exact Test, p > .999), or for success following the first endstate-tool, (χ² (1, N = 54) = 
0.081, p = .776), or second action demonstrations (χ² (1, N = 32) = 0.125, p = .723). As 
such, data were combined across gender for subsequent analyses. 
Children’s success at innovating the solution during their first exposure to the apparatus 
was examined to see whether the manipulation exercise facilitated their performance. 
Overall children were very poor during their first exposure to the task, with only 5 out of 
54 children successfully making a hook tool; all 5 children were in the older age group. 
Three of these children were in the manipulation group and 2 were in the no manipulation 
group, demonstrating no effect of condition, Fisher’s Exact Test, p > .999. This is in line 
with previous findings (Beck et al., 2011, experiment 3; Cutting et al., 2011, experiment 1) 
showing that manipulation of materials prior to the main task does not aid children in 
innovating the solution. 
Children who were successful on their first exposure to the task were excluded 
from subsequent analyses that compared success following the demonstrations. 
To investigate whether children were more successful following the endstate 
demonstration if they had received the manipulation exercise Chi-square analyses were 
used to compare children’s performance between the two conditions (manipulation vs. no 
manipulation). For the older age group, children were significantly more likely to make a 
hook tool following the endstate demonstration if they had received the manipulation 
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exercise, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .015 (see table 6.1). This suggests that children are able 
to coordinate the information if both pieces of information have been highlighted for them. 
No such difference was seen for the younger children, Fisher’s Exact Test, p > .999.  One 
interpretation of this is that the younger children’s difficulty is at least in part with 
coordinating the information to innovate the means to solve the task. However, the 
difference between the two age groups may be due to lower working memory capacity of 
the younger children. Perhaps younger children were unable to remember information that 
had been highlighted for them prior to them encountering the main task. We tested this  
possibility in experiment 2. 
 
 
For children requiring the second action demonstration, only around half were 
successful at innovating the tool needed (see table 6.1). Chi-square analysis revealed no 
difference in the levels of success for each group following the action demonstration for 
either the younger, χ² (1, N = 20) = 0.800, p = .371, or older children, Fisher’s Exact Test, 
p > .999. This level of success was lower than previously observed following similar tool 
manufacturing demonstrations and we return to this in the General Discussion.  
Table 6. 1 Frequency of children’s tool-making following different levels of instruction 
in Experiment 1. 
   Success 
Age 
Group 
(years) Condition N 
Before 
Demonstrations 
After  
endstate-tool 
demonstration 
After action 
demonstration 
4 to 5 
Manipulation 15 - 5 6 
 No 
manipulation 14 - 4 4 
5 to 6 
Manipulation 15 3 8 2 
 No 
manipulation 15 2 2 5 
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6.3 Experiment 8 
 In experiment 1 the 5-to-6-year-old children were successful in innovating the 
means to make the required hook tool, only if they had received both the manipulation 
exercise in which they manipulated a pipecleaner, and were shown an example of the pre-
made tool required to solve the task. Individually these pieces of information were not 
sufficient to elicit either the innovation of the solution (following the manipulation) or the 
innovation of the means (following the endstate-tool demonstration) required to solve the 
task. However, even when given both these pieces of information, 4-to-5-year-olds did not 
solve the task. In experiment 2 we tested whether younger children’s difficulty was due to 
them merely forgetting information that had been highlighted prior to them encountering 
the main task. We compared children’s behavior on the same manipulation version of the 
task from experiment 1 in which the manipulation information was given to children 
before they attempted the task and the endstate information given after initial failure (high 
memory condition), to a low memory version where children were given both the 
manipulation and endstate information together after children’s initial failure on the 
innovation task to minimize the chance of forgetting. 
 
6.3.1 Method 
6.3.1.1 Participants 
The participants were 55 children aged 4 to 5 years (27 boys), mean = 4; 7 (range 
(4; 2 – 5; 2) from an Infant school in Birmingham, UK. The ethnic composition of the 
sample was 97% Caucasian, 2% Black and 1% Asian. 
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6.3.1.2 Materials 
The materials were the same as in experiment 1, with the omission of the string and 
the S-shape printed onto card for the manipulation exercise. 
 
6.3.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested in a similar environment to that outlined in Experiment 1. 
Children were systematically allocated to either the low memory or the high memory 
condition alternately based on the teacher’s class list. We changed the manipulation 
exercise to involve only the pipecleaner, so that children were not provided with irrelevant 
information which may add to their memory load unnecessarily. Children in the high 
memory condition received the task as in the manipulation condition in experiment 1. 
Children in the low memory condition were given the apparatus and told to try and retrieve 
the sticker. If unsuccessful, these children were then given the pipecleaner manipulation 
exercise immediately followed by the endstate-tool demonstration. As in experiment 1, 
children in both conditions received the action demonstration if they failed to make the 
required hook tool in the 30 seconds following the endstate demonstration.  
 
6.3.2 Results & Discussion 
There were no effects of gender on level of success pre-demonstration, Fisher’s 
Exact Test, p = .340, or for success following the first endstate, χ² (1, N = 46) = 0.490, p = 
.484, or second action, demonstration, χ² (1, N = 32) = 3.802, p = .051. As such, data were 
combined across gender for subsequent analyses. 
As in experiment 1 very few children successfully made a hook tool on their first exposure 
to the apparatus. Only 4 out of 50 children successfully made the required hook tool, 2 
children in each condition. Using Chi-square analyses we next compared children’s 
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success at innovating the means to make a hook tool following the endstate demonstration 
for each of the conditions. We found no difference in success levels between the two 
groups, χ² (1, N = 46) = 0.107, p = .743 (see table 6.2), with only around a quarter of 
children successfully innovating the means to make a hook tool following the endstate 
demonstration. This suggests that children’s poor performance in experiment 1 cannot be 
explained by underdeveloped memory. 
 
Table 6. 2 Frequency of children’s tool-making following different levels of instruction in 
Experiment 8. 
 
  Success 
Condition N 
Before 
Demonstrations 
After  
endstate-tool 
demonstration 
After action 
demonstration 
Low Memory 25 2 7 5 
High Memory 25 2 6 9 
 
 
As in experiment 1 success following the second action demonstration was lower 
than reported in previous studies. Just under half of children who failed to innovate after 
the first demonstration were successful following this second demonstration, with chi-
square analysis revealing no difference in success between the two groups, χ² (1, N = 32) = 
1.245, p = .265. 
6.4 General Discussion 
In the current work we distinguished between innovation of the solution and 
innovation of the means required to solve tool-making tasks. Innovation of the solution 
refers to when children were able to come up with and make the tool they needed by 
themselves without seeing an example of that tool. Innovation of the means refers to when 
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children successfully made the tool needed to solve a problem after having seen an 
example of the tool required but not a demonstration of how to make that tool. The current 
findings suggest a series of limiting steps in innovation, with children getting stuck at 
different steps at different ages.  
Children at both ages were poor at innovating the solution needed to succeed on the 
task, even if they had information about pipecleaner properties highlighted for them. This 
demonstrates difficulty with generating information in both age groups. Older children 
were successful at coordinating information to innovate the means only if they had 
information concerning both pipecleaner properties and the need for a hook highlighted for 
them. However, even if both pieces of information were highlighted younger children still 
failed to successfully coordinate information and innovate the means needed to make the 
required tool.   
Overall, very few children spontaneously innovated the solution of a hook tool with 
either no additional information or just information about pipecleaner properties 
highlighted; all successful children were in the older age group. These results are in line 
with previous research demonstrating that young children have great difficulty in 
innovating the solutions to tool-making problems with either no additional information 
(Beck et al., 2011, experiment 2) or information highlighting pipecleaner properties (Beck 
et al., experiment 3; Cutting et al., 2011, experiment 1). 
Children’s ability to innovate the means to make a tool was tested following the 
endstate demonstration. Children were shown a pre-made pipecleaner hook, but were not 
shown how to make it. This enabled us to discover whether children could innovate the 
means to make the hook for themselves. Children in both age groups were extremely poor 
at innovating the means to make the hook tool following the endstate-tool demonstration if 
they had not had information regarding pipecleaner properties highlighted for them, i.e. 
children in the no manipulation group. Older children who had information regarding 
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pipecleaner properties highlighted were significantly more successful in making the 
required hook tool following the endstate demonstration than children who had not had 
pipecleaner properties highlighted for them. This suggests that if both pieces of 
information were readily accessible to older children they were able to successfully 
coordinate it in to a solution. Conversely, children in the younger age group displayed 
great difficulty in innovating the means to make the required hook tool even if they had 
both pieces of information highlighted for them. This suggests that younger children face a 
limitation in the domain of tool making in that they are unable to coordinate information 
even when it is highlighted. 
These findings from experiment 1 suggest that children’s difficulty with tool 
innovation could be due to problems with generating information. Children were unable to 
generate additional information when given certain aspects of the task. For example, 
children who received the manipulation exercise which highlighted the pliable property of 
pipecleaners were unable to generate information about hooks needed to allow them to 
innovate the task solution. Similarly, following the endstate demonstration, children in the 
no manipulation condition, were unable to generate information regarding the properties of 
pipecleaners and successfully innovate the means of bending the pipecleaner into a hook. 
Further evidence suggests progression in the way children between the ages of 4 
and 6 can use information to solve problems. Older, 5 to 6 year old, children could 
successfully coordinate knowledge in to a useful solution if they had both information 
about pipecleaner properties and information about hooks highlighted for them. However, 
even when given all the pieces of knowledge required, younger children faced a limitation 
and could not coordinate this information in to a useful solution. In experiment 1 children 
in the manipulation condition received information about pipecleaner properties prior to 
the task, and then information regarding the endstate tool they needed to achieve after 
initial failure, however these children were unable to coordinate this information and 
Chapter 6 
146 
 
combine it together to make the required tool. Only 5 out of 15 children were successful at 
making the hook tool following the endstate demonstration. In experiment 2 the possibility 
that children merely could not remember the information that had been highlighted was 
ruled out. Children in this experiment were not helped when all of the relevant pieces of 
information were highlighted just before they encountered the main task. Therefore, young 
children’s difficulty seems unlikely to be explained by underdeveloped working memory. 
Findings from both age groups fit with the suggestion that tool innovation is an ill-
structured problem that requires solvers to both generate and coordinate knowledge in 
order to solve a task. As younger children have difficulty with both of these steps it is 
unsurprising that they perform so poorly on ill-structured tool innovation tasks. 
Performance appeared to improve with age with 5- and 6- year olds being able to 
coordinate information in to a useful solution if it had been highlighted, but these older 
children still displayed great difficulty with generating this information for themselves. 
Regardless of how good children’s ability to coordinate knowledge is they can never 
succeed in solving the task if they are unable to generate the components of knowledge 
required. As such, we still see poor innovation ability in this older age group under some 
conditions (Beck et al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011). 
It is surprising that both age groups had difficulty in generating the required 
knowledge needed to innovate the solution as previous evidence suggests that children 
possess all of the individual pieces of knowledge required to solve this tool-innovation 
task. First, children recognized that a hook was a solution to the task. This is demonstrated 
in Beck and colleagues tool selection task (2011, experiment 1), in which children from 
the age of 4 understood the hook to be the most functional tool and chose it over a straight 
pipecleaner significantly more than chance. Furthermore there is a wealth of evidence 
showing that children can readily recognize a hook as a functional tool when shown how 
to make one. Without being shown how to use the tool children readily manufactured a 
Chapter 6 
147 
 
hook tool and used it correctly when shown a hook-making demonstration (Beck et al., 
2011; Cutting et al., 2011). Second, pipecleaners are readily accessible to young children 
in the UK and are used during craft sessions in both nurseries and infant schools. As such 
children are likely to possess knowledge about their pliant nature. Additional evidence for 
children’s knowledge of pipecleaner properties comes from the manipulation exercises 
children encountered prior to being given the tool-making tasks (Beck et al., 2011, 
experiment 3; Cutting et al., 2011, experiment 1). So if children possess all of this 
information why can they not generate it in the context of a tool-innovation task?  
Having domain knowledge may not be sufficient to solve ill-structured problems. 
To solve these problems knowledge must be well-integrated into what is termed structural 
knowledge. Only when we have structural knowledge can we represent problems 
effectively, and flexibly use this knowledge to solve them (Jonassen et al., 1993). The 
children in the current studies are novices. Although these children may possess all the 
independent pieces of knowledge the task requires, they do not have sufficient experience 
with the world and the materials to have integrated structural knowledge. We suggest that 
young children lack the flexibility needed to generate their knowledge from memory and 
then coordinate it in order to solve these tool-innovation tasks. 
Despite showing children’s difficulties in both innovating the solution and the 
means to solve tasks the current and previous work investigating children’s tool making 
(Beck et al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011) demonstrates children’s aptitude for learning from 
others. Many children successfully solved the task and manufactured the required hook 
tool following the second action demonstration. However, these current results show 
success levels lower than those reported following the same demonstration in previous 
studies. Previously nearly all children were successful following an action demonstration 
(Beck et al.; Cutting et al.), but only around half the children in these current experiments 
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were successful.  This could of course be due to the sample of children used, but there may 
be an alternative explanation.  
Children in these studies received two demonstrations from the same experimenter. 
For children requiring the second action demonstration the first endstate-tool 
demonstration proved to not be useful, as such these children may have subsequently lost 
faith in the experimenter as a source of useful information and therefore ignored 
information they were given in the second demonstration. Evidence from studies 
investigating children’s trust in informants suggests that children do not use information 
provided by a previously inaccurate informant (Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Nurmsoo 
& Robinson, 2009).  This finding needs to be explored further to discover whether 
incremental demonstrations may be detrimental to children’s learning about how to make 
tools. Discovering how children use sources of information is useful not only in this 
current line of work, but may have far reaching consequences in other domains where 
social learning occurs. 
Altogether, these studies show that young children have difficulty both innovating 
the solutions and innovating the means to solve tool-making tasks. Findings from both age 
groups suggest children’s main difficulty to be with generating their knowledge from 
memory. Younger children in these studies also displayed great difficulty with 
coordinating their knowledge.  As children develop and integrate their knowledge they 
first improve in their capacity to coordinate information, and can do so readily if all the 
information needed is highlighted for them. We suggest that as children develop further 
their knowledge will become more integrated. This will allow them to access and generate 
their knowledge more flexibly, and along with their ability to coordinate knowledge, 
enable them to solve these ill-structured tool-innovation tasks. 
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7.0 Overview 
 The research in this thesis aimed to discover the extent of young children’s 
difficulties innovating novel tools and investigated reasons why tool innovation might be 
so difficult. In this concluding chapter I will first briefly summarise the findings from each 
of the chapters and then discuss them in relation to each other and other literatures. I will 
also discuss the wider implications and make suggestions for future research. 
7.1 Chapter summaries 
7.1.1 Chapters 2 to 4: How robust are children’s tool-innovation difficulties? 
 Children’s tool making is an exciting new area of research. In these early chapters 
broad definitions of different types of tool making were used. The term tool innovation 
was used to describe the making of a novel tool to solve a problem, whereas tool 
manufacture was used to describe tool making following instruction. The work in this 
thesis was predominantly interested in children’s tool-innovation abilities.  
The main focus of chapter 2 was to replicate and extend Beck et al.’s (2011) novel 
finding that tool innovation is difficult for young children. Children were tested on Beck et 
al.’s hook-innovation paradigm as well as a new tool-making task that required children to 
innovate a straight tool from a bent pipecleaner required to push a ball out of a transparent 
horizontal tube. Children between the ages of 4 and 7 were tested and similar success 
levels to the previous work were found. Children’s difficulties were shown to extend to the 
new innovation task, although children did find this task comparatively easier. 
 Chapter 3 extended children’s tool-innovation difficulties even further. Children 
were tested on the same two pieces of apparatus used in chapter 2, but this time the 
required tool could be made by one of four different tool-making modes as defined by B. 
Beck (1980). This not only allowed for the testing of children’s innovation via different 
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modes of tool making, but also tested children’s ability to make tools from different 
materials. No differences in success levels were seen within each task for the different 
modes of tool making leading to the conclusion that contrary to suggestions from the 
animal literature (Kacelnik et al., 2006) there is no complexity hierarchy for different 
modes of tool making in human children. The main findings from chapters 2 and 3 are that 
tool-innovation difficulty is a replicable and robust finding that extends to various types of 
tool making. 
 Despite there being no differences in success levels between the different modes of 
tool making within tasks, differences were observed within the different tool-making 
modes across tasks. Using these additional analyses from chapter 3 as a basis, chapter 4 
further investigated the physical aspects of the task which may alter task difficulty. Three 
levels of tool-making were proposed: mode, transformation and action. As transformation 
and action covaried in chapter 3, chapter 4 separated these components in order to discover 
where task complexity might lay. Children were tested on tasks that required the same 
mode and transformation i.e. reshaping/unbending or subtracting/removal, but different 
specific actions. Children performed comparably on tasks requiring the same 
mode/transformation, but differences were seen between the different types (i.e. subtract 
and reshape). The specific action required made no difference to success. Taking the 
results from chapters 3 and 4 together, it was suggested that research in chapter 3 was 
focusing at the wrong level of tool making. Rather than focusing at the broad level of tool-
making mode, together these studies suggested that task difficulty was better categorised 
by the transformation that each tool-making episode requires.  
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7.1.2 Chapters 5 and 6: Why do children find tool innovation difficult? 
 Chapter 5 investigated whether executive function may play a role in children’s 
tool-innovation ability. Experiment 5 found that children’s task performance was not 
improved by a delay designed to prevent impulsive behaviour. Experiment 6 found that no 
singular executive function correlated with tool-innovation performance. Additionally no 
relationship was found between tool innovation and success on the ill-structured six parts 
test. Originally designed to test the proposal that tool innovation is an ill-structured 
problem, a lack of relationship does not necessarily dispute this proposal.  It is possible 
that these two tasks could both be ill-structured yet show no relationship due to differences 
in their composition. Individual executive components may be required in differing 
amounts making it difficult to directly compare the two tasks. As such we retained the 
suggestion that the difficulty of tool innovation is due to it being an ill-structured problem. 
Ill-structured problems require the solver to generate solutions for themselves. This 
involves multiple executive functions in conjunction with each other and does not simply 
reduce down to the sum of its parts. 
 Building on this, chapter 6 aimed to discover which aspects of tool innovation 
make the task particularly difficult. Various aspects of the task solution were demonstrated 
to children in order to discover where difficulty may lay. Five- to six-year-olds were 
shown to be competent at coordinating knowledge when it was highlighted for them, but 
had difficulties in generating this knowledge for themselves. In contrast, younger children 
could not coordinate knowledge even when all aspects of the task solution were 
highlighted for them. 
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7.2 Discussion of General Findings  
7.2.1 Are some tool-innovation tasks harder than others? 
 First, different elements of the task were manipulated to ensure that difficulty was 
not a product of the task design. Issues relating to permission and pragmatics were ruled 
out in experiments 1 and 2. Second, physical aspects of the tasks were manipulated, such 
as the apparatus and the type of tool required. Experiments 1 and 2 found low success 
levels in a new and seemingly simple task requiring children to unbend a pipecleaner to 
make a long straight tool. However, this task was found to be significantly easier than the 
hook bending task, a finding that has been replicated in all studies where both of these 
tasks were used. This difference in success levels led to the question of why some tool-
innovation tasks may be easier for children to achieve than others. 
 Experiment 3 compared different types of tool making that used different materials. 
Using the vertical-tube apparatus from the original hook-making task and the horizontal-
tube apparatus from the unbending task we tested children’s ability to innovate tools using 
B. Beck’s (1980) four different modes of tool making: detaching, subtracting, adding and 
reshaping. With the exception of detaching which we concluded was not a true test of tool 
making; no differences between the different tool-making modes were found on each of 
the tasks. Children found all tool-making modes equally difficult and performed poorly. 
Experiment 4 built on these findings and compared different tasks in more detail. Taken 
together, the results from chapters 3 and 4 led to the suggestion that rather than 
categorising difficulty of tool-making tasks based on B. Beck’s modes, difficulty is better 
categorised by the transformation that is required. This means that rather than categorising 
tasks based on a mode such as reshaping which is broad in its definition, we should 
categorise tasks on the precise transformation within that mode, i.e. we should group all 
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unbending reshaping tasks together and these differ in complexity to the bending reshaping 
tasks.  
These findings provide a useful framework in which we can categorise and make 
predictions about the complexity of different tool-making tasks. This is useful not only in 
work such as this on human children’s tool making but also in the comparative literature. I 
will return to this point more fully in section 7.4.  
Using the finding that transformation is an important determinant of tool-making 
complexity as a basis, further work now needs to determine what exactly makes one 
transformation more difficult than another. This thesis presents findings that an unbending 
transformation is easier to achieve than a bending transformation (experiments 1-3), and 
that unbending is also easier than removal (experiment 4). In experiment 3 it was 
speculated that differences in success levels following an endstate-tool demonstration 
could be due children’s ability to recognise the relationship between the endstate-tool they 
are shown and the raw materials they possess. The transformation required to achieve the 
endstate-tool from the raw materials may be clearer to see in some cases than others. 
Following experiment 3 it was suggested that higher success levels following 
demonstration in the horizontal-tube task for the add compared to the subtract mode of tool 
manufacture may have been due to the obviousness of the transformation. For the add 
mode the transformation was to join together three identical pieces of dowel to make a 
long stick, whereas in the subtract mode the transformation required was to remove a small 
piece of dowel from a larger more prominent piece. The transformation in the add mode 
would have been clearer for the child to see and therefore an easier transformation to 
execute. To fully understand tool-making complexity we need to untangle these 
differences further and investigate which elements of a transformation make it easier or 
harder for children to achieve. 
  
Chapter 7 
155 
 
7.2.2 What do children need to know in order to make a tool? 
Throughout this thesis various studies have directly or indirectly addressed the 
question of what children need to know in order to be able to make a tool. Experiments 1 
and 2 demonstrated that showing children an action demonstration in which they saw the 
tool they needed to make and how to make it, was sufficient to induce tool manufacture on 
the hooks and unbending tasks (see also Beck et al., 2011 for similar evidence for the 
hooks task). Experiment 1 replicated the findings of Beck et al. (Experiment 3) that 
demonstration of the means alone was not sufficient to elicit tool making in children. In 
these studies children received a warm-up in which they manipulated the pipecleaner. 
Highlighting the means by which the tool was required to be made did not aid children on 
the subsequent task. Chapters 3 to 5 used a two-stage demonstration procedure in which 
after initial failure children saw a demonstration of the endstate-tool they needed to 
achieve. For the majority of children seeing an example of the tool they needed to make 
without having information highlighted as to how to make that tool was not sufficient to 
enable them to make that tool for themselves. Taken together the research from chapters 2 
to 5 suggests that in order to successfully innovate novel tools children must have 
knowledge regarding the tool they are required to make and knowledge of the means to 
make that tool. Neither piece of knowledge by itself was sufficient to elicit tool making, 
but when given together, as in the action demonstration, children were highly successful. 
 Evidence from experiment 4 suggests there is a third required factor for children’s 
successful tool innovation. In order to successfully complete tool-innovation tasks children 
must also understand the means to use a tool they have created. Evidence from Beck et 
al.’s tool-selection task demonstrates that children as young as 4 were able to choose a 
hooked tool to complete a task and were successful in using it to achieve their goal. 
Therefore in our tool-innovation tasks requiring the making of a hook, we can safely 
presume that children had no difficulty in knowing the means to use the hook tool once 
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they had made it. However, evidence from experiment 4 suggests that in some cases 
children may be able to successfully make a tool but then lack the knowledge to use that 
tool effectively. A previously unseen behaviour was encountered in experiment 4 where in 
the indirect tasks the majority of children correctly made the required tool following the 
end-state tool demonstration, but did not then go on to use the tool correctly to retrieve the 
target. Children needed to be prompted in how to use the tool to complete the task. This 
finding shows that as well as understanding what tool is needed to solve a task and the 
means to make that tool, children must also understand how to use the tool. It could be the 
case that in the hook tasks the means to use the tool was simple for children because they 
had good experience and knowledge of using hooks. Alternatively once children had made 
the tool following the demonstration it could have been that the number of options as to 
what they could do with their tool in relation to the task apparatus were minimal therefore 
making the correct means to use the tool very obvious. In contrast the indirect tasks in 
experiment 4 were more complex in terms of the apparatus design. There were more 
degrees of freedom in what one could do with a tool they had made as there were two 
potential entrances in to which the tool could be inserted. This greater complexity could 
explain why children did not know how to use their tool. A tool selection task using the 
indirect apparatus could help to confirm this.  
In summary we suggest there to be three components of knowledge that children 
require in order to make a tool. First, they must know what tool is needed to solve the task. 
Second, they must know the means to make that tool. Finally, they must know how to use 
the tool once it has been made.  
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7.2.3 Tool Innovation is an ill-structured problem. 
 Throughout this thesis I have argued that tool innovation is an ill-structured 
problem. In this section I will bring together the evidence to support this. There are two 
strands of research in to ill-structured problem solving, both of which are relevant to this 
current work. The first strand of research provides a general framework for ill-structured 
problem solving and suggests the difficulty of these problems to be due to the need to both 
generate and coordinate knowledge. The second strand of research focuses on the 
executive control that is required for this generation and coordination of knowledge. 
 Based on Reitman’s (1965) definition tool innovation is an ill-structured problem. 
Children are given information about the start and goal states but there is information 
missing about the transformation required to achieve the goal. Children must generate the 
information regarding the required transformation for themselves and then coordinate it in 
to a useful solution. 
Experiment 7 concluded that the main difficulty faced by 4-to-6-year-olds was the 
requirement to generate knowledge needed to solve the task. That is, children must 
generate knowledge about the tool that is needed, the means to make that tool and the 
means to use the tool. Previous studies have demonstrated children’s ability to easily 
generate knowledge about how to use hooks and so experiment 7 focused only on the 
generation of information about the tool required and the means to make the tool. Even if 
knowledge about either the required tool or the means to make the tool was highlighted, all 
children in this age range had great difficulty in generating the additional information 
required to solve the task.  
Experiment 7 found development between the ages of 4 and 6 in the way children 
could use information to solve problems. When all of the relevant information was 
highlighted children aged 5 and above could successfully coordinate the information in to 
a useful solution. However, even when information regarding pipecleaner properties 
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(means to make tool) and the need for a hook (tool required) were highlighted, the younger 
children failed to coordinate this information in to the required solution. Similar findings 
for children not being able to use information that we know they have has been reported by 
Brown (1990). Drawing on her own work and that of Bates, Carlson-Luden, and 
Bretherton (1980), Brown described the inconsistencies in infants’ abilities based on their 
understanding of contact. Habituation paradigms show an understanding for the need of 
contact between 5 and 7 months, yet at 10 months infants were unable to use this 
knowledge to solve a tool-use problem unless the objects were already touching. Even by 
13-to-18-months children could not succeed on such tasks unless they had received a 
demonstration, that is they could not envision the contact solution for themselves. These 
studies together with those reported in this thesis support suggestions in the ill-structured 
problem solving literature that having domain knowledge is not sufficient to be successful 
on problem solving tasks (Jonassen, Beissner & Yacci, 1993). Knowledge must be well-
integrated into structural knowledge that can be flexibly generated and coordinated in 
order to solve problems. Although the infants in Brown’s studies and the children in the 
current tool-innovation studies appeared to have all the required knowledge to solve the 
given tasks, these findings suggest that this knowledge was not established enough to 
enable them to successfully generate it in the context of the tasks. As infants or children 
gain more experience and knowledge, the information they possess becomes better 
integrated and children are able to access it more readily.  
 To generate and coordinate pieces of information requires multiple executive 
functions such as working memory – one must remember the goal, inhibition – one must 
inhibit irrelevant information, and task switching – one must switch between alternative 
strategies. Each of these executive functions is used in conjunction with each other and 
does not simply reduce down to the sum of its parts. Throughout this thesis various aspects 
of executive control have been investigated, and together the evidence supports this view.   
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In experiments 1 and 2 perseverative tendencies and the ability to switch between 
different task solutions were ruled out as possible limiting factors for children’s tool-
innovation difficulties. In experiment 5 inhibitory control was explored in more detail 
through a paradigm created to test children’s impulsivity. Preventing children from acting 
impulsively did not aid tool-innovation performance. This provides further evidence that 
inhibitory control is not a limiting factor for children’s abilities. Finally, in experiment 6 
an extensive executive function battery was conducted alongside a tool-innovation task. 
None of the executive measures were found to correlate with tool-innovation performance. 
Taken together these studies suggest that tool-innovation difficulty cannot be explained by 
a deficit in a singular executive function. Tool innovation is not simply an inhibition task 
or a working memory task. Tool innovation requires multiple executive functions and none 
of those tested have been found to be a limiting factor on children’s performance. 
 The main focus of research investigating ill-structured problem solving and 
executive function comes from the study of frontal lobe patients. Deficits in ill-structured 
problem solving have been found in patients who perform at an otherwise normal level on 
traditional executive function measures (Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Goel, Pullara & 
Grafman, 2001). Recent advances have discovered that patients showing this divergence in 
abilities have damage to an area of the frontal lobe known as Brodmann Area 10 (Burgess, 
Dumontheil & Gilbert, 2007). Brodmann Area 10 has been demonstrated to have 
protracted maturation between the ages of 5 and 11 (Dumontheil, Burgess & Blakemore, 
2008). This taken together with evidence of improved tool-innovation performance 
between these ages further adds to support for the suggestion that tool innovation is an ill-
structured problem. 
To date there is very little other research on children’s ill-structured problem 
solving. Studies that do investigate children’s ill-structured problem solving abilities differ 
to tool-innovation tasks in the way they are ill-structured. Tool innovation is ill-structured 
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because there is a lack of information regarding the transformation required to move from 
the start state to the goal state. In contrast tasks such as the six parts test (Emslie, Wilson, 
Burden, Nimmo-Smith, Wilson, 2003) are ill-structured due to the goal state being ill-
defined. It is possible that no relationship was found between hook innovation and the six 
parts test in chapter 6 due to this difference in the way the tasks are ill-structured. To my 
knowledge tool innovation is the first task for children that is ill-structured due to a lack of 
information regarding transformation. As such results from tool-innovation tasks could be 
the first to show the development of this type of ill-structured problem solving ability in 
children and it would be interesting to see if difficulties extend to other ill-structured 
domains. In particular it would be interesting to see if children’s abilities in other domains 
requiring innovation follow the same developmental trajectory demonstrated in this thesis. 
Additionally the categorisation of tool-innovation tasks as ill-structured problems opens up 
the possibility that these tasks could be useful in the testing of Dysexecutive syndromes 
such as patients with frontal lobe damage and children with autism. White, Burgess and 
Hill (2009) tested children with autism on traditional executive function tasks and more 
open-ended ill-structured tasks. Similar to the findings of frontal lobe patients (Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991), White et al. found that autistic children performed comparably to controls 
on traditional executive tasks but performed significantly worse on the ill-structured 
measures. Tool-innovation tasks have the potential to be a new measure for testing the 
abilities of autistic children. 
7.3 A Model for Tool Innovation 
 Bringing together the components discussed above I would like to suggest a model 
outlining the process by which children are able to innovate the solutions for tool-making 
problems (see Figure 7. 1). I will take the innovation of a hook tool as an example to 
illustrate the model. To innovate the solution of a hook tool children need to generate the 
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knowledge of what tool is needed (a hook), the means to make that tool (bending pliable 
pipecleaners) and how to use the tool (enter in to tube, and pull up bucket from handle). 
Once children have generated these pieces of knowledge they need to coordinate them in 
to the required solution. To generate and coordinate all of this knowledge requires multiple 
executive functions in conjunction with each other. Children must use their working 
memory to hold in mind the goal and the relevant pieces of information as they generate 
them, they must inhibit irrelevant information and naïve theories, and they must switch 
between different solutions when their initial ideas prove to be incorrect.  
 Experiment 7 suggested the main difficulty for children was to generate 
information. The results of this experiment do not enable us to tell whether there was a 
difference in difficulty for generating knowledge about the tool needed or knowledge 
about the means to make the tool. When either of these pieces of information were 
highlighted individually success levels were at floor, giving no indication of a difference 
between them. Coordinating information was found to be easier for children than 
generating information. Children in the older age group in experiment 7 successfully 
coordinated information if all the relevant pieces were highlighted. Coordination was 
difficult for the younger children even if the information was highlighted suggesting that 
capacity for coordination may develop between 5 and 6 years old. Further work needs to 
be done to establish which stages of this model are the most difficult to achieve. However, 
at this stage I would like to suggest that to successfully innovate a tool solution children 
must use their executive abilities to generate and coordinate their knowledge of what tool 
is needed, the means to make that tool, and how that tool should be used.  
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Figure 7. 1 A model for tool innovation 
 7.4 Contribution to Non-Human Animal Literature 
This thesis provides the first series of studies investigating human children’s tool 
making. Due to this fact the majority of the background literature that has informed the 
current work has come from the non-human animal literature. Since Goodall first reported 
chimpanzees using twigs to fish for termites in the 1960s there has been a huge interest in 
non-human animal tool use and tool making. The work in this thesis has suggested new 
ways of thinking about tool making and has provided new definitions and frameworks in 
which we can categorise and compare tool-making behaviours across species. The main 
contribution this thesis makes is to introduce new definitions for different levels of tool 
making. This is important as it enables us to directly compare different types of tool-
making behaviour across a variety of species. By applying the framework of definitions set 
out in this thesis across different fields larger and more direct claims about different 
findings can be made.  
This thesis proposes tool making to be split in to three different levels: innovation 
of the tool solution, innovation of the means to make a tool, and tool manufacture. 
Innovation of the tool solution refers to when one must make a tool without having seen an 
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example of the tool they are required to make. This requires the maker to generate 
information about the type of tool that needs to be made, the means to make it, and how to 
use it to achieve their goal. Innovation of the means refers to when one has seen an 
example of the tool they need to make but have to generate the means to make that tool for 
themselves, and also know how to use that tool. Tool manufacture refers to where one 
makes a tool following instruction that demonstrates what tool needs to be made and how 
to make it. In the studies in this thesis children were required to work out the means of 
how to use the tool for themselves as no demonstrations of how to use the tools were 
given2. Under this current definition a demonstration showing how to use the tool would 
also be termed tool manufacture. Although not addressed in this current work, further 
consideration needs to take place to determine whether these two types of tool manufacture 
should be separated in to two separate terms to generate even finer definitions of tool-
making behaviour. 
Using these new definitions allows us to directly compare tool-making behaviours 
more precisely. If we take for example the hook-making behaviour of Betty the crow 
(Weir, Chappell & Kacelnik, 2002) and compare it to the hook-making abilities of young 
children, at first it would appear that Betty was outperforming the children. However, by 
more carefully defining different levels of tool making it is clear that these studies are not 
directly comparable. In the child studies no information was given about the tool required 
or the means to make the tool, as such these children were required to innovate the solution 
of a hook tool. In contrast in the corvid study Betty had had previous experience with a 
hook tool, and one was actually present at the time of testing (although her partner Abel 
had flown off with it!). This means that Betty had information about the tool she needed 
                                                     
2 Exceptions to this can be found in chapter 4 where verbal prompts about how to use the made tools were 
given to children. 
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but not information about how to make one, as such Betty innovated the means to make a 
hook tool. 
To my knowledge there are no studies investigating non-human animals’ ability to 
innovate the solution in tool-making studies. Under the definitions laid out in this thesis 
tool-making studies with animals focus on the ability to innovate the means or investigate 
abilities for tool manufacture. In many studies animals first engage in a familiarisation 
phase where they get to interact with the apparatus and a suitable tool before being given 
unsuitable ‘tools’ they need to modify. For example, Visalberghi, Fragaszy and Savage-
Rumbaugh (1995) first gave capuchin monkeys and great apes a straight stick tool with 
which to retrieve a reward from a tube before giving them the bundle and H-shape stick 
conditions which required modification. As the primates had seen an example of the tool 
required, this task tests ability for innovating the means to make a tool. In Bania et al.’s 
(2009) study investigating chimpanzees’ abilities for subtraction and adding the 
experimenter gave the chimpanzee a demonstration of how to assemble or disassemble a 
tool before each trial. As such this study tested the ability of chimpanzees to manufacture 
tools. 
 As these examples demonstrate, clearer definitions of different tool making levels 
enable us to make more precise comparisons of tool-making behaviour. They also 
highlight gaps in the comparative literature, as there are no studies investigating abilities 
for innovating the solution to tool making studies. 
 The work in this thesis has also advanced the work in the non-human literature by 
making suggestions about the determinants of tool-making complexity. Studies of non-
human primates have reported differing success levels within participants and species on 
different tool-making tasks. For example, Bania et al. (2009) found that chimpanzees were 
much more successful at subtracting than they were at adding, and Visalberghi et al. 
(1995) found great apes to be better on tool-making tasks than capuchin monkeys. 
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However, researchers do not address why these differences might be seen. At present 
researchers investigating non-human animal tool making have primarily focused on 
cataloguing tool-making behaviour (B. Beck, 1980; Schumaker, Walkup & Beck, 2011). 
This is undoubtedly a crucial first stage of investigation, but I would argue that as well as 
understanding who can do what, we also need to understand why they can do it and why 
some tool-making behaviours are easier than others. This thesis makes the first steps in 
understanding the complexity related to different aspects of tool-making behaviour. An 
understanding of tool-making complexity will allow us to predict different species’ 
capacities in the domain of tools, which in turn can help to inform us about the evolution 
of our own tool-rich culture. 
7.5 Social Learning 
 The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate children’s tool innovation, 
however as this ability was demonstrated to be poor these studies have produced a rich 
data set concerning children’s observational learning of tool making. Experiments in this 
thesis provide evidence for children’s abilities to make tools via imitation and emulation. 
Imitation occurs when a model’s goal is recognised and reproduced using the same 
specific actions used by the model (Tomasello, 1990). Children imitate the production of a 
tool in the current studies when they manufacture a tool following the action 
demonstration. Emulation occurs when an observer recognises and reproduces a model’s 
goals but does not use the specific actions demonstrated by the model (Tomasello).  In the 
current studies endstate emulation is observed when children make a tool following an 
endstate-tool demonstration. Children do not see the actions required to make the tool but 
can emulate the tool solution by innovating the means to make that tool for themselves. 
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7.5.1 Imitation of tool making  
First, it is important to note that when children were given the opportunity for 
observational learning in the current studies they only received demonstrations of how to 
make the required tool. None of the studies in this thesis included a demonstration of how 
to use the tool. These are the first studies to investigate the social learning of tool making 
all other studies on children’s tool behaviour have focused on the learning of tool use. In 
line with previous results from Beck et al. (2011) children in experiments 1 and 2 
demonstrated great aptitude for learning about tool making from others. Following an 
action demonstration where children were shown what tool to make and how to make it 
success levels were near ceiling. These results add to evidence that children are excellent 
social learners for tool-related behaviours. Previously, children have been shown to imitate 
tool use from the age of two (Nielsen, 2006). This thesis shows that children readily 
imitate tool-making behaviours, with evidence from Beck et al. (2011) demonstrating this 
in children as young as 3 years old. It is possible that younger children may also be able to 
imitate tool-making behaviours but as yet we do not have evidence to support this. A 
potential difficulty in testing younger children’s abilities is that although they may 
understand how to make a tool, young children may lack the dexterity to do so, making it 
difficult to test them. Together the findings from this thesis along with evidence from tool-
using experiments support suggestions from the social learning literature that humans are 
adapted for learning from others and readily imitate a model’s actions (Csibra & Gergely, 
2009; Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2009; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini & Hopper 
2009). 
 Success levels following the action demonstration from experiments 7 and 8 are at 
odds with the suggestion that children are excellent imitators. Children were much less 
successful following the action demonstration in these hook-making studies than they had 
been previously. One potential reason for this finding could be due to children’s lack of 
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trust in the model. Studies investigating children’s trust in informants support this 
suggestion. Nurmsoo & Robinson (2009) found that when looking for a hidden toy in 
collaboration with a puppet, children were more likely to ignore the puppet’s suggestion 
and guess for themselves if the puppet had previously been inaccurate. Similarly, 3-to-4-
year-olds lost faith in an informant following inaccuracy in word and object-function 
learning tasks (Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008).  In experiments 7 and 8 children who 
reached the action demonstration phase had already received an endstate-tool 
demonstration from the experimenter. It is possible that because the information the 
experimenter gave them in this endstate-tool phase had proved insufficient to help them in 
the task, children then lost faith in the experimenter as a reliable source of information, and 
therefore did not to use the information the experimenter gave them in the action 
demonstration.  
More research in to children’s behaviour following different accuracies of 
demonstrations could provide us with more knowledge of how children learn from others 
and who children choose to learn from. In particular, this could guide us in understanding 
how tool-making methodology spreads within groups.  Would children always go to the 
experts or group leaders? Or would they be willing to learn new tool-making skills from 
older children and those less skilled? Evidence to date suggests that children prefer models 
who are held in high esteem (Laland, 2004) and have a good track record of being accurate 
(Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009). Children have also been shown to have preference for adult 
over child models (Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken & Tomasello, 
2010), although they will flexibly consider accuracy over age (Jaswal & Neely).  
It would be interesting to see how children learn from their peers when there are no 
adults to guide their behaviour. It may be that a hierarchy of individuals based on their 
knowledge state emerges. These are important factors in the transmission of new skills that 
could help us to understand the evolution of human tool behaviour. Recent diffusion chain 
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studies have shown that children faithfully transmit behaviours along a chain (Flynn & 
Whiten, 2008; Horner, Whiten, Flynn & de Waal, 2006). Diffusion chain methodology 
involves children being set a task, usually an artificial fruit (a puzzle box that can be 
opened by removing a number of defences), which they are then shown how to complete. 
Once the child has successfully retrieved their reward they then demonstrate the task to the 
next child and so on. Horner and colleagues seeded two chains of children with different 
methods to retrieve a reward on the same task. They found that children remained faithful 
to the method they observed, with fidelity at 100%. 
Flynn and Whiten (2010) used open diffusion to see how behaviours spread more 
naturally. In this study children were first allowed to interact with an artificial fruit 
individually with no instructions or modelled demonstration, this was to give children time 
to acquire information about the apparatus. The apparatus was then placed in the 
classroom so that all children had access to it. Children discovered the two different 
methods for retrieving the reward during the individual phase, but quickly converged onto 
a single method during the open diffusion. This demonstrates children’s ability to learn 
from others and how behaviours become normalised within groups. This study provides 
some insight into how children learn from each other and how behaviours spread. 
However, this task was comparably easier than the tool-innovation task, with over half of 
children succeeding in the initial phase. As such there were plenty of models to enable 
behaviours to spread quickly. It would be interesting to see how behaviours spread in a 
more difficult task such as tool innovation. Flynn and Whiten reported collaboration in 
their study and it is possible that this may be observed more when a task is harder to 
achieve. 
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7.5.2 Emulation of tool making 
 In experiments 3 to 8 we introduced a two-stage demonstration procedure where 
after initial failure on the tool-innovation phase of the task children first received a 
demonstration of the endstate-tool they needed to make. If children were not successful in 
making a tool following this demonstration they then proceeded on to the action 
demonstration which was conducted as in the previous experiments. As noted above the 
endstate-tool demonstration was designed to test whether children could innovate the 
means to make the shown tool for themselves. Under the social learning literature 
definitions this would be endstate emulation, i.e. could children emulate the goal of 
producing the required tool?  
Results from experiments 3, 7 and 8 showed that young children (aged 4 to 6) were 
poor at emulating the goal and innovating the solution for themselves. Children get better 
at emulation with age, with 6-to-8-year-olds in experiment 6 performing well after the 
endstate-tool demonstration. This is in line with the suggestion of Want and Harris (2002) 
that children become able to emulate when they have better causal understanding of the 
task. Children are only able to emulate if they understand the causal mechanisms involved, 
if not children need to imitate the actions they have seen to achieve the goal. Looking at 
success levels across studies the results suggest young children to be more successful at 
making tools via imitation than they are by endstate emulation.  This would support 
suggestions in the social learning literature that have shown two-and-a-half-year-olds to be 
more successful in completing a task following social conditions where they saw a model 
performing the correct action only or saw the correct action and the endstate, than when 
they saw the endstate only (Call, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2005). In the current tool-
making studies there has not yet been direct comparison of these two types of 
demonstration. A study where half of the unsuccessful innovators received the endstate-
tool demonstration and half received the action demonstration would help to confirm the 
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suggestion that children are more successful at imitation than emulation and corroborate 
Call et al.’s results. 
 These studies provide the first evidence for children’s aptitude for social learning 
in the domain of tool making. Together with the vast evidence for children’s abilities to 
learn how to use tools from others these findings add to evidence to suggest that humans 
have adapted for social learning (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). This suggestion is more fully 
explored in the next section. 
7.5.3 Evolution of Human Cumulative Culture 
  Human culture is unique. No other species has such a diverse culture that 
encompasses a huge range of behaviours including technology, language and social 
institutions (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Whiten, 2011). Culture is defined as behaviour that 
is learned by all members of a group, is faithfully transmitted between individuals 
(Tomasello, Kruger and Ratner, 1993) and is not the product of genetic or environmental 
changes (Boyd & Richerson, 1996). Cultural variation refers to differences between groups 
due to differences in the behaviours that have spread within them. Cultural variation has 
been reported in a diverse range of species from chimpanzees (McGrew, 1992) to lizards 
and fish (Lefebvre & Palameta, 1988). Cultural variation can be seen between different 
chimpanzee populations in terms of behaviours such as tool use and grooming (see Whiten 
et al., 1999 for an extensive review). However, cumulative cultural evolution is very rare. 
Most culture produces behaviours that individuals could learn by themselves. In contrast 
cumulative culture evolution produces behaviours that individuals would be unable to 
invent individually.  Boyd and Richerson argue that cumulative culture exists only in 
humans, songbirds and possibly chimpanzees. However in birds cumulative culture is 
limited to their songs (Boyd & Richerson) and Whiten (2011) suggests that examples of 
chimpanzee cumulative culture are rare and do not compare to behaviours seen in humans. 
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Recently there has been much speculation about what makes the cumulative evolution of 
human technological culture unique. 
 Tomasello et al. (1993) argued that human cumulative culture has been possible 
due to what they term the ‘ratchet-effect’. One generation starts off by doing something 
one way, which is transmitted by social learning to the next generation. This next 
generation faithfully copies these processes but modifies them to make them more 
efficient. This new process is then transmitted to the next generation who make their own 
modifications and so on. Over time this means significant changes are made that allow 
human culture to evolve. The ability of humans to achieve this ratchet effect is thought to 
be due to faithful transmission; as such the current focus of cumulative culture research is 
on differences in social learning ability between different species, most notably between 
humans and our nearest relatives, chimpanzees.  High fidelity transmission ensures that all 
the required information is passed on. Humans have been demonstrated to be faithful 
imitators from infancy (Meltzoff, 1988) through to adulthood (McGuigan, Makinson & 
Whiten, 2011). The current work on children’s abilities to learn how to manufacture tools 
from others adds to the wealth of research in this area.  
Differences between human and chimpanzee social learning are argued to be the 
reason for differences in our abilities for cumulative culture (Tomasello et al., 1993; 
Tomasello, 1999).When learning new behaviours humans focus on the body actions of the 
model, that is they copy the processes to achieve the goal as well as the goal itself (Tennie, 
Call & Tomasello, 2009). This fidelity means that rather than ‘reinventing the wheel’ each 
time a subject encounters a task they can use information they have gained from others as 
a starting point. In contrast chimpanzees focus on the physical effects or outcomes. 
Chimpanzees copy the product rather than the process. By failing to imitate the process 
needed to achieve a goal chimpanzees are at a disadvantage. Chimpanzees may be 
successful in creating the product but they have to innovate the means to create their goal 
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from scratch each time, this requires greater cognitive capacity and is more time 
consuming.  
 Cumulative cultural evolution requires innovation as well as faithful transmission 
(Caldwell, Schillinger, Evans & Hopper, 2012; Tomasello, 1999). Successful transmission 
is of course important for the spread of behaviours, but behaviour is unable to evolve 
without innovation. There is a vast literature on the social learning and transmission of tool 
behaviours, but there is a gap in the literature when it comes to innovation. Innovations 
have been reported in other domains such as food preparation and threat displays. Japanese 
macaques have famously been reported to wash sweet potatoes (Kawai, 1965), and 
chimpanzees in from Gombe adopted a new aggressive gesture in the form of wrist 
shaking following an innovation from one individual (Kummer & Goodall, 1985). 
Innovations are difficult to study, especially ones that occur naturally as it is difficult to 
establish whether the behaviours observed are truly novel (Ramsey, Bastian & van Schaik, 
2007). 
This thesis provides the first evidence for the development of children’s innovation 
abilities in the domain of tool making. These studies have clearly demonstrated that 
innovation is a difficult and late-developing ability. It has been speculated that this could 
be due to the ill-structured nature of tool innovation that places huge demands on 
executive functions. The difficulty of innovating a tool for oneself could explain why 
humans have a great aptitude for learning from others. New innovations are rare and as 
such it is vital that they are spread through social learning as individuals are unlikely to 
discover them for themselves. The faithful transmission of innovations ensures that new 
adaptions are kept and that culture is able to evolve.  However, perhaps human adaptation 
for social learning has come at a cost to our ability to innovate. Young children are brought 
up in a culture where learning from others via both observational learning and teaching are 
the norm. It is possible that this over-reliance on others for knowledge prevents children 
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from innovating for themselves. Until we have a greater understanding of the process by 
which innovations are made we will be unable to fully understand how human culture 
evolved. Social learning is undeniably important for the transmission of culture but 
without innovation evolution could not have occurred. This thesis makes the first steps in 
understanding the difficulties involved in innovation, and provides a solid basis on which 
future research can progress. 
7.6 Future Research 
 Children’s tool making is a new and exciting area of investigation. As such there 
are many possible avenues for future study. In the various sections above I have made 
some suggestions for future research. I will summarise the major suggestions in this 
section alongside some additional thoughts. 
 This thesis suggests the complexity of tool-making problems is due to the 
transformation of materials that is required rather than the broader level of tool-making 
mode as previously suggested (Kacelnik et al., 2006). I have speculated that some of the 
differences in success levels seen between different tasks may be due to how obvious the 
transformation required is. For example making a tool by removing a large piece of 
material will be much clearer to recognise than if only a small piece of material needed to 
be removed. At present this suggestion is merely based on observations of the different 
tasks, but this suggestion could be tested empirically.  
Another possible reason for differences seen between different transformations 
could be due to ‘undoing’ being easier than ‘doing’. For example in the unbending task a 
pipecleaner which would usually be presented straight is bent in half, therefore you must 
‘undo’ what has been done to it to make the required tool. In the case of hook making the 
pipecleaner comes in its ‘natural’ form and you must ‘do’ something to it to make a tool. It 
seems plausible that ‘undoing’ something and putting it back to its natural state might be 
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easier to achieve than ‘doing’ something to a raw material. There are of course more 
possibilities as to what one can ‘do’ with something, but limited ways in which to ‘undo’ 
it. All of this of course relies on the recognition that the material is not in its natural state 
in the case of ‘undoing’. The suggestion that ‘undoing’ might be easier than ‘doing’ is 
supported by anecdotal evidence that some children in the unbending task automatically 
straightened the pipecleaner, returning it to its ‘natural’ state, with little outward evidence 
that they knew they needed to do this for the task. Investigation of more tasks that involve 
‘doing’ versus ‘undoing’ could test this suggestion. 
 Research investigating cumulative culture suggests that culture evolves due to 
collaboration (Tennie et al., 2009). Cumulative culture results in innovations and 
inventions that one individual could not arrive at by themselves (Boyd & Richerson, 
1996). Based on this suggestion it would be interesting to discover whether children 
perform better on tool-innovation tasks if they have the opportunity for collaboration. This 
could take the form of a structured group activity where children are set the challenge of 
innovating a tool to win a reward either in pairs or small groups. Children have been 
shown to collaborate from a young age. Warneken, Lohse, Melis and Tomasello (2010) 
reported successful collaboration in problem solving tasks for children as young as 3 years. 
Furthermore, children appeared to recognise the contribution of their collaborator as they 
tended to share rewards equally. Supporting suggestions regarding cumulative culture, 
collaboration has been shown to create greater levels of success than participants could 
achieve individually in the domains of mathematics (Mullins, Rummel & Spada, 2011) 
and route planning (Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989). Mullins et al. suggest that when learning 
mathematics collaboration aids students as they are required to verbalise their thoughts and 
explanations which makes them more explicit. This elaboration helps to progress learning. 
An alternative design would be to see how long and by what means children are 
able to solve a tool-innovation problem if it was left in a communal area over time so that 
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all members of a group (e.g. a class) had full access to the problem. As well as showing us 
how innovations may develop this would also give opportunity to discover how new 
innovations spread amongst a group through social learning. Flynn and Whiten (2010) 
noted that the majority of studies in to the social learning of tool use use a dyadic design, 
where imitation of behaviours is assessed following a demonstration from a single model. 
Although some skills may be learnt in this way, they propose that the majority of 
behaviours are more likely to be learnt following multiple demonstrations from a number 
of models, with the learner having numerous attempts at the task themselves. Using a more 
naturalistic study design we will be able to discover how innovations are discovered and 
transmitted throughout a group. Children might imitate following direct observation, 
alternatively they may emulate the result if they come across someone else’s premade tool. 
This study design would also allow us to see if children will teach each other once they 
have discovered a solution. Open diffusion such as this has been tested in children on tool-
use experiments where the aim is to open an artificial fruit to retrieve a reward (Flynn & 
Whiten, 2010. See also Flynn & Whiten 2008; Whiten et al., 1996 for more structured 
diffusion chains using an artificial fruit). Flynn and Whiten found evidence of imitation, 
collaboration and teaching in their tool using study. It would be interesting to discover 
whether these would also be found in a more complex task requiring tool making. 
Learning how to use tools is important, but to discover more about human tool evolution 
more research needs to uncover the processes by which individuals learn how to make 
tools. 
 The current research has suggested that children should have all the required 
knowledge needed to solve tool-innovation problems but lack the ability to generate this 
knowledge in the context of the task. One way in which this suggestion could be tested is 
to investigate children’s implicit knowledge. Research on gesture has found that before 
children are able to explicitly pass tasks they often demonstrate understanding of task 
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components through their implicit gestures (Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986). Using 
Piagetian conservation tasks Church and Goldin-Meadow found that many children 
answered the conservation questions incorrectly but made spontaneous gestures that 
corresponded with the correct answers. These gestures were thought to convey implicit 
knowledge that the child had but was unable to explicitly verbalise. On other tasks children 
who spontaneously produced gestures containing solution relevant information were found 
to be more receptive to later instruction than children that did not produce relevant 
solutions in their gestures (Church & Goldin-Meadow; Alibali & Goldin-Meadow, 1993; 
Perry, Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1988).  
In more recent work Broaders, Wagner Cook, Mitchell and Goldin-Meadow (2007) 
actively encouraged children to gesture whilst completing maths problems. They found 
that children elicited implicit knowledge about the tasks through their gestures despite 
being unable to solve them explicitly. However the children whose gestures revealed 
implicit understanding were more likely to benefit from instruction in a follow-up session. 
This study concluded that gesture plays a causal role in learning. This argument is based 
on evidence that gesturing enables learners to express their implicit knowledge; in turn this 
implicit knowledge makes children more likely to learn from instruction. 
Gestures are also argued to highlight and help structure information (Alibali, 
Spencer, Knox & Kita, 2011). As well as gaining insight in to which children are on the 
verge of solving tool-making tasks, gesture may also help children to succeed. It has been 
argued that gesturing whilst problem solving reduces cognitive load (Goldin-Meadow, 
Nusbaum, Kelly & Wagner, 2001). This has been documented in adult studies looking at 
gear movement problems (Alibali et al, 2011), and maths and word learning studies with 
children (Goldin-Meadow et al.). Gesture may be a useful medium with which to gain 
more knowledge about what children understand in tool-innovation problems, and also to 
gain understanding of methods that can be used to progress children’s abilities. 
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Anecdotally I have observed gestures during tool-innovation tasks that suggest 
children may have implicit knowledge about the tasks. In one particular example a 3-year-
old girl gestured a hook shape by drawing it in the air, although she was unable to 
successfully make a pipecleaner hook to complete the task. Asking children to gesture 
whilst explaining how they intend or how they tried to solve the task following failure may 
help to identify children who are on the cusp of being able to solve tool-innovation 
problems. Gesture may also aid children in solving tasks following demonstrations. It 
would be interesting to see if children who implicitly portray correct solutions in their 
gestures are more successful following the endstate-tool demonstration than children who 
do not show implicit knowledge in their gestures.  
7.7 Conclusions 
 This thesis contains the first series of studies to investigate children’s tool making. 
In contrast to the vast literature demonstrating children’s impressive abilities for tool use, 
this work concludes that there is a divergence in children’s abilities in the domain of tool 
making. Children have demonstrated a great aptitude for learning how to make tools from 
others, a finding that fits well with social learning literature investigating tool use which 
suggests humans to be well adapted for learning from others. In contrast, children display 
great difficulty in innovating a novel tool for themselves. Children’s difficulties in tool 
innovation have been shown to be a robust phenomenon spanning several tasks and tool-
making methods. This thesis takes the first steps in discovering what determines the 
complexity of different tool-making episodes, suggesting that research should focus on the 
transformation needed. Throughout this thesis it has been argued that the difficulty of tool 
innovation is due to its ill-structured nature. This concluding chapter amalgamated the 
evidence for this suggestion drawing on different problem solving literatures to support 
this view. Finally, this thesis provides much needed structure to the human and non-human 
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tool behaviour literatures by providing new definitions and frameworks with which to 
describe and test behaviours seen both in the wild and the laboratory. 
 Recently, there has been great interest in discovering why human tool behaviour is 
unique and how our cumulative culture has evolved. Innovation is a vital component of 
cumulative culture, yet it has been neglected in favour of the study of social learning. This 
thesis provides the first evidence for the development of innovation ability and 
demonstrates that innovation is a difficult and late-developing capacity. The fact that 
‘reinventing the wheel’ for oneself is comparatively difficult could help to explain why 
humans have become such proficient social learners. Both innovation and social learning 
are clearly important for the evolution of tool culture and both have the potential to be the 
limiting step in this evolution.  Current researchers have focused on examining the 
differences in social learning behaviours between human and non-human primates but 
more attention should focus on different species’ abilities to innovate. Tool innovation is 
cognitively demanding and could be the key component that makes human tool culture 
uniquely complex. 
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